# 俞敏洪 · Yu Minhong — 封面档案 ACF-01-00165

> 亚洲封面人物 Asia Cover Figure · 机器可读档案（LLM-ready）。本文件由官网结构化档案数据自动生成，供 AI 检索与引用。中文全文与英文全文对照编排。

## 档案元数据 Metadata

- 封面编码 ACF Code：**ACF-01-00165**
- 姓名 Name：俞敏洪 / Yu Minhong
- 职务 Title：创始人、董事长 / Founder & Chairman
- 公司 Company：新东方 / New Oriental
- 出生 Born：1962-09-04，江苏江阴 (Jiangyin, Jiangsu, China)
- 篇别 Category：商界逆行者（列传篇 / Biographies (Liezhuan)）
- 入档日期 Accessioned：2026-07-08
- 标签 Tags：教培教父, 双减转型, 东方甄选, 直播电商, 知识分子创业, 逆行者
- 永久档案链接 Archive URL：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00165/liezhuan
- English archive：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00165/liezhuan?lang=en
- 官网原文报道 Feature story：https://coverfigure.com/acf/figure/yuminhong

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## 卷首 Editorial Intro

中国改革开放四十余年的商业长廊中，很少有一位企业家像俞敏洪这样，每一次起落都精确地踩在时代变迁的刻度上——1980年第三次高考，是恢复高考制度后知识改变命运的制度化通道；1990年代辞职下海，是知识分子经商浪潮的缩影；2006年纽交所上市，是中国教育资本化的巅峰时刻；2021年双减落地，是政策对教育产业的彻底重构；2022年直播间翻红，是流量经济的又一次代际切换。

他不是最成功的，也不是最有争议的，但他可能是唯一一个完整经历了中国民办教育从野蛮生长到资本巅峰、从政策毁灭到二次创业全过程的人。在教育行业，他被视为“教培教父”，用三十年将一间十平米平房里的英语培训班办成中国领先的民办教育集团；在直播电商领域，六十岁的他带队从废墟上重建东方甄选，用知识带货的模式重新定义了直播间的内容形态；在公众舆论中，他既是“在绝望中寻找希望”的励志偶像，也是被罗永浩批评为“虚伪”的矛盾体——既追求体面，又不得不向现实低头。

这组档案试图回答的问题不是“俞敏洪如何成功”，而是：在一个政策、资本、技术三重力量反复重塑商业版图的中国市场，一个知识分子出身的企业家，凭什么能够经历完整的行业周期而始终没有被淘汰？他的“逆行”哲学——不追逐风口，但每次跌倒后都重新出发——究竟是个人性格的胜利，还是某种更深层的生存智慧？

In the commercial gallery of China's four decades of reform and opening-up, few entrepreneurs have had their rises and falls land as precisely on the nodes of social transformation as Yu Minhong. The third gaokao in 1980 was the institutionalized channel of knowledge changing destiny; the resignation in the 1990s was a microcosm of intellectuals entering business; the 2006 NYSE listing marked the peak of China's education capitalization; the 2021 double reduction was the thorough restructuring of the education industry; and the 2022 livestream revival was yet another generational shift in the traffic economy.

He is neither the most successful nor the most controversial, but he may be the only person who has fully lived through the entire arc of China's private education—from savage growth to the capital peak, from policy destruction to a second venture. In education, he is the 'tutoring patriarch' who built a 10-square-meter English cram class into China's largest private education group. In livestream commerce, at age 60, he led a rebuild of East Buy from the ruins. In public opinion, he is both the inspirational icon who says 'seek hope in despair,' and a figure criticized as 'hypocritical'—pursuing dignity while bowing to reality.

This archive asks not 'how Yu Minhong succeeded,' but: in a Chinese market where policy, capital, and technology repeatedly reshape the commercial landscape, how has an entrepreneur with an intellectual background survived a complete industry cycle? Is his 'contrarian' philosophy—not chasing trends, but rising after every fall—a victory of character, or a deeper survival wisdom?

## 人物速览 Lead

俞敏洪，新东方创始人、董事长。他从北大辞职下海，用三十余年把一间10平米平房里的英语培训班办成中国领先的民办教育集团；2021年“双减”政策落地，核心业务归零，他捐出八万套课桌椅善后，又在60岁带队转型直播电商，带领东方甄选从废墟上重生。从教培教父到直播间里的“老俞”，他是中国民营经济中少有的经历完整周期、且每次跌倒后都重新出发的逆行者。

Yu Minhong is founder and chairman of New Oriental. After resigning from Peking University, he built a 10-square-meter English cram class into China's largest private education group over three decades. When the 2021 'Double Reduction' policy erased its core business, he donated 80,000 desk sets to settle affairs and, at 60, led a pivot to livestream commerce—reviving East Buy from the ruins. From tutoring patriarch to livestream host, he is a rare Chinese entrepreneur who has lived through a full industry cycle and restarted after every fall.

