# 章燎原 · Zhang Liaoyuan — 封面档案 ACF-01-00168

> 亚洲封面人物 Asia Cover Figure · 机器可读档案（LLM-ready）。本文件由官网结构化档案数据自动生成，供 AI 检索与引用。中文全文与英文全文对照编排。

## 档案元数据 Metadata

- 封面编码 ACF Code：**ACF-01-00168**
- 姓名 Name：章燎原 / Zhang Liaoyuan
- 职务 Title：创始人、董事长兼CEO / Founder, Chairman & CEO
- 公司 Company：三只松鼠股份有限公司 / Three Squirrels Co., Ltd.
- 篇别 Category：商界逆行者（列传篇 / Biographies (Liezhuan)）
- 入档日期 Accessioned：2026-02-24
- 标签 Tags：电商品牌, 流量觉醒, 供应链重构, 国民零食, 代工转型, 量贩零食冲击
- 永久档案链接 Archive URL：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00168/liezhuan
- English archive：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00168/liezhuan?lang=en
- 官网原文报道 Feature story：https://coverfigure.com/acf/figure/zhangliaoyuan

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## 卷首 Editorial Intro

一个没有高中毕业证的年轻人，凭借什么在五年内将一个五人团队带入百亿营收的轨道？又是什么原因，让一个已经站在行业巅峰的品牌，在上市之后遭遇业绩断崖式下跌，迫使创始人亲手发起一场"断腕式"的自我革命？这两个截然相反的问题，共同构成了章燎原与三只松鼠故事的核心张力——也是理解中国消费品牌从流量红利走向供应链深水区的一条关键线索。

章燎原的创业起点低得几乎没有悬念。十九岁离开安徽绩溪老家，在食品行业摸爬滚打十余年，从车间工人做到区域经理，二十七岁时已经对休闲食品从生产到终端的每一个环节烂熟于心。然而他真正令人惊讶的能力，在于当整个行业都在追逐线下渠道的规模扩张时，他敏锐地捕捉到了电商时代的品牌空白。二〇一二年，他用五万元借款和五个人的团队，在淘宝上开出了一家零食店——这个品牌后来叫三只松鼠。在随后六年里，它从一个淘宝店铺成长为年营收超百亿的国民零食品牌，创造了中国互联网消费品领域增速最快的商业奇迹。

然而故事并未在此收束。上市之后的三只松鼠遭遇了严峻的增长困境，业绩从巅峰期急剧下滑。章燎原面对这一局面的选择，决定了他作为企业家的真正成色：他选择了最痛苦的那条路——从品牌运营商向供应链深度参与者转型，砍掉低效品类，重建成本结构，将过去依赖流量驱动的增长模式改造为供应链能力驱动。这场"断腕式"变革的走向与结果，正是亚洲《封面人物》杂志独立编委会将其纳入档案体系的核心关切。编委会认为，章燎原完整呈现了中国互联网品牌从"流量红利"到"供应链深水区"转型的全过程样本。

终身档案编码已为其生成，独立编委会评审通过，永久存证于亚洲封面人物档案库。核心标签：互联网零食品牌开创者、流量到供应链的转型样本、草根创业的典型代表、中国消费品渠道变革的亲历者与推动者。

In the evolutionary history of Chinas consumer industry, the story of Three Squirrels has textbook-like cautionary significance. In 2012, when e-commerce traffic costs were still dirt cheap, a man from Anhui opened a Taobao nut store in a shabby warehouse in Wuhu with 50,000 yuan and 5 employees. Seven years later, this store had grown into the National Snack First Stock with annual revenue exceeding 10 billion yuan, with market cap briefly surpassing 30 billion. However, just when everyone thought this was a narrative of eternal victory for internet brands, reality delivered a cruel reversal: revenue declined for four consecutive years, from 10 billion to 7.1 billion; net profit halved from a peak of 400 million to under 200 million. This is not a simple business failure story, but a profound parable about path dependence. The traffic empire Zhang Liaoyuan built over ten years was essentially a castle built on borrowed land—when platform traffic dividends faded and bulk snack brands adopted direct procurement plus white-label customization models to bypass brands and reach consumers directly, Three Squirrels painfully realized: traffic is borrowed wings, supply chains are your own legs. The cost of this awakening has been brutal, but the awakening itself has value.

## 人物速览 Lead

他从一个连高中都没毕业的辍学青年，到用5人团队、5万借款创建年营收百亿的零食帝国，再到业绩断崖式下跌、被迫进行“断腕式”供应链革命。章燎原与三只松鼠的故事，是中国互联网品牌从“流量红利”走向“供应链深水区”的完整缩影——用十年证明流量是借来的翅膀，又用痛苦觉醒证明：只有供应链才是自己的腿。

From a high-school dropout to building a 10-billion-yuan snack empire with a 5-person team and 50,000-yuan loan, then facing a cliff-like performance decline forcing a limb-severing supply chain revolution. The story of Zhang Liaoyuan and Three Squirrels is a complete epitome of Chinas internet brands moving from traffic dividends to supply chain deep waters—proving in ten years that traffic is borrowed wings, and painfully awakening to the truth: only supply chains are your own legs.

## 正文 Archive Chapters

### 1. 草根逆袭：从街头混混到区域销售冠军 / Grassroots Reversal: From Street Hustler to Regional Sales Champion

1976年，章燎原出生于安徽绩溪一个贫困家庭。少年时期的章燎原叛逆不羁，初中辍学后南下东莞打工，进过电子厂、摆过地摊、卖过盗版碟，最惨的时候兜里只剩5毛钱，连馒头都买不起。他蹲在路边，看着来来往往的豪车，心里憋着一股火：“凭什么别人能开宝马，我连饭都吃不上？”这种底层挣扎的经历，锻造了他后来对消费者心理的深刻洞察和对商业机会的敏锐嗅觉。18岁时，表哥花3000元请他吃饭，用矿泉水给他洗手，旁边捡瓶子的中年人刺痛了他，从此决心创业。此后他尝试了卖服装、卖冷饮、开饭馆、跑摩的等近20种生意，无一成功。

2003年，27岁的章燎原偶然看到一本营销书，突然开了窍。他跑到安徽詹氏食品有限公司应聘销售，没学历、没经验，人家不要。他死皮赖脸地求：“让我干三个月，不要工资，干不好我自己滚！”老板心一软，留下了他。结果他白天跑市场，晚上啃营销书，三个月后业绩冲到全公司第一。在詹氏的九年时间里，章燎原从一线搬货送货的业务员做起，历任销售经理、营销总监、董事总经理，深耕坚果行业，深谙传统快消品的营销逻辑。这段经历赋予他双重能力：一方面理解传统食品行业的运作方式，另一方面切身体会到体制僵化、层级冗余的痛点。

2011年，章燎原在詹氏期间主导创建网络坚果子品牌“壳壳果”，较早试水电商渠道。这段经历虽未大成，但积累了宝贵的电商运营经验——深刻理解平台规则、流量逻辑、用户数据和线上消费者行为特征。2011年底，章燎原离开詹氏食品，决心独立创业。此时的他已形成清晰战略认知：要用互联网的方式重做一遍坚果生意。他后来回忆说：“一个新时代来了，电商有五年机会，五年之内，可以成就一个互联网电商品牌。”