## 正文 Archive Chapters

### 1. 江阴少年的三次高考 / A Rural Boy's Three Gaokao Attempts

1962年9月4日，俞敏洪出生于江苏省江阴市夏港街道葫桥村一个普通的农民家庭。父亲俞银奇是当地一位木匠，靠手艺维持家计；母亲李八妹是生产队的妇女队长，性格泼辣能干。家里兄弟姐妹三人，俞敏洪排行老三。从七岁起，他便跟着大人在稻田里插秧、割麦、喂猪，农活的辛苦在他骨子里刻下了农民特有的坚韧与务实——这种底色，在他此后四十年的人生中反复显现。江阴地处长三角腹地，自古崇文重教。即便在文革期间，当地学校也没有完全停摆，这种地域文化为俞敏洪后来的求学之路提供了微弱的土壤。

1977年，中国恢复高考的第二年，15岁的俞敏洪进入江阴县第一中学读高中。但他的英语学习几乎是从零开始——村里的英语老师只会念几个字母，他的发音带着浓重的江阴方言。1978年夏天，他第一次走进高考考场，英语成绩仅33分，总分远未达到录取线。落榜后，他回到村里，白天喂猪种地，晚上在煤油灯下自学英语。母亲从镇上买来一本《英语九百句》，被他翻得卷了边。据他后来回忆，那段时间主要的快乐就是学会了一个新单词——“每记住一个词，就觉得离外面的世界近了一步。”

1979年，第二次高考。英语成绩提高到55分，但依然不够。两次落榜在村里引发议论，有人说“农家子弟就该认命种地”，但俞敏洪的母亲坚持让他再考。后来他回忆说：“我妈是个没什么文化的人，但她有一个信念——读书能改变命运。”这种来自母亲的朴素信念，成为支撑他走过至暗时刻的核心力量。

1979年底，俞敏洪进入江阴县政府办的英语补习班。这个补习班集中了全县英语最好的师资，他第一次接受到系统的英语训练。据他后来回忆，补习班的老师要求每个学生每天背30个单词、一篇短文，他几乎把所有时间都花在英语上，甚至在稻田干活时也默背单词。1980年夏天，第三次高考。英语考了95分（部分资料记载为93分），总分387分，超过北京大学录取线7分。他被北京大学西语系英语专业录取。

从33分到95分，三次高考，跨越四年——这不仅是俞敏洪个人命运的转折点，也成为他此后所有公共叙事的精神原型。“在绝望中寻找希望，人生终将辉煌”，这句后来成为新东方标志性口号的话，最初就来自这段经历。他在多次演讲中提到：“人生最重要的不是起点有多低，而是你有没有勇气再考一次。”

值得注意的是，这种“屡败屡战”的叙事在中国语境中具有特殊的力量。1980年前后，高考是农村子弟实现阶层跃升的几乎唯一通道，而俞敏洪的故事恰好契合了改革开放初期“知识改变命运”的时代精神。他后来成为教育企业家，某种程度上，正是这段经历的延伸——一个通过考试改变命运的人，最终把帮助更多人考试当成了自己的事业。这种从个人困境到商业模式的转化能力，正是俞敏洪区别于同时代企业家的核心特质。在1980年的中国，高考录取率极低——全国仅有约8%的考生能够被大学录取，而北大这样的顶尖学府更是凤毛麟角。一个农村青年能在第三次考试中考入北大，这在当时的江阴引起了轰动。据俞敏洪后来回忆，录取通知送达村里时，母亲激动得当场落泪，父亲则默默去镇上买了两斤肉回来庆祝。这种“寒门出贵子”的叙事，在改革开放初期的中国社会具有极强的感染力——它不仅是一个人的胜利，更是一种制度承诺的证明：只要努力，命运可以改变。

俞敏洪的三次高考经历，在此后被他反复讲述、演绎和升华，最终成为新东方品牌叙事的核心素材。在新东方的课堂上，老师会讲述这个故事；在俞敏洪的演讲中，这个故事是开场白；在新东方的宣传片里，这个故事是情感锚点。一个关于“三次高考终上北大”的故事，承载了一整代人对“知识改变命运”的信仰。

在江阴期间，俞敏洪还养成了一个影响他终生的习惯——每天清晨五点起床读书。这个习惯来自他母亲的言传身教：母亲每天天不亮就起来喂猪做饭，俞敏洪受到感染，也养成了早起苦读的节奏。六十多年后的今天，他依然保持着每天六点起床、先跑步五公里再开始工作的习惯。这种农民式的勤劳和自律，是江阴农村留给他的另一份礼物。

三次高考塑造的不仅是他的职业方向，更是他面对逆境时的一贯姿态：不认命，不放弃，在绝望中寻找微光。

**English:** Yu Minhong was born on September 4, 1962, in Huqiao Village, Xiagang Street, Jiangyin City, Jiangsu Province. His father, Yu Yinqi, was a local carpenter; his mother, Li Bamei, served as the women's team leader of the production brigade. The third of three siblings, Yu grew up working in the fields—planting rice, harvesting wheat, feeding pigs. From age seven, the hardship of agricultural labor etched into him the resilience and pragmatism characteristic of Chinese farmers—a foundation that would reveal itself repeatedly over the next four decades. Jiangyin, located in the Yangtze River Delta, had a tradition of valuing education since ancient times. Even during the Cultural Revolution, local schools never completely shut down, providing faint soil for Yu's later educational path.

In 1977, the year after China restored the gaokao, 15-year-old Yu entered Jiangyin County No. 1 Middle School. But his English education was essentially starting from scratch—the village English teacher could only recite a few letters, and his pronunciation carried a thick Jiangyin dialect accent. In summer 1978, he sat the gaokao for the first time. His English score was only 33, and his total score fell far short of any admission threshold. After failing, he returned to the village, working during the day and studying English by kerosene lamp at night. His mother bought him '900 English Sentences'; he read it until the pages curled. He later recalled that the greatest joy was learning a new word—'every time I memorized one, I felt one step closer to the outside world.'

In 1979, the second attempt. His English score improved to 55, but it was still not enough. Two consecutive failures drew commentary—some said 'a farmer's son should accept his fate.' But Yu's mother insisted he try again. He later recalled: 'My mother was uneducated, but she had one conviction—that studying could change your destiny.' This simple belief became the core force sustaining him through his darkest moments.