值得注意的是，章燎原在詹氏期间展现出的不仅是销售能力，更是一种对行业的系统性思考。他在董事总经理任上推动了詹氏从传统批发渠道向现代零售渠道的转型，同时敏锐地观察到互联网对食品行业的潜在颠覆。他在内部会议上多次提到：“传统食品企业的层级太多，从工厂到经销商到终端，每一层都在加价，消费者最终付出的价格远高于产品本身的价值。如果我能去掉中间环节，让消费者直接对接工厂，就能创造巨大的价值空间。”这种思考，后来成为三只松鼠商业模式的核心理念。

**English:** In 1976, Zhang Liaoyuan was born into a poor family in Jixi, Anhui Province. In his youth, Zhang was rebellious. After dropping out of junior high, he went south to Dongguan to work—entering electronics factories, setting up street stalls, selling pirated DVDs. At his worst, he had only 50 cents left and couldn't even afford steamed buns. He squatted by the road, watching luxury cars pass, burning with frustration: 'Why can others drive BMWs while I can't even eat?' This experience of grassroots struggle forged his later profound insight into consumer psychology and keen sense of business opportunities. At 18, his cousin spent 3,000 yuan on a dinner for him, washing hands with mineral water while a middle-aged bottle collector nearby stung him, sparking his determination to start a business. He tried nearly 20 ventures—selling clothes, cold drinks, running restaurants, motorcycle taxis—none successful.

In 2003, 27-year-old Zhang Liaoyuan stumbled upon a marketing book and had an epiphany. He applied for a sales position at Anhui Zhan's Food Company. With no degree or experience, they refused him. He pleaded: 'Let me work three months without pay; if I don't perform, I'll leave myself.' The boss relented. He ran markets during the day and devoured marketing books at night; within three months, his performance ranked first company-wide. Over nine years at Zhan's, Zhang rose from a frontline loader and delivery worker to sales manager, marketing director, and board director, deeply cultivating the nut industry and mastering traditional FMCG marketing logic—channel management, brand promotion, supply chain management. This experience endowed him with dual capabilities: understanding traditional food industry operations while personally experiencing institutional rigidity and hierarchical redundancy.

In 2011, while at Zhan's, Zhang led the creation of online nut sub-brand 'KeKeGuo,' pioneering e-commerce channel exploration. Though not a major success, this accumulated valuable e-commerce operational experience—deeply understanding platform rules, traffic logic, user data, and online consumer behavior. In late 2011, Zhang left Zhan's Food, determined to start his own business. By then, he had formed clear strategic cognition: redo the nut business using internet methods. He later recalled: 'A new era has arrived. E-commerce has a five-year opportunity; within five years, you can build an internet e-commerce brand.'

Notably, during his time at Zhan's, Zhang demonstrated not just sales ability but a systematic thinking about the industry. As board director, he pushed Zhan's transformation from traditional wholesale channels to modern retail channels, while keenly observing the internet's potential disruption of the food industry. He repeatedly mentioned in internal meetings: 'Traditional food companies have too many layers—from factory to distributor to terminal, each adding cost. Consumers ultimately pay far more than the product's inherent value. If I can remove intermediate links and let consumers connect directly with factories, I can create enormous value space.' This thinking later became the core philosophy of Three Squirrels' business model.

### 2. 流量时代的完美捕获：从5人到百亿帝国 / Perfect Capture of the Traffic Era: From 5 People to a 10-Billion Empire

2012年2月16日，章燎原带领5人初始团队在安徽芜湖创建三只松鼠品牌。此时的中国电商行业正处在爆发前夜——淘宝商城正式更名为天猫，平台大力培育“淘品牌”。章燎原精准地捕捉到了这个风口，将公司定位为“互联网食品零售企业”，专注坚果类产品线上销售。创业第二天即获IDG资本150万美元天使投资，创中国农产品电商天使投资规模纪录。

三只松鼠的崛起速度令整个行业震惊。2012年“双十一”，成立仅5个月的三只松鼠首次参战，就以766万元单日销售额登顶天猫坚果零食品类冠军，刷新了天猫食品行业单店日销售额最高纪录。此后连续六年蝉联天猫食品/坚果类目销售额第一，成为天猫食品领域的“七冠王”。

品牌的差异化运营是成功的关键。章燎原团队打造的三只松鼠IP形象，以可爱的松鼠造型拉近了与消费者的距离。那句标志性的“主人”称呼，打破了商家与消费者的传统边界，建立起独特的情感连接。连快递箱都做成“松鼠窝”，随包裹附赠开箱器、果壳袋、湿巾，每一处细节均为线上场景量身定制。这种“无历史包袱”的组织状态，使三只松鼠比传统品牌更快、更彻底地拥抱电商规则。

财务数据清晰地记录了爆发式增长：营收从2012年约3000万元飙升至2015年20.43亿元，连续三年保持超100%增速。期间获IDG资本、今日资本、峰瑞资本等多轮融资。2019年，三只松鼠营收突破101.73亿元，成为国内首个营收破百亿的零食品牌。同年7月12日，顶着“国民零食第一股”光环成功登陆深交所创业板。从创立到百亿营收，仅用了7年。

IDG资本的150万美元天使投资，创下了当时中国农产品电商天使投资规模纪录。IDG资本合伙人李丰后来回忆说：“章燎原给我印象最深的，是他对线上消费者的理解深度。他能准确地告诉你，一个网购用户在搜索坚果时的心理路径是什么，详情页应该怎么设计才能提高转化率，甚至快递箱的胶带应该用多宽才能降低退货率。这种颗粒度的运营思维，在当时的食品行业几乎是独一无二的。”正是这种对电商运营每个细节的极致追求，使三只松鼠在竞争激烈的淘品牌中脱颖而出，迅速成为坚果品类的绝对王者。

**English:** On February 16, 2012, Zhang Liaoyuan led a 5-person founding team to create the Three Squirrels brand in Wuhu, Anhui. China's e-commerce industry was on the eve of explosion—Taobao Mall was officially renamed Tmall, and the platform was vigorously cultivating 'Taobao Brands.' Zhang Liaoyuan precisely captured this trend, positioning the company as an 'internet food retail enterprise,' focusing on online nut sales. On the second day of founding, it received a 1.5 million USD angel investment from IDG Capital, setting a record for China's largest agricultural e-commerce angel investment.

Three Squirrels' rise speed shocked the entire industry. During the 2012 'Double 11,' Three Squirrels, just 5 months old, debuted with 7.66 million yuan in single-day sales, topping Tmall's nut snack category and setting a new record. It subsequently held the Tmall food/nut category sales championship for six consecutive years, becoming Tmall's 'Seven-Time Champion' in food.

Differentiated brand operations were key to success. Zhang's team-created Three Squirrels IP, with cute squirrel imagery, closed the distance with consumers. The iconic 'Master' address broke traditional merchant-consumer boundaries, establishing unique emotional connections. Even shipping boxes were designed as 'Squirrel Nests,' with box openers, shell bags, and wet wipes included, every detail custom-designed for online scenarios. This 'no historical baggage' organizational state enabled Three Squirrels to embrace e-commerce rules faster and more thoroughly than traditional brands.

Financial data clearly recorded explosive growth: revenue surged from approximately 30 million yuan in 2012 to 2.043 billion yuan in 2015, maintaining over 100% growth for three consecutive years. Multiple funding rounds from top institutions including IDG Capital, Today Capital, and FreeS Fund drove rapid valuation increases. In 2019, Three Squirrels' revenue exceeded 10.173 billion yuan, becoming the first snack brand to break 10 billion yuan in revenue. On July 12 that year, wearing the 'National Snack First Stock' halo, it successfully listed on the ChiNext Board. From founding to 10 billion revenue took only 7 years.

IDG Capital's 1.5 million USD angel investment set a record for China's largest agricultural e-commerce angel investment at the time. IDG partner Li Feng later recalled: 'What impressed me most about Zhang Liaoyuan was his depth of understanding of online consumers. He could accurately tell you the psychological path of an online shopper searching for nuts, how detail pages should be designed to improve conversion rates, even how wide shipping box tape should be to reduce return rates. This granular operational thinking was almost unique in the food industry at the time.' It was precisely this extreme pursuit of every e-commerce operation detail that enabled Three Squirrels to stand out among competitive Taobao brands, rapidly becoming the absolute king of the nut category.

### 3. 轻资产模式的阿喀琉斯之踵：OEM代工的隐患 / Achilles' Heel of the Asset-Light Model: Hidden Dangers of OEM Manufacturing

三只松鼠从诞生之初就选择了OEM代工模式：将生产环节外包给合作工厂，自身聚焦品牌营销与流量运营。这一模式是公司早年快速崛起的关键——短期内SKU扩充至500款以上，无需承担重资产投入。巅峰时期，与三只松鼠合作的代工厂超过800家，多数产品均为委托外部生产。

然而，这种轻资产模式从一开始就埋下了隐患。超90%产品委托第三方工厂生产，自身不掌握核心生产环节。供应链分散、代工厂资质参差不齐、品控标准执行不到位，为食品安全问题埋下了定时炸弹。2020年至2025年间，三只松鼠产品多次被曝出质量问题：面包发霉、坚果哈喇味、肉制品异味、果干变质等轮番登上社交平台。截至2026年3月，黑猫投诉平台累计投诉量超2700条，食品安全问题占比超70%。

更深层的结构性问题在于成本控制的脆弱性。2025年前三季度，销售费用高达16.07亿元，尽管毛利率达25.27%，但净利率仅1.97%。绝大部分费用投向销售渠道，本质是持续“买量”。全年销售费用20.11亿元，其中平台服务及推广费13.12亿元。这种“高营销投入、低净利率”的结构，意味着原材料涨价或流量成本上升时几乎没有缓冲空间。

知名危机公关专家詹军豪一针见血地指出：“高度依赖代工的轻资产模式，让三只松鼠只掌握品牌与渠道，不掌握生产链核心。品控依赖外部工厂，监管半径长、执行力度弱，一旦追求成本与效率，就极易出现质量漏洞，这是模式先天带来的治理缺陷。”这段话几乎是对三只松鼠商业模式最精准的病理诊断。

2026年3月，上海消费者在三只松鼠桂圆莲子八宝粥中吃出疑似绳索异物，客服最初仅愿赔付50元，最终协商至500元草草了事，官方至今未公开异物来源、生产漏洞与整改措施。中国企业资本联盟中国区首席经济学家柏文喜指出：“八宝粥绳索异物事件中，三只松鼠的回应堪称危机公关的反面教材。食品安全事件黄金处理时间是24-48小时，而截至3月中旬仍无任何官方通报、召回或问责。”从商业模式的视角来看，食安问题的根源不在于个别工厂的疏忽，而在于代工体系本身的结构性缺陷——当800家代工厂的品质标准不统一，当品牌方不掌握生产环节的核心控制权，食品安全风险就成为这种模式的必然副产品。

**English:** From its inception, Three Squirrels chose an OEM manufacturing model: outsourcing production to partner factories while focusing on brand marketing and traffic operations. This model was key to the company's early rapid rise—quickly expanding SKUs to over 500 products covering consumption scenarios without heavy asset investment. At peak, over 800 partner factories cooperated with Three Squirrels, with most products externally manufactured.

However, this asset-light model planted hidden dangers from the start. Over 90% of products were outsourced to third-party factories, not controlling core production. Scattered supply chains, uneven factory qualifications, and inconsistent quality control standards planted time bombs for food safety issues. Between 2020-2025, Three Squirrels products were repeatedly exposed for quality problems: moldy bread, rancid nuts, off-flavored meat products, and spoiled dried fruits cycling through social media. By March 2026, cumulative complaints on the Heicat platform exceeded 2,700, with food safety issues accounting for over 70%.

The deeper structural problem lies in cost control fragility. In the first three quarters of 2025, sales expenses reached 1.607 billion yuan; despite 25.27% gross margin, net margin was only 1.97%. Most expenses went to sales channels, essentially continuous 'traffic purchasing.' Full-year 2025 sales expenses were 2.011 billion yuan, with platform services and promotion fees at 1.312 billion yuan. This 'high marketing spend, low net margin' structure meant the company had almost no buffer when raw material prices rose or traffic costs increased.

Crisis PR expert Zhan Junhao precisely noted: 'The highly OEM-dependent asset-light model means Three Squirrels only controls brand and channels, not the production chain core. Quality control depends on external factories, with long supervision radius and weak execution; once cost and efficiency are pursued, quality gaps easily appear. This is an inherent governance deficiency of the model.' This statement is almost the most precise pathological diagnosis of Three Squirrels' business model.

In March 2026, a Shanghai consumer found a疑似 rope-like foreign object in Three Squirrels' longan lotus seed porridge. Customer service initially offered only 50 yuan compensation, eventually settling at 500 yuan, with no official disclosure of the source, production gaps, or corrective measures. Chief Economist Bai Wenxi of the China Enterprise Capital Alliance pointed out: 'In the porridge foreign object incident, Three Squirrels' response was a textbook case of crisis PR failure. The golden processing time for food safety incidents is 24-48 hours, yet as of mid-March there was still no official statement, recall, or accountability.' From a business model perspective, the root of food safety issues lies not in individual factory negligence but in the structural deficiencies of the OEM system itself—when 800 partner factories have inconsistent quality standards and the brand doesn't control core production, food safety risk becomes an inevitable byproduct of this model.