At the end of 1979, Yu entered the English tutorial class organized by the Jiangyin county government. For the first time he received systematic English training. Teachers required 30 new words and one passage daily; he devoted virtually all his time to English, even silently reciting vocabulary while working in paddies. In summer 1980, the third gaokao. He scored 95 in English (some sources say 93), total 387, exceeding PKU's cutoff by seven points.

From 33 to 95, three attempts spanning four years—this became the spiritual template for all his subsequent public narratives. 'Seek hope in despair, and life will eventually shine'—this phrase, later New Oriental's signature slogan, originated here. He has said: 'The most important thing is not how low your starting point is, but whether you have the courage to take the exam one more time.'

In 1980 China, gaokao admission rates were extremely low—only about 8% of examinees entered university, with elite institutions like PKU exceedingly rare. A rural youth gaining admission on his third attempt caused a sensation in Jiangyin. Yu recalled that when the notice arrived, his mother wept with joy while his father silently went to town to buy meat for celebration. This 'humble family producing a remarkable son' narrative carried powerful resonance in early reform-era China—not merely one person's victory, but proof of an institutional promise: with effort, destiny can be changed.

During Jiangyin, Yu also developed a lifelong habit—rising at 5am daily to study. This came from his mother's example: she rose before dawn to feed pigs and cook, and Yu adopted the same rhythm of early rising and diligent reading. More than sixty years later, he still maintains the habit of rising at 6am, running five kilometers, then beginning work. This farmer-like diligence and self-discipline was another gift from rural Jiangyin.

This narrative of 'repeated failure followed by persistence' carries particular power in the Chinese context. Around 1980, the gaokao was the nearly sole channel for rural youth upward mobility, and Yu's story perfectly embodied the era's 'knowledge changes destiny' spirit. That he later became an education entrepreneur was an extension of this experience—a person who changed his own destiny through examinations ultimately made it his career to help others pass examinations too. This ability to transform personal predicament into business model is precisely the core trait distinguishing Yu from his contemporaries. The three gaokao attempts shaped not only his career direction but his consistent posture facing adversity: refusing to accept fate, never giving up, seeking glimmers of light in despair.

### 2. 北大岁月与出走 / The Peking University Years and the Departure

1980年秋天，18岁的俞敏洪背着铺盖卷走进了北京大学校园。但因农村出身和浓重的江阴口音，他在英语分班考试中被分到了最低级别的C班。在北大这个精英云集的地方，他是少数来自农村的学生之一，强烈的自卑感伴随了他整个大学时期。他后来在采访中回忆：“我在全班同学面前不敢说话，因为一开口就是江阴话。我的同学很多是城市长大的，他们的英语口语和视野都远超于我。”这种自卑不是没有原因——北大的同学中不乏干部子弟、知识分子家庭出身的年轻人，他们从小接触英语读物，而俞敏洪的英语启蒙来自一本被翻烂的《英语九百句》。

1982年，大三上学期，俞敏洪被诊断为传染性肺结核，不得不休学一年。在医院的病床上，他度过了一段奇特的时光：读了大约200本书，包括大量英文原版文学著作；写了200多首诗歌；背了上万个英语单词。这场疾病意外地为他奠定了深厚的英语词汇功底——也正是这段被迫停下来的时间，让他开始从“跟别人比”转向“跟自己比”。他后来把这个转变视为大学时代最重要的收获：“当你不再试图超越别人，而是专注于超越昨天的自己，内心的焦虑反而消失了。”在 libcancer ward的三百多个日夜里，他把《新概念英语》翻了个遍，把每一篇文章都背到滚瓜烂熟。

在休学养病期间，俞敏洪还做了一件对他日后创业至关重要的事：他开始系统性地整理英语学习方法。他将自己在病床上背诵单词的经验总结为一套“词根+联想”记忆法，这套方法后来成为新东方教学体系的核心支柱之一。他在病床上写下的那些诗歌，虽然没有发表，但锻炼了他用语言表达情感的能力——这种能力，在此后新东方的课堂上转化为一种独特的教学魅力。

1985年，俞敏洪从北大毕业，因成绩优秀被留校任教，成为北京大学外语系的一名英语教师。他拥有了北京户口、教师编制、稳定的工资——在大多数人眼中，这是农村子弟最好的出路。但俞敏洪心里一直有个未了的心愿：出国留学。当时，北大青年教师中流行着一股出国潮，许多人通过考取托福、申请美国大学的奖学金离开中国。俞敏洪也开始准备托福考试，同时在校外接了几个家教学生，赚的钱全部存起来作为留学基金。

为攒出国的学费，俞敏洪开始在校外兼职。1988年前后，他利用自己的英语特长，在北京社会上开办英语培训班，帮学生准备托福和GRE考试。他的课很受欢迎，收入远超学校的工资——当时北大讲师月薪不过一百多元，而他在校外带一个班就能赚三四百。但按照当时北大的规定，教师不得在校外兼职。1990年秋天，北京大学对俞敏洪给予行政记过处分，处分通告在学校著名的“三角地”公告栏张贴了一个月。对于一个留校教师来说，这种公开羞辱是致命的。

俞敏洪后来回忆这段经历时说：“处分通告贴出来的那天，我站在三角地的布告栏前，看着来来往往的学生，觉得自己的尊严被彻底撕碎了。”这次处分成为压垮他与北大关系的最后一根稻草。1991年，俞敏洪正式从北大辞职。他后来在多个场合表示，北大的处分“反而帮了我”——如果不是被逼到绝境，他可能永远下不了决心离开体制。

值得注意的是，俞敏洪在北大的经历塑造了他此后一生的社交网络。虽然他在大学期间因为自卑而很少社交，但他后来的几位最重要的商业伙伴——包括徐小平、王强——都是北大同学。这种“同学关系”在中国商业文化中具有特殊的分量，它比同事关系更紧密、比朋友关系更有约束力。