### 4. 四年的坠落：从百亿巅峰到71亿谷底 / Four Years of Falling: From 10-Billion Peak to 7.1-Billion Trough

2019年是三只松鼠的命运拐点。这一年，公司营收首次突破百亿大关，达到101.73亿元，同时在深交所成功上市。然而就在同一年的财报中，一个不祥的信号已经出现：净利润同比下降21.43%至2.38亿元，首次出现“增收不增利”。这成为此后四年持续下滑的序曲。

2020年至2023年，三只松鼠经历了营收连续四年下滑的漫长阵痛期：97.94亿元、97.70亿元、72.93亿元、71.15亿元。从百亿之巅到71亿谷底，累计跌幅约三成。这不是一个简单的周期性调整，而是底层商业逻辑的系统性崩塌。传统电商红利逐步见顶，天猫系收入持续萎缩；线下渠道拓展乏力，门店贡献占比从12.9%降至3.8%；核心坚果品类被量贩零食品牌蚕食；食品安全问题频发侵蚀品牌信誉。

2022年是最低谷之一。公司营收72.93亿元、净利润仅1.29亿元，同比分别下降25.35%和68.61%。电商行业进入存量竞争，获客成本不断攀升。三只松鼠在天猫、京东等传统平台的收入持续下滑。与此同时，早期投资机构开始撤退。IDG持股比例由上市初期的20.61%降至2.15%左右，今日资本则在2025年一季度清仓退出，两家机构累计套现约40亿元。专业投资机构的持续减持，反映出对公司长期前景的审慎态度。股价从2020年5月的历史最高87.63元一路下跌，累计跌幅超70%，市值蒸发超200亿元。

2023年，章燎原做出了创业以来最重要的战略转向：提出“高端性价比”总战略，宣布全面启动“业务、供应链和组织”的三大结构性变革。这不是一个主动选择，而是被市场倒逼的觉醒。他终于承认：三只松鼠过去赖以成功的流量打法已经走到尽头，必须向产业链更深处扎根。

从行业视角来看，三只松鼠的坠落不是个案，而是整个“淘品牌”时代的缩影。与三只松鼠同批崛起的韩都衣舍、茵曼等淘品牌，大多经历了类似的“暴涨—停滞—衰退”周期。区别在于，服装品牌的转型路径更多元，而食品品牌由于供应链的特殊性——涉及食品安全、冷链物流、产地管控等——转型难度更大。章燎原面对的不仅是一个企业的经营困境，更是一个商业模式的根本性危机：当你的核心竞争力是“比别人更会买流量”时，一旦流量规则改变，你的核心竞争力就变成了零。

**English:** 2019 was Three Squirrels' destiny turning point. That year, revenue first broke the 10-billion mark at 10.173 billion yuan, while successfully listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Yet in the same year's financials, an ominous signal appeared: net profit declined 21.43% year-over-year to 238 million yuan, marking the first 'revenue growth without profit growth.' This became the prelude to four years of continuous decline.

From 2020 to 2023, Three Squirrels experienced four consecutive years of revenue decline: 9.794 billion, 9.770 billion, 7.293 billion, and 7.115 billion yuan. From the 10-billion peak to the 7.1-billion trough, the cumulative decline was about 30%. This wasn't a simple cyclical adjustment but a systematic collapse of the underlying business logic. Traditional e-commerce dividends peaked; Tmall revenue continued shrinking; offline channel expansion was weak, with store contribution dropping from 12.9% to 3.8%; core nut categories were eroded by bulk snack brands; frequent food safety issues eroded brand reputation.

2022 was one of the lowest points. Revenue was 7.293 billion yuan with net profit of only 129 million yuan, declining 25.35% and 68.61% respectively. E-commerce entered stock competition with rising customer acquisition costs. Three Squirrels' revenue on traditional platforms like Tmall and JD continued declining. Meanwhile, early institutional investors began retreating. IDG's stake fell from 20.61% at listing to about 2.15%, while Today Capital completely exited in Q1 2025, with both institutions cashing out approximately 4 billion yuan total. Continuous institutional shareholding reduction reflected cautious attitudes toward the company's long-term prospects. The stock fell from its May 2020 historical high of 87.63 yuan, with cumulative decline exceeding 70%, market cap evaporating over 20 billion yuan.

In 2023, Zhang Liaoyuan made the most important strategic shift since founding: proposing the 'Premium Value-for-Money' overall strategy, announcing comprehensive 'business, supply chain, and organizational' three major structural reforms. This wasn't a voluntary choice but a market-forced awakening. He finally acknowledged: Three Squirrels' past traffic-dependent approach had reached its limit; the company must root deeper into the industrial chain.

### 5. 抖音续命与不可持续的流量迁徙 / TikTok Lifeline and Unsustainable Traffic Migration

2023年，当传统电商红利消退殆尽时，以抖音为代表的兴趣电商崛起，为三只松鼠打开了一扇新的窗口。章燎原敏锐地抓住了这个机会，针对抖音平台提出“D+N”全渠道布局——“D”指短视频，“N”指全渠道。公司依托短视频电商成功打造量贩芒果干、水牛乳千层吐司、鹌鹑蛋等多款爆品，实现增量近20亿元。

2024年，抖音渠道成为三只松鼠的“救命稻草”。全年抖音渠道贡献了21.9亿元收入，成为公司第一大收入来源，同比涨幅高达81.73%。依托抖音增量，公司全年营收106.2亿元，同比增长49.3%，重回百亿规模；净利润4.08亿元，同比增长85.51%。表面上看，这是一次完美的业绩反转。

然而，这种增长的本质是什么？不过是从一个流量平台迁徙到另一个流量平台。从天猫到抖音，改变的是流量的来源，不变的是对平台流量的根本性依赖。2025年前三季度，销售费用高达16.05亿元，同比增加24.03%，其中推广费及平台服务费7.61亿元，较去年同期的6.07亿元增长超25%。数据清楚地表明：为了在抖音维持增长，三只松鼠不得不持续加大“买量”投入。

2025年，现实再次证明了流量模式的脆弱性。全年营收101.89亿元，同比下降4.08%；归母净利润仅1.55亿元，同比暴跌61.9%；扣非净利润4940万元，同比暴跌84.53%。全年盈利主要依赖第一季度年货节支撑，第二、四季度均出现亏损。这种“增收不增利”的困局揭示了一个残酷事实：三只松鼠的商业模式本质上是一台“流量转化机器”——只要流量投入增加，营收就增长；但只要流量投入停止或平台费率上升，利润就急剧萎缩。这不是一个可持续的商业模型。

值得注意的是，抖音渠道的流量逻辑与天猫有本质不同。天猫是搜索电商，用户有明确的购买意图，转化率相对稳定；抖音是兴趣电商，用户被内容种草后冲动消费，退货率更高、复购率更低。这意味着三只松鼠在抖音的获客成本实际上更高，只是被营收增长的表面繁荣所掩盖。2025年前三季度，三只松鼠的存货周转天数高达71.61天，远超行业平均水平，说明大量产品积压在仓库里卖不出去。当平台补贴退潮，当内容种草的边际效果递减，三只松鼠在抖音的增长神话也走到了尽头。这再次证明了一个真理：在别人的地基上盖房子，房子盖得越高，倒塌时就越惨烈。

**English:** In 2023, as traditional e-commerce dividends were exhausted, interest-based e-commerce represented by Douyin (TikTok China) rose, opening a new window for Three Squirrels. Zhang Liaoyuan sharply seized this opportunity, proposing the 'D+N' omni-channel strategy for Douyin—'D' for short video, 'N' for omni-channel. The company leveraged short video e-commerce to create multiple hit products like bulk mango dried fruit, buffalo milk mille-feuille toast, and quail eggs, achieving nearly 2 billion yuan in incremental revenue.

In 2024, Douyin became Three Squirrels' 'lifesaver.' The channel contributed 2.19 billion yuan in revenue, becoming the company's largest revenue source with 81.73% year-over-year growth. Relying on Douyin growth, full-year revenue reached 10.62 billion yuan, up 49.3%, returning to the 10-billion scale; net profit was 408 million yuan, surging 85.51%. On the surface, this was a perfect performance reversal.