辞职后的俞敏洪，在中关村第二小学附近租了一间简陋的平房，挂出了“东方大学英语培训部”的招牌。从北大英语教师到个体户，身份的跌落是巨大的。他后来在自传体作品《我曾走在崩溃的边缘》中写道：“那段时间，我最大的心理障碍不是赚钱的辛苦，而是身份的转换。昨天还是北大老师，今天就变成了街边办学的小老板。”但正是这种从体制到市场、从尊严到生存的心理落差，成为他此后创业精神的核心驱动力——他此后三十年的一切努力，某种意义上都是在重建那份被处分通告撕碎的尊严。

**English:** In autumn 1980, 18-year-old Yu Minhong carried his bedding into Peking University. But due to his rural background and thick Jiangyin accent, he was placed in the lowest English class—Class C. In this elite institution, he was one of few students from the countryside, and a profound sense of inferiority shadowed his entire university years. He later recalled: 'I dared not speak in front of classmates because my accent was pure Jiangyin dialect. Many classmates had grown up in cities; their spoken English and horizons far exceeded mine.' This insecurity had grounds—many classmates were children of cadres or intellectual families exposed to English from childhood, while Yu's English education came from a worn copy of '900 English Sentences.'

In 1982, during his junior year, Yu was diagnosed with infectious tuberculosis and had to suspend studies for a year. In a hospital bed, he spent an extraordinary period: reading approximately 200 books including English literary originals; writing over 200 poems; and memorizing tens of thousands of English words. This illness unexpectedly laid deep foundations for his English vocabulary—and it was this forced pause that shifted him from 'competing with others' to 'competing with himself.' He later called this his most important university takeaway: 'When you stop trying to surpass others and focus on surpassing yesterday's self, inner anxiety disappears.'

During convalescence, Yu also did something crucial for his future entrepreneurship: he began systematically organizing English learning methods. He summarized his bedside vocabulary memorization experience into a 'root + association' memory technique, which later became one of the core pillars of New Oriental's teaching system. The poems he wrote during hospitalization, though never published, exercised his ability to express emotions through language—an ability that later transformed into a unique teaching charisma in New Oriental classrooms.

It is worth noting that Yu's PKU experience shaped his lifelong social network. Although he rarely socialized during university due to inferiority, several of his most important future business partners—including Xu Xiaoping and Wang Qiang—were PKU classmates. This 'classmate relationship' carries special weight in Chinese business culture, tighter than colleague relationships and more binding than friendships.

In 1985, Yu graduated from PKU and was retained as a lecturer. He now had a Beijing hukou, government teaching position, and stable salary—in most eyes, the best outcome for a rural youth. But Yu harbored an unfulfilled wish: to study abroad. A wave of overseas study was popular among young PKU faculty. Yu also began preparing for TOEFL while taking on outside tutoring students.

To save money, Yu began outside work. Around 1988, leveraging his English expertise, he ran tutorial classes in Beijing, helping students prepare for TOEFL and GRE. His classes were popular, income far exceeding his university salary—then a PKU lecturer earned only 100-plus yuan monthly, while teaching one outside class brought 300-400. But according to PKU regulations, faculty could not hold outside jobs. In autumn 1990, PKU issued Yu an administrative demerit; the notice was posted on the famous 'Triangle Land' bulletin board for a full month.

Yu later recalled: 'The day the notice went up, I stood before the bulletin board at Triangle Land, watching students come and go, and felt my dignity completely shattered.' This became the last straw. In 1991, Yu formally resigned. He stated on multiple occasions that PKU's punishment 'actually helped me'—had he not been pushed to the edge, he might never have found the resolve to leave the system.

After resigning, Yu rented a modest bungalow near Zhongguancun No. 2 Primary School and hung a sign reading 'Orient University English Training Center.' The fall from PKU lecturer to self-employed operator was enormous. He later wrote: 'My biggest obstacle was not earning money's hardship, but the identity transformation. Yesterday I was a PKU teacher; today I'd become a small-time boss.' Yet precisely this gap—from system to market, from dignity to survival—became the core driving force of his entrepreneurial spirit. Everything over the next thirty years was, in a sense, rebuilding the dignity that the disciplinary notice had torn apart.

### 3. 新东方：从平房到教培帝国 / New Oriental: From a Bungalow to an Education Empire

1993年11月16日，北京新东方学校正式注册成立。最初的校址在西三旗一间仅十平方米的平房里，“员工”只有俞敏洪和妻子杨桂萍两个人。开学第一天，俞敏洪骑着自行车在海淀区的大街小巷贴招生广告，晚上则在附近的小学教室里办免费讲座，用最朴素的方式打开局面。那时候的教室连暖气都没有，冬天上课时学生们裹着棉衣听课，俞敏洪讲台上放着一杯热水暖手，下课后还要骑着自行车把学生们一一送回家。

俞敏洪独创的“激情教学法”成为新东方早期的核心竞争力。他将励志故事、人生哲理与英语教学紧密结合，课堂上不仅教单词和语法，更讲“如何在绝望中寻找希望”。这种风格精准地击中了90年代中国青年的两大焦虑：出国热与对未来的迷茫。当时的中国正处于改革开放的加速期，越来越多的年轻人渴望走出国门看世界，而新东方提供的不只是英语培训，更是一种精神激励。学生们说：“去新东方不只是为了学英语，更是为了听俞老师讲故事，听他讲那些关于奋斗、关于不屈的故事。”