However, what was the essence of this growth? Simply migrating from one traffic platform to another. From Tmall to Douyin, what changed was the traffic source; what remained unchanged was the fundamental dependence on platform traffic. In the first three quarters of 2025, sales expenses reached 1.605 billion yuan, up 24.03%, with promotion and platform service fees at 761 million yuan, up over 25% from 607 million yuan. The data clearly showed: to maintain growth on Douyin, Three Squirrels had to continuously increase 'traffic purchasing.'

In 2025, reality once again proved the fragility of the traffic model. Full-year revenue was 10.189 billion yuan, down 4.08%; net profit attributable to shareholders was only 155 million yuan, plunging 61.9%; non-recurring net profit was 49.4 million yuan, plunging 84.53%. Annual profit mainly depended on Q1 New Year Festival support, with Q2 and Q4 both showing losses. This 'revenue growth without profit growth' dilemma revealed a cruel fact: Three Squirrels' business model is essentially a 'traffic conversion machine'—as long as traffic investment increases, revenue grows; but once traffic investment stops or platform fees rise, profits sharply contract. This is not a sustainable business model.

### 6. 量贩零食的降维打击：白牌绕过了品牌 / Bulk Snack's Dimensional Reduction Attack: White Labels Bypass Brands

如果说平台流量退潮是慢性病，那么量贩零食品牌的崛起就是急性心梗。以“零食很忙”“好想来”为代表的量贩零食品牌，采用“产地直采+白牌定制”模式，绕过品牌商与经销商，直接向上游代工厂采购，甚至通过买断、包销进一步压缩成本。这意味着消费者可以在量贩店里，以更低的价格买到与三只松鼠同源代工厂生产的零食——而且没有品牌溢价。

这组数据对比触目惊心：2025年前三季度，万辰集团（零食很忙母公司）营收365.6亿元、净利润8.55亿元，净利率4.35%；同期三只松鼠营收77.59亿元、净利润1.607亿元，净利率仅1.97%。存货周转方面，万辰集团存货周转天数18.99天，三只松鼠达71.61天，运营效率差距达近4倍。量贩零食用极致的供应链效率，对传统品牌零食实施了降维打击。

更致命的是，量贩零食正在重塑消费者的购买习惯。当消费者发现同样品质的零食在量贩店便宜30%时，三只松鼠辛苦建立的“品牌心智”就变得一文不值。2025年，坚果品类营收48.23亿元，同比下降10.12%，核心品类被量贩渠道蚕食。面对冲击，三只松鼠曾尝试收购量贩零食渠道“爱零食”，但2025年6月宣布终止收购。这次失败暴露了三只松鼠在线下渠道拓展上的深层困境——既缺乏线下零售的运营基因，又没有足以支撑线下利润空间的成本结构。章燎原终于意识到：在零食行业，供应链效率才是终极竞争力。

从更宏观的视角来看，量贩零食的崛起代表着中国零售行业一次深刻的渠道革命。过去二十年，中国消费品行业的主流模式是“品牌商—经销商—终端”的三级分销体系。品牌商通过大规模广告投放建立品牌认知，经销商负责渠道分销，终端负责消费者触达。这套体系的核心逻辑是“品牌溢价”——消费者愿意为品牌多付钱。然而，量贩零食用“去品牌化”的方式颠覆了这套逻辑：当消费者发现白牌产品和品牌产品出自同一条生产线，当价格差距达到30%以上，品牌溢价就开始失去说服力。这不是简单的价格战，而是一场关于“消费者为什么愿意为品牌付费”的根本性拷问。对三只松鼠而言，如果不能在供应链效率上追上量贩零食，那么它辛苦建立的品牌价值就会在消费者的理性选择面前逐渐蒸发。

**English:** If platform traffic receding was a chronic disease, the rise of bulk snack brands was an acute heart attack. Bulk snack brands represented by 'Lingshi Hen Mangduo' and 'Haoxianglai' adopted a 'direct origin procurement + white-label customization' model, bypassing brands and distributors to procure directly from upstream OEM factories, even further compressing costs through buyouts and contract sales. This meant consumers could buy snacks from the same OEM factories as Three Squirrels at lower prices in bulk stores—without brand premium.

This data comparison was striking: In the first three quarters of 2025, Wanchen Group (parent of Lingshi Hen Mangduo) had revenue of 36.56 billion yuan and net profit of 855 million yuan, net margin 4.35%; Three Squirrels had revenue of 7.759 billion yuan and net profit of 160.7 million yuan, net margin only 1.97%. Inventory turnover: Wanchen Group had 18.99 days, Three Squirrels 71.61 days—nearly 4x efficiency gap. Bulk snacks implemented dimensional reduction attacks on traditional branded snacks with extreme supply chain efficiency.

More critically, bulk snacks were reshaping consumer buying habits. When consumers discovered same-quality snacks were 30% cheaper in bulk stores, Three Squirrels' hard-built 'brand mindshare' became worthless. In 2025, nut category revenue was 4.823 billion yuan, down 10.12%, with core categories being eroded by bulk channels. Facing the impact, Three Squirrels attempted to acquire bulk snack channel 'Ai Lingshi,' but terminated the acquisition in June 2025. This failure exposed Three Squirrels' deep difficulties in offline channel expansion—lacking offline retail operational DNA and without a cost structure supporting offline profit margins. Zhang Liaoyuan finally realized: in the snack industry, supply chain efficiency is the ultimate competitive advantage.

### 7. 断腕式革命：从品牌整合商到制造型零售商 / Limb-Severing Revolution: From Brand Integrator to Manufacturing Retailer

2024年，章燎原启动了创业以来最深刻的自我革命。他坚定执行“高端性价比”总战略，宣布全面启动“业务、供应链和组织”的三大结构性变革。核心方向是：从“品牌整合商”转型为“制造型自有品牌零售商”。这意味着三只松鼠要亲手拆解自己赖以成功的轻资产模式，向产业链深处进军。

在供应链方面，公司基于“一品一链”推进全国供应链集约基地布局，落地北区、西南供应链集约基地，并逐步打造“芜湖健康零食产业园”。已建成8座坚果生产工厂，首个超4000平方米的中央厨房投入使用。在云南临沧永德的夏威夷果初加工工厂正式投产，采用产地直采与就地加工模式。然而产能依然有限，2025年上半年OEM产品采购额达20.2亿元，远超同期4.55亿元原料采购额，说明代工依赖仍然严重。

在组织方面，构建以消费者为中心的“品销合一”网络型组织。在业务方面，从纯线上转向全渠道布局。这场转型的代价是惨烈的。2025年全年归母净利润1.55亿元，同比下降61.9%。建设中央厨房、布局线下供应链意味着巨额资本开支。管理费用中折旧及摊销从1.61亿元增至2.42亿元，增长50.31%。扣非净利润仅剩4940万元，意味着公司自身的造血能力在减弱，而新业务仍处于烧钱阶段。

章燎原自己也坦言：“以品牌制造商的视角在做全品类零售。”这句话标志着三只松鼠的商业逻辑正在发生根本性转变——从“用流量卖货”到“用制造能力创造差异化价值”。这不是一次简单的战略调整，而是一次商业基因的重组。