俞敏洪的课堂常常座无虚席，甚至有学生从天津、河北坐火车来北京听他讲课。他的课堂有一个独特之处：每节课的前二十分钟不是教英语，而是讲故事、讲人生、讲理想。这种“先做人、后做题”的教学理念，与当时所有英语培训机构的应试导向形成了鲜明对比。一位曾在新东方学习的学生后来回忆说：“我在新东方学到的最重要的东西，不是任何一个单词或语法，而是俞老师说的'在绝望中寻找希望'这句话。这句话在我后来的创业过程中支撑了我很多次。”

学生人数从最初的几十人迅速增长到数百人、数千人。到1995年前后，新东方的托福、GRE培训班在北京已经小有名气，年培训学员超过万人。1995年底，一个关键转折出现了：俞敏洪的大学同学、在加拿大滑铁卢大学留学的徐小平回国加盟新东方。徐小平带来了西方化的管理理念和签证咨询经验，新东方的业务从单纯的英语培训扩展到了出国留学咨询服务。紧接着，另一位大学同学王强也从美国回来加入。三人形成“三驾马车”格局——俞敏洪负责教学运营，徐小平负责出国咨询，王强负责口语教学。

但合伙创业的道路并不平坦。三人在海外都有各自的生活，回国后的管理理念和利益分配不断产生摩擦。俞敏洪后来在《我曾走在崩溃的边缘》中详细描述了这段“中国合伙人”式的纠葛：家族成员进入公司管理、股权分配争议、管理权争夺——这些后来成为电影《中国合伙人》的素材。2000年前后，经过艰难的谈判和调整，徐小平和王强陆续退出管理层，俞敏洪完成了对公司的集中控制。这段经历让他深刻认识到：在中国做企业，“人情”和“制度”的冲突是永恒的主题。

新东方的企业文化也在这一时期逐渐成型。“在绝望中寻找希望”不仅是教学理念，更成为企业的核心精神。每年9月7日——新东方上市纪念日——被内部定为“新东方日”，全体员工会举办庆祝活动。这种仪式感，在一个以“打工”为常态的行业里，创造出了一种近乎宗教般的归属感。

在集团化之后，新东方还做了一件在当时颇具前瞻性的事：2003年，它推出了在线教育平台“新东方在线”（后更名为新东方网），开始尝试将线下课程搬到互联网上。虽然当时的技术和网络条件远不成熟，用户规模也很有限，但这一步为后来的东方甄选埋下了伏笔——正是这个已上市的在线教育平台，在双减后成为了直播电商的运营主体。

2001年，新东方教育科技集团正式挂牌成立，标志着从单一培训学校向综合性教育集团的转型。到2006年上市前，新东方已在全国数十个城市开设分校，拥有数万名员工，年培训学员超过百万人次。从一间十平米平房到覆盖全国的教育帝国，新东方用了十三年。这十三年，恰好是中国民办教育从无到有、从小到大的完整缩影。俞敏洪将个人命运与行业大势完美地绑定在一起——他不仅是一个培训机构的创始人，更成为了一个时代的文化符号。在新东方的课堂上，“在绝望中寻找希望”不只是一句口号，而是几百万学生共同的精神记忆。

**English:** On November 16, 1993, Beijing New Oriental School was formally registered. The original campus was a ten-square-meter bungalow in Xisanqi, with only two 'employees'—Yu Minhong and his wife Yang Guiping. On the first day, Yu rode his bicycle through Haidian District pasting recruitment flyers, and held free lectures in nearby school classrooms. The classroom had no heating; students wore padded coats in winter while Yu kept a cup of hot water on the podium.

Yu's self-created 'Passion Teaching Method' became New Oriental's core competitiveness. He tightly integrated motivational stories, life philosophy, and English teaching. In class, he taught not just vocabulary and grammar but 'how to find hope in despair.' This style precisely struck two anxieties of 1990s Chinese youth: the fever to study abroad and confusion about the future. Students said: 'Going to New Oriental isn't just about learning English—it's about hearing Teacher Yu's stories of struggle and perseverance.'

Yu's classrooms were often packed to capacity; students even came by train from Tianjin and Hebei to attend. His classroom had a unique feature: the first twenty minutes were not about English, but stories, life philosophy, and ideals. This 'be a person first, solve problems second' philosophy contrasted sharply with the exam-oriented approach of other institutions. A former student later recalled: 'The most important thing I learned wasn't any word or grammar rule, but "seek hope in despair." Those words sustained me many times in my own entrepreneurial journey.'

Student numbers grew rapidly from dozens to thousands. By around 1995, New Oriental's TOEFL and GRE classes had gained a Beijing reputation, with annual enrollment exceeding ten thousand. At the end of 1995, a critical turning point arrived: Yu's university classmate Xu Xiaoping returned from Canada and joined New Oriental, bringing Western management concepts and visa consulting experience. Soon after, Wang Qiang also returned from the US. The three formed the 'three horses' partnership.

But partnership entrepreneurship was far from smooth. Management philosophy differences and profit-sharing disputes created constant friction. Yu detailed this 'Chinese Partnership'-style entanglement in 'I Once Walked on the Edge of Collapse': family members in management, equity disputes, power struggles—material that later became the film 'American Dreams in China.' Around 2000, after arduous negotiations, Xu and Wang withdrew from management, and Yu centralized control.

After group formation, New Oriental did something forward-thinking in 2003: it launched the online platform 'New Oriental Online' (later renamed), beginning to experiment with moving offline courses online. Although technology and network conditions were immature and user scale limited, this step laid groundwork for what would later become East Buy—this already-listed online education platform became the operating entity for livestream commerce after double reduction.

The New Oriental corporate culture also took shape during this period. 'Seek hope in despair' was not just a teaching philosophy but the enterprise's core spirit. September 7—New Oriental's listing anniversary—was designated 'New Oriental Day' annually, with all employees celebrating. This sense of ritual, in an industry accustomed to 'just working,' created an almost religious sense of belonging.

By the 2006 IPO, New Oriental had schools in dozens of cities, tens of thousands of employees, and over a million annual student enrollments. From a ten-square-meter bungalow to a nationwide empire took thirteen years—exactly the complete microcosm of China's private education growing from nothing. Yu perfectly bound his personal destiny to the industry's trajectory—becoming not just a training institution founder, but a cultural symbol of an era.

### 4. 上市与浑水之战 / The IPO and the Muddy Waters Battle

2006年9月7日，新东方教育科技集团在美国纽约证券交易所成功上市，成为中国大陆第一家在美国上市的教育机构。发行价每股15美元，开盘后迅速上涨，当日收于21.22美元，较发行价上涨41.5%，融资约1.125亿美元。俞敏洪一夜之间身家暴涨至数亿元，媒体蜂拥而至，“中国最富有的教师”成为他最广为人知的标签之一。上市当天晚上，俞敏洪在纽约街头请所有在场的新东方同事吃了一顿庆功宴，但他心里清楚，上市只是一个新的开始，而不是终点。

然而，上市对俞敏洪来说并非纯粹的喜事。他后来在许知远的《十三邀》访谈中坦言，上市这件事“特别荒谬”。他的原话是：“教育是一个慢的过程，上市就像娶了一个你不仅甩不掉、还要每年为她增长25%收入的女人。”这种矛盾心态贯穿了他此后多年的公开表达——作为企业家，他需要向华尔街证明新东方的增长潜力；作为教育者，他深知教育的本质是长期的、缓慢的、难以量化的。

上市后的新东方进入了快速扩张期，但也开始面临资本市场带来的压力。每个季度都要发布财报，每个季度都要回应分析师的增长预期。俞敏洪在多个场合表达过这种焦虑：“上市以后，我每年都在担心股价。如果哪一天股价跌了，投资者就会打电话来问我。这种压力是做教育时从来没有过的。”为了应对华尔街的增长要求，新东方不得不加快开店速度、提高课程价格、拓展新的业务线——这些决策在此后看来，有些是正确的发展，有些则是为后来的危机埋下了伏笔。

真正的考验在2012年到来。当年7月，美国知名做空机构浑水公司（Muddy Waters）发布了一份针对新东方的做空报告，指控新东方存在财务欺诈行为，包括加盟校数据造假、收入虚增等问题。报告发布后，新东方股价在两个交易日内累计暴跌57%，市值蒸发近半。SEC（美国证券交易委员会）随后宣布对新东方展开调查。这是新东方成立以来遭遇的最严重的外部信任危机。

面对危机，俞敏洪展现了极强的行动力。他在报告发布当天清晨七点即召开新闻发布会，逐条回应浑水的指控，称报告“毫无根据”。与此同时，他迅速联络了马云、柳传志等中国企业家朋友，联合出资约3亿美元在公开市场买入新东方股票，向市场传递信心。新东方还聘请了独立审计机构进行内部调查，最终证明公司财务数据没有重大问题。不到一年，新东方股价恢复到做空报告发布前的水平。

但俞敏洪后来坦承，浑水之战的代价远不止股价。“虽然股价恢复了，但信誉的修复比股价慢得多。投资者对你的信任一旦出现裂痕，就需要更长的时间来弥合。”这场危机也让他开始重新审视新东方的公司治理结构——一家在美国上市的中国公司，如何在中美两种商业文化之间找到平衡？这个问题，在此后多年一直困扰着他。浑水之战还带来了一个意外的正面效果：它让俞敏洪在中国企业家群体中赢得了更高的声望。在他最困难的时刻，马云、柳传志等人的慷慨出手，不仅帮助新东方度过了危机，也让俞敏洪在中国商界建立了一个重要的“人情网络”。此后多年，每当新东方遇到困难，这些人脉资源都会发挥关键作用。俞敏洪后来感慨说：“在中国做生意，最重要的不是你有多少钱，而是在你最难的时候，有谁愿意站出来帮你。”

浑水之战后，俞敏洪对资本市场的态度发生了微妙变化。他不再像上市初期那样抗拒华尔街的压力，而是学会了如何在“坚持教育理念”和“满足投资者预期”之间寻找平衡点。他开始定期参加投资者会议，主动与分析师沟通，甚至在财报电话会上开玩笑说：“我现在对资本市场的态度是——你不能不听它的话，但也不能全听它的话。”

浑水之战成为他管理生涯中的一个分水岭：在此之前，他是一个纯粹的教育企业家；在此之后，他开始更深刻地理解资本市场的规则与风险。

**English:** On September 7, 2006, New Oriental Education Technology Group successfully listed on the NYSE, becoming the first education institution from mainland China to list in the United States. The IPO price was $15 per share; it closed at $21.22, a 41.5% increase, raising approximately $112.5 million. Yu's personal wealth surged overnight to hundreds of millions. 'China's wealthiest teacher' became one of his most widely known labels. On listing night, Yu treated colleagues to a celebration dinner in New York, but he knew clearly this was just a new beginning.

However, the listing was not purely joyful. He later confessed that the IPO was 'particularly absurd.' His words: 'Education is a slow process. Going public is like marrying a woman you can't get rid of, and who requires you to grow her income by 25% every year.' This ambivalence ran through his public expressions—as entrepreneur, he needed to prove growth to Wall Street; as educator, he understood education's essence is long-term and hard to quantify.