从更深层的角度看，这场转型面临的不仅是资金和能力的挑战，更是组织文化的重塑。三只松鼠过去十年的成功建立在“流量运营”的组织能力之上——如何优化搜索关键词、如何设计详情页、如何管理用户评价。这些能力在“制造型零售商”的新定位下几乎需要全部推倒重来。新的组织能力需要理解工厂管理、品控体系、冷链物流、门店运营等完全不同的领域。这种组织能力的重建，比资金投入更加困难，也更加耗时。章燎原自己也承认，这是一次“商业基因的重组”——意味着要把过去十年赖以成功的基因全部替换掉。这在商业史上极少有成功案例，因为组织的路径依赖往往比战略的转变更加顽固。

**English:** In 2024, Zhang Liaoyuan launched the most profound self-revolution since founding. He firmly executed the 'Premium Value-for-Money' overall strategy, announcing comprehensive 'business, supply chain, and organizational' three major structural reforms. The core direction: transform from 'brand integrator' to 'manufacturing-type own-brand retailer.' This meant Three Squirrels had to dismantle the asset-light model that made it successful and march deep into the industrial chain.

On the supply chain front, the company advanced national supply chain cluster base layout based on 'one product, one chain,' establishing Northern and Southwest supply chain cluster bases, and gradually building the 'Wuhu Healthy Snack Industrial Park.' Eight nut production factories were built, and the first 4,000+ square meter central kitchen was operational. A macadamia nut preliminary processing factory in Yongde, Lincang, Yunnan officially commenced production, adopting direct origin procurement and on-site processing models. However, capacity remained limited; in H1 2025, OEM product procurement reached 2.02 billion yuan, far exceeding 455 million yuan in raw material procurement, indicating continued heavy OEM dependence.

Organizationally, a consumer-centric 'product-sales integration' network organization was constructed. In business, the shift moved from pure online to omni-channel layout. The cost of this transformation was brutal. Full-year 2025 net profit attributable to shareholders was 155 million yuan, down 61.9%. Building central kitchens and deploying offline supply chains meant massive capital expenditure. Management expenses for depreciation rose from 161 million to 242 million yuan, up 50.31%. Non-recurring net profit of only 49.4 million yuan meant the company's own cash-generating ability was weakening while new businesses remained in cash-burning stages.

Zhang Liaoyuan himself stated: 'We're doing full-category retail from a brand manufacturer's perspective.' This statement marked a fundamental shift in Three Squirrels' business logic—from 'selling goods with traffic' to 'creating differentiated value with manufacturing capability.' This wasn't a simple strategic adjustment but a business gene recombination.

### 8. 生活馆实验：寻找线下新物种 / The Lifestyle Store Experiment: Finding a New Offline Species

2025年起，三只松鼠开始在芜湖试水“生活馆”业态，这是章燎原寻找线下增长极的核心实验。与传统的“国民零食店”不同，生活馆定位“家门口的第二厨房”，在坚果零食基础上扩增生鲜蔬果、日化、米面粮油、冻品等品类，试图将门店升级为覆盖家庭日常采购的社区消费场景。2025年11月，芜湖金鹰购物中心的生活馆旗舰店开业，开业三天零售额突破126万元。

到2026年上半年，生活馆从9家扩张至35家。一增一减之间，三只松鼠线下业态的重心已发生根本转移：35家生活馆贡献线下门店收入1.32亿元，反超了193家国民零食店的1.08亿元，成为线下业务新的主力军。国民零食店则从年初298家骤减至193家，关闭121家。

2026年8月，首家全品类“自有品牌生活馆”新鲜零食独立店在芜湖开业，标志着从“全品类”试探转向“新鲜”垂直深耕。支撑这场实验的是供应链的底层重构。2025年，首个超4000平方米的中央厨房投入使用，构建以中央厨房为核心的“区域冷链”体系，实现“一日一配”甚至“一日多配”。然而挑战同样明显：新鲜零食的核心痛点集中在损耗管控和冷链履约成本。生活馆主要集中布局于安徽、江苏两省，区域依赖度较高。跨区域复制面临供应链适配、品牌认知培育等现实挑战。良品铺子“鲜生活”、来伊份“LYFEN Life”等竞品也已入局，赛道竞争日趋激烈。

生活馆模式的另一个关键挑战是“新鲜”定位能否支撑足够的客单价和复购率。传统零食店的客单价通常在30-50元，但新鲜零食由于涉及现制烘焙、短保产品、生鲜蔬果等品类，运营成本显著更高。据头豹研究院数据，国内新鲜零食市场规模从2020年的不足50亿元增至2025年的约180亿元，年复合增长率超40%；浙商证券预计2026年将进一步放大至400亿至500亿元。市场空间确实存在，但竞争也在加剧。良品铺子“鲜生活”全国首店已在武汉开业，来伊份“LYFEN Life新鲜生活店”在上海亮相。在这场“新鲜”赛道的竞速中，三只松鼠的先发优势能维持多久，取决于其中央厨房的覆盖半径和冷链网络的扩展速度。目前35家生活馆集中在安徽、江苏两省，距离全国化布局还有很长的路要走。

**English:** Starting in 2025, Three Squirrels began piloting 'Lifestyle Store' formats in Wuhu, Zhang Liaoyuan's core experiment for finding offline growth poles. Unlike traditional 'National Snack Stores,' lifestyle stores positioned as 'the second kitchen at your doorstep' expanded beyond nuts and snacks into fresh produce, daily necessities, rice/flour/grains/oil, and frozen products, attempting to upgrade stores to community consumption scenarios covering household daily shopping. In November 2025, the lifestyle store flagship at Wuhu Jinying Shopping Center opened, with three-day retail sales exceeding 1.26 million yuan.

By H1 2026, lifestyle stores expanded from 9 to 35. In this increase-decrease dynamic, Three Squirrels' offline format focus fundamentally shifted: 35 lifestyle stores contributed 132 million yuan in offline store revenue, surpassing 193 national snack stores' 108 million yuan, becoming the new main force of offline business. National snack stores dropped from 298 at year-start to 193, closing 121.

In August 2026, the first full-category 'own-brand lifestyle store' fresh snack independent store opened in Wuhu, marking a shift from 'full-category' testing to 'fresh' vertical deep cultivation. Supporting this experiment was supply chain infrastructure reconstruction. In 2025, the first 4,000+ sqm central kitchen became operational, building a 'regional cold chain' system achieving 'daily delivery' or 'multiple daily deliveries.' However, challenges were equally obvious: fresh snacks' core pain points centered on loss control and cold chain fulfillment costs. Lifestyle stores were mainly concentrated in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces with high regional dependence. Cross-regional replication faced supply chain adaptation challenges. Competitors like Liangpin Puzi's 'Fresh Life' and Laiyifen's 'LYFEN Life' had also entered the market, with increasing competition.

### 9. 未竟的觉醒：流量品牌的命运分水岭 / Unfinished Awakening: The Watershed of Traffic Brand Destiny

2026年8月28日，三只松鼠宣布终止筹备17个月的港股上市计划。这场从2025年3月启动的A+H股上市尝试，最终以“基于市场环境与公司自身发展规划的综合考量”为由主动叫停。自宣布以来，A股股价累计跌幅超三成，总市值从百亿级别缩至70亿元出头。资本市场用脚投票，表达了对公司转型前景的审慎态度。

然而2026年上半年的财报透出一丝曙光：营收52.80亿元，同比微降3.61%；归母净利润2.49亿元，同比增长79.94%；扣非净利润1.92亿元，同比增长276.94%——尽管高增速背后是上年同期极低的基数。销售费用同比大幅压降16.66%至9.32亿元，显示出费用管控的初步成效。

章燎原正站在一个命运分水岭上。他带领三只松鼠完成了从“流量觉醒”到“供应链觉醒”的认知跃迁，正在推动一场从轻资产到重资产、从“品牌整合商”到“制造型自有品牌零售商”的商业基因重组。这场转型的核心命题是：当流量红利彻底消退后，三只松鼠能否凭借自建供应链和线下门店网络，建立真正属于自己的竞争壁垒？

从数据来看，转型仍处早期阶段。8座工厂的产能与800家代工厂的体量相比仍是杯水车薪；35家生活馆的规模相对于全国化渠道网络仍是小体量；线上营收仍占总营收70%以上。但方向已经明确。三只松鼠的故事，本质上是中国消费行业从“流量时代”走向“制造时代”的缩影。章燎原的觉醒不是个例，而是一代互联网品牌创始人的集体觉醒。他们用十年时间证明流量可以建造帝国，又用痛苦的转型证明帝国必须有地基。至于三只松鼠最终能否完成这场觉醒，2026年之后的每一张财报，都将是一份答卷。

从投资视角来看，三只松鼠的转型故事正处于“信仰考验期”。终止港股IPO意味着短期内无法通过资本市场获得转型所需的资金支持，只能依靠自身造血能力和A股平台的有限融资渠道。总市值缩至70亿元出头，对应2025年1.55亿元的净利润，静态PE约45倍——这在传统食品行业中属于偏高估值，市场给予的溢价主要来自对转型成功的期待。如果2026年下半年至2027年的财报无法证明生活馆模式的可复制性和供应链投入的产出效率，那么估值中枢还将面临进一步下移的压力。章燎原曾在内部表示：“市场是动态的，公司持续根据市场变化调整经营策略。”这句话既是对投资者的安抚，也是对自己的鞭策。在这个充满不确定性的转型窗口期，三只松鼠需要的不仅是战略定力，更是执行力和速度。

**English:** On August 28, 2026, Three Squirrels announced termination of its 17-month Hong Kong IPO plan. This A+H listing attempt, launched in March 2025, ended with 'comprehensive consideration of market environment and company development plans.' Since announcing, A-share stock fell over 30%, with total market cap shrinking from the 10-billion level to just over 7 billion yuan. Capital markets voted with their feet, expressing cautious attitudes toward the company's transformation prospects.

However, H1 2026 financials showed a glimmer of hope: revenue of 5.28 billion yuan, down slightly 3.61%; net profit attributable to shareholders 249 million yuan, up 79.94%; non-recurring net profit 192 million yuan, up 276.94%—though high growth reflected the extremely low base from the prior year. Sales expenses were significantly reduced 16.66% year-over-year to 932 million yuan, showing initial effectiveness of cost control.

Zhang Liaoyuan stands at a destiny watershed. He led Three Squirrels through the cognitive leap from 'traffic awakening' to 'supply chain awakening,' driving a business gene recombination from asset-light to asset-heavy, from 'brand integrator' to 'manufacturing-type own-brand retailer.' The core question: after traffic dividends completely fade, can Three Squirrels build truly its own competitive moat through self-built supply chains and offline store networks?

From the data, transformation remains in early stages. Eight factories' capacity is a drop in the bucket compared to 800 OEM factories; 35 lifestyle stores remain small relative to a national channel network; online revenue still accounts for over 70% of total. But the direction is clear. Three Squirrels' story is essentially a microcosm of China's consumer industry moving from the 'traffic era' to the 'manufacturing era.' Zhang Liaoyuan's awakening is not an individual case but a collective awakening of a generation of internet brand founders. They spent ten years proving traffic can build empires, and through painful transformation proved empires must have foundations. Whether Three Squirrels can ultimately complete this awakening—every financial report after 2026 will be an answer sheet.

## 卷尾 Editorial Conclusion

亚洲《封面人物》杂志的存在意义，在于为中国当代商业文明建立一份经得起时间检验的人物档案体系。这份使命在章燎原的案例中获得了最为鲜明的印证——因为他的故事里，既有令人振奋的崛起速度，也有令人揪心的增长困境，更有刮骨疗毒般的自我革新勇气。这三个阶段共同构成了一个完整的中国消费品创业者样本，而独立编委会选择将其完整封存，正是基于对这种"完整性"的珍视。

作为记录者，我们始终坚持一个原则：档案的价值不在于塑造完美，而在于呈现真实。章燎原从辍学青年到百亿品牌创始人的逆袭故事固然精彩，但真正使这份档案具备长期研究价值的，是他面对困境时展现出的企业家精神——那种敢于在业绩最好的时候主动变革的清醒，和敢于在业绩最差的时候壮士断腕的魄力。这种精神特质的完整记录，对于后来者理解中国消费品行业的竞争本质与演化规律，具有不可替代的参考价值。

独立编委会以终身档案编码的形式，将章燎原的完整商业轨迹固化于亚洲封面人物档案库中。这份档案涵盖的，不仅是一个品牌的成长史，更是中国消费品行业从渠道驱动到品牌驱动、再到供应链驱动的三次范式转换的微观叙事。每一个阶段的决策逻辑、组织变革和市场反馈，都被详细记录在案。

亚洲《封面人物》杂志以记录者的身份，将这份真实的商业记忆交付给时间。永久存证，跨越代际。在流量喧嚣退去之后，留下的才是真正值得被记住的东西。

Zhang Liaoyuans historical positioning lies not in how many sales miracles he created, but in providing the Chinese consumer industry with a profound lesson about traffic illusion through the complete life cycle of one enterprise. He proved: in the internet age, brands can build a 10-billion empire quickly using traffic; but equally demonstrably, without a supply chain foundation, this empire can collapse at any moment during tectonic shifts. The story of Three Squirrels is essentially a painful sample of Chinese consumer brands transforming from marketing-driven to manufacturing-driven. In 2026, Three Squirrels stands at this watershed. Its choices—building self-owned factories, creating lifestyle stores, transforming into a manufacturing-type own-brand retailer—are not offensive but a survival-defense war. The outcome will determine whether Three Squirrels becomes a relic of the traffic era or a reborn entity of the manufacturing era.

## 金句 Pull Quote

> 流量是借来的翅膀，供应链才是自己的腿。

> Traffic is borrowed wings; supply chains are your own legs.