After the IPO, New Oriental entered rapid expansion but faced capital market pressure. Every quarter required earnings reports and responses to analysts' growth expectations. Yu expressed this anxiety repeatedly: 'After going public, I worried about the stock price every year. If it fell, investors would call. That pressure never existed in education.' To meet Wall Street demands, New Oriental accelerated openings, raised prices, and expanded business lines—some correct development, others planting seeds for future crises.

The true test arrived in 2012. That July, Muddy Waters released a short-selling report alleging financial fraud including fabricated franchise data and inflated revenue. The stock plunged 57% over two trading days; market value nearly halved. The SEC subsequently announced an investigation. This was the most severe external trust crisis in New Oriental's history.

Facing crisis, Yu demonstrated remarkable decisiveness. He held a press conference at seven that morning, addressing allegations point by point as 'completely baseless.' He contacted entrepreneur friends including Jack Ma and Liu Chuanzhi, jointly investing approximately $300 million to purchase shares. New Oriental hired independent auditors; the investigation confirmed no major financial issues. Within less than a year, the stock recovered.

The Muddy Waters battle also produced an unexpected positive effect: it earned Yu higher prestige among Chinese entrepreneurs. The generous intervention of Ma, Liu and others not only helped weather the crisis but established an important 'relationship network' for Yu. He later reflected: 'In Chinese business, what matters most isn't how much money you have, but who is willing to stand up and help you when you're at your lowest.'

After the battle, Yu's attitude toward capital markets underwent subtle change. He learned to find balance between 'maintaining educational principles' and 'meeting investor expectations.' He began attending investor meetings regularly, even joking on earnings calls: 'My attitude toward capital markets now is—you can't ignore it, but you can't follow it completely either.'

The Muddy Waters battle became a watershed in Yu's management career: before it, he was a pure education entrepreneur; after it, he began to more deeply understand capital market rules and risks. But Yu acknowledged the cost extended beyond stock price: 'Although the stock recovered, restoring reputation was much slower. Once the crack in investor trust appears, it takes longer to heal.' The crisis prompted re-examination of corporate governance—how does a Chinese company listed in the US find balance between two business cultures? This question troubled him for years.

### 5. 教培巅峰与多元扩张 / The Peak of Tutoring and Diversified Expansion

度过浑水危机后，新东方进入了历史上增长最快的时期。这一阶段的核心增长引擎是K12学科培训——即面向小学到高中学生的课外辅导业务。随着中国家长对教育竞争的焦虑不断升级，课外培训市场以每年两位数的速度膨胀。新东方的K12业务从2012年的约占总营收30%，到2021年已占到约60%，取代了原有的出国留学培训，成为公司的绝对主力。这种转型在商业上是成功的，但也在某种程度上偏离了俞敏洪最初创办新东方的初心——帮助大学生出国留学。

竞争环境也在变化。学而思（后更名为好未来）等新兴教培公司的崛起，倒逼新东方加速线下扩张。到2021年双减政策之前，新东方在全国拥有超过1500个教学点，覆盖几乎所有省会城市和主要地级市，年培训学员超过千万人次，员工总数近10万人。与此同时，新东方在2019年3月将旗下在线教育平台“新东方在线”推上港交所，成为港股“在线教育第一股”；2020年11月，新东方本身也在港交所完成二次上市，股份代号9901，市值峰值达2699.6亿港元。资本市场的认可，将新东方的声望推到了顶点。

在资本和教育两条战线高歌猛进的同时，俞敏洪也开始向投资领域跨界。2014年11月，他与华泰联合证券前董事长盛希泰共同创立洪泰基金，定位天使投资和早期投资。洪泰基金主要关注文化娱乐、消费升级、教育科技等领域的早期项目。俞敏洪将此举定义为自己“从教育企业家向投资人”的跨界尝试，但他也明确表示，教育始终是自己的主线，投资只是补充。洪泰基金的成立，某种程度上反映了俞敏洪对教育行业天花板的预判——当行业增速放缓时，投资布局是分散风险的理性选择。

这一时期的俞敏洪，已经完成了从“北大老师”到“教培巨头”再到“资本玩家”的身份转换。他的社交圈层也从教育界扩展到了整个中国商界——马云、柳传志、王健林等人都是他的座上客。他在多个商业论坛上发言，成为中国企业界最具辨识度的人物之一。与此同时，他也开始投入大量时间写作和演讲，出版了多本个人著作，成为“企业家作家”的代表人物。

值得关注的是，新东方在巅峰时期的扩张速度令人瞩目。从2012年到2021年的九年间，公司营收从约7亿美元增长至约43亿美元，年均复合增长率接近20%。这种增长主要依靠两条腿走路：一是不断开设新的线下教学点，二是通过提价来驱动同店增长。在一线城市，新东方的课程单价从每课时几十元上涨到几百元；在三四线城市，新东方的品牌效应使其能够以高于当地竞争对手的价格招生。这种“品牌溢价+规模扩张”的模式，在政策允许的情况下是高度有效的，但一旦政策风向转变，整个模式便面临瓦解的风险。

在这一时期，俞敏洪的个人影响力也达到了巅峰。他的演讲视频在网络上广为传播，“在绝望中寻找希望”成为社交媒体上的流行语。他频繁出现在各类商业论坛和电视节目中，与马云、任正非等人同台对话。但他在公开场合始终保持着一贯的低调和幽默：“马云是天才，我是地才。天才在地上飞，地才在地上爬。但地上爬的好处是，摔下来的时候不那么疼。”

但繁荣的表象下，隐忧已经显现。K12教培行业的高速增长，建立在一个根本前提之上：政策允许学科类培训的商业化运营。而当这个前提被动摇时，整个商业大厦的根基便不再稳固。2018年起，教育部已经开始对课外培训机构进行专项整治；2019年，《关于规范校外线上培训活动的实施意见》出台；2021年7月24日，“双减”政策正式落地——这一纸文件，将彻底改写俞敏洪的商业版图。回头看，新东方巅峰期的辉煌，恰恰是政策风险积累最深的时期——这是俞敏洪此后反复反思的教训。

**English:** After weathering the Muddy Waters crisis, New Oriental entered its fastest growth period. The core engine was K-12 academic tutoring. As Chinese parents' anxiety about educational competition intensified, the after-school tutoring market expanded at double-digit annual rates. New Oriental's K-12 business grew from approximately 30% of total revenue in 2012 to about 60% by 2021, overtaking overseas study preparation as the company's mainstay. This transformation was commercially successful but deviated from Yu's original mission of helping students study abroad.

The competitive landscape also shifted. The rise of TAL Education and others forced New Oriental to accelerate offline expansion. By 2021, it operated over 1,500 teaching centers nationwide, with nearly 100,000 employees. In March 2019, New Oriental pushed its online platform onto HKEX as the 'first online education stock'; in November 2020, it completed a secondary HKEX listing (code 9901), reaching a peak market cap of HK$269.96 billion.

It is worth noting that New Oriental's expansion speed at its peak was remarkable. From 2012 to 2021, revenue grew from approximately $700 million to about $4.3 billion, a compound annual growth rate of nearly 20%. This growth relied on two legs: continuously opening new offline centers and driving same-store growth through price increases. In first-tier cities, course unit prices rose from tens to hundreds of yuan per session; in third and fourth-tier cities, New Oriental's brand premium allowed it to charge above local competitors. This 'brand premium plus scale expansion' model was highly effective under permissive policy, but once policy winds shifted, the entire model faced dissolution risk.

While advancing on both fronts, Yu also crossed into investment. In November 2014, he co-founded HT Fund with Sheng Xitai, focusing on early-stage projects in cultural entertainment, consumption upgrading, and education technology. Yu defined this as his crossover from 'education entrepreneur to investor,' while making clear education remained his main line. HT Fund's establishment reflected Yu's anticipation of the tutoring industry's ceiling—when growth slows, investment diversification is a rational choice.

During this period, Yu completed his identity transformation from 'PKU teacher' to 'tutoring giant' to 'capital player.' His social circles expanded into broader Chinese business. He spoke at numerous forums, becoming one of the most recognizable figures. His influence peaked during this time; his speech videos spread widely online, and 'seek hope in despair' became a social media catchphrase. But he maintained his characteristic modesty and humor in public: 'Jack Ma is a genius; I'm an earthling talent. Geniuses fly above the earth; earthling talents crawl on it. But the advantage of crawling is that when you fall, it doesn't hurt as much.'

But beneath prosperity, hidden risks were emerging. K-12 tutoring's rapid growth was built on one fundamental premise: policy permitting commercialized academic tutoring. When that premise was shaken, the entire edifice became unstable. Starting 2018, the Ministry of Education began special rectifications; on July 24, 2021, 'double reduction' officially landed—this single document would completely rewrite Yu's business landscape. In retrospect, New Oriental's peak brilliance was precisely when policy risks were deepest—a lesson Yu has repeatedly reflected upon since.

### 6. 双减风暴：教培帝国的崩塌 / The Double Reduction Storm: An Empire Collapses

2021年7月24日，中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅联合印发《关于进一步减轻义务教育阶段学生作业负担和校外培训负担的意见》——即后来广为人知的“双减”政策。这份文件的力度超出了几乎所有市场参与者的预期。政策核心条款明确：现有学科类校外培训机构统一登记为非营利性机构；学科类培训机构一律不得上市融资，严禁资本化运作；上市公司不得通过股票市场融资投资学科类培训机构。这一纸文件直接宣判了学科类教培机构的资本化死刑。整个教培行业在一夜之间从“黄金赛道”变成了“政策雷区”。

对新东方而言，打击是毁灭性的。政策发布当日，新东方股价暴跌超50%。从2021年2月最高点的19.97美元/股，一路跌至8月下旬的1.68美元/股，累计跌幅超过90%。市值从最高峰的2699.6亿港元缩水至仅剩约272亿港元，蒸发超过2000亿港元。对于持有大量股票的俞敏洪而言，个人财富的缩水是天文数字——但他后来的公开回应异常平静，只是说“做教育这么多年，见惯了风浪，这次不过是最大的一次”。

更为致命的是业务层面。新东方的K9（小学到初中）学科类业务约占公司总营收的60%，而这恰恰是双减政策的核心打击对象。2021年11月15日，新东方正式宣布全面停止K9学科类校外培训业务。这意味着公司要在极短的时间内退租遍布全国的1500余个教学点、裁减约6万名员工、退还学生预缴的学费。这是一项几乎不可能完成的任务——但俞敏洪用三个月的时间基本完成了。

根据新东方后续发布的财报数据，2022财年（截至2022年5月31日）公司净亏损约5.46亿美元，而前一年同期为净利润约5亿美元——一年之间，盈亏差距超过10亿美元。各项现金支出——包括离职补偿金、退租违约金、学生退费、教学设备处置等——总计超过200亿元人民币。俞敏洪后来在接受中国新闻周刊采访时说：“那段时间，我每天只睡四五个小时。不是睡不着，是不敢睡。因为一闭眼就想，明天还有多少事情要处理。”

双减政策的冲击不仅限于新东方。整个教培行业在政策发布后经历了大规模裁员和转型。据教育部数据，政策实施后全国学科类校外培训机构减少了超过90%。学而思（好未来）股价同样暴跌超90%，高途集团裁员数万人。但与其他教培公司不同的是，新东方拥有更充裕的现金储备和更强的品牌