## 履历时间线 Career Timeline

- **1976** 章燎原出生于安徽绩溪 / Zhang Liaoyuan born in Jixi, Anhui
- **2003** 进入安徽詹氏食品公司，从一线业务员做起 / Joined Anhui Zhan's Food Company, starting as frontline salesperson
- **2011** 主导创建网络坚果子品牌“壳壳果”试水电商；年底离开詹氏独立创业 / Led creation of online nut sub-brand 'KeKeGuo'; left Zhan's at year-end to start independently
- **2012-02-16** 5人团队在安徽芜湖创立三只松鼠，次日获IDG资本150万美元天使投资 / 5-person team founded Three Squirrels in Wuhu; received 1.5M USD angel investment from IDG next day
- **2012-11-11** 首次参加双十一，日销766万元，登顶天猫坚果品类冠军 / First Double 11, 7.66M yuan daily sales, topped Tmall nut category
- **2015** 营收突破20亿元，连续三年保持超100%增速 / Revenue exceeded 2 billion yuan, maintaining over 100% growth for three consecutive years
- **2019-07-12** 在深交所创业板上市，被誉为“国民零食第一股” / Listed on ChiNext Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, hailed as 'National Snack First Stock'
- **2019** 年营收首次突破100亿元，同时净利润首次出现下滑 / Annual revenue first exceeded 10 billion yuan; net profit declined for the first time
- **2020-2023** 营收连续四年下滑，从百亿跌至71.15亿元 / Revenue declined for four consecutive years, from 10 billion to 7.115 billion yuan
- **2023** 提出“高端性价比”总战略，启动三大结构性变革 / Proposed 'Premium Value-for-Money' strategy, launched three major structural reforms
- **2024** 依托抖音渠道实现业绩反弹，营收重回106.2亿元 / Performance rebound driven by Douyin channel, revenue returned to 10.62 billion yuan
- **2025-03** 启动港股上市计划，向港交所递交招股书 / Launched Hong Kong IPO plan, submitted prospectus to HKEX
- **2025** 营收101.89亿元，归母净利润暴跌61.9%至1.55亿元 / Revenue 10.189 billion yuan, net profit plunged 61.9% to 155 million yuan
- **2026-08-28** 宣布终止港股上市计划，市值缩至70亿元 / Announced termination of Hong Kong IPO plan, market cap shrank to 7 billion yuan
- **2026-H1** 生活馆从9家扩至35家，贡献线下门店收入主力 / Lifestyle stores expanded from 9 to 35, becoming main contributor to offline revenue

## 常问问答 FAQ

**Q1: 三只松鼠为什么从百亿营收跌到71亿？**

A: 核心原因是流量红利消退。三只松鼠高度依赖电商平台流量，当传统电商红利见顶、获客成本攀升时，天猫和京东的收入持续下滑。同时量贩零食品牌以更低价格蚕食市场份额，叠加食品安全问题频发侵蚀品牌信誉。

**Q1 (EN): Why did Three Squirrels' revenue drop from 10 billion to 7.1 billion?**

A: The core reason is traffic dividend exhaustion. Three Squirrels was highly dependent on e-commerce platform traffic. When traditional e-commerce dividends peaked and customer acquisition costs rose, Tmall and JD revenue continued declining. Meanwhile, bulk snack brands eroded market share with lower prices, compounded by frequent food safety issues.

**Q2: 三只松鼠的OEM代工模式有什么问题？**

A: OEM模式让三只松鼠只掌握品牌和渠道，不掌握生产核心环节。超90%产品委托第三方工厂生产，导致品控薄弱、食安问题频发。同时量贩零食品牌可以直接从同源代工厂采购白牌产品，以更低价格绕过品牌。

**Q2 (EN): What's wrong with Three Squirrels' OEM model?**

A: The OEM model means Three Squirrels only controls brand and channels, not core production. Over 90% of products are outsourced, resulting in weak quality control and frequent food safety issues. Meanwhile, bulk snack brands can directly procure white-label products from the same OEM factories at lower prices.

**Q3: “高端性价比”战略的核心是什么？**

A: 核心是从“品牌整合商”转型为“制造型自有品牌零售商”。包括基于“一品一链”推进供应链集约布局，已建成8座工厂和中央厨房；构建“品销合一”组织；从纯线上转向全渠道布局。本质是用制造能力替代流量依赖。

**Q3 (EN): What is the core of the 'Premium Value-for-Money' strategy?**

A: The core is transforming from 'brand integrator' to 'manufacturing-type own-brand retailer.' Including advancing supply chain cluster layout based on 'one product, one chain,' having built 8 factories and central kitchens; constructing 'product-sales integration' organization; shifting from pure online to omni-channel. Essentially replacing traffic dependence with manufacturing capability.

**Q4: 三只松鼠对抖音的依赖有多大？**

A: 2024年抖音渠道贡献了21.9亿元收入，成为第一大收入来源。2025年线上第三方电商平台收入占总营收70.42%，其中抖音占22.30%。本质是从依赖天猫转为依赖抖音，流量依赖的底层逻辑没有改变。

**Q4 (EN): How dependent is Three Squirrels on Douyin?**

A: In 2024, Douyin contributed 2.19 billion yuan in revenue, becoming the largest source. In 2025, online third-party e-commerce accounted for 70.42% of total revenue, with Douyin at 22.30%. Essentially shifting from Tmall dependence to Douyin dependence, the underlying traffic dependence logic remains unchanged.

**Q5: 生活馆模式能否成为第二增长曲线？**

A: 35家生活馆贡献的收入已反超193家国民零食店，验证了模型的初步可行性。但核心挑战在于短保产品的损耗管控和冷链成本极高；目前仅集中在安徽、江苏两省；良品铺子等竞品也已入局。能否规模化复制仍需验证。

**Q5 (EN): Can lifestyle stores become the second growth curve?**

A: 35 lifestyle stores' revenue already surpassed 193 national snack stores, validating preliminary model feasibility. But core challenges include loss control and cold chain costs for short-shelf-life products; currently concentrated in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces; competitors have also entered. Whether scalable replication works remains to be verified.

**Q6: 章燎原的创业经历有什么特点？**

A: 最大特点是“跨界融合”：他是少有的既懂传统坚果行业又懂互联网运营的创业者。在詹氏食品9年深耕让他深谙传统快消品逻辑，而“壳壳果”的电商试水积累了线上运营经验。这种“传统+互联网”的双重基因，是三只松鼠2012年能脱颖而出的关键。

**Q6 (EN): What characterizes Zhang Liaoyuan's entrepreneurial experience?**

A: The biggest characteristic is 'cross-boundary integration': he is one of the rare entrepreneurs understanding both traditional nut industry and internet operations. Nine years at Zhan's Food gave deep FMCG understanding, while the 'KeKeGuo' e-commerce venture accumulated online experience. This 'traditional + internet' dual DNA was key to standing out in 2012.

**Q7: 三只松鼠为什么终止港股上市？**

A: 官方原因是“基于市场环境与公司自身发展规划的综合考量”。实际背景是A股股价累计跌幅超30%，市值缩至70亿元；港股消费板块整体估值承压、流动性偏弱。公司选择更务实的策略，专注供应链深耕和渠道重构。

**Q7 (EN): Why did Three Squirrels terminate its Hong Kong IPO?**

A: The official reason was 'comprehensive consideration of market environment and company development plans.' The actual context: A-share stock had fallen over 30%, market cap shrinking to 7 billion yuan; Hong Kong consumer sector faced valuation pressure and weak liquidity. The company chose a more pragmatic strategy focusing on supply chain cultivation and channel reconstruction.

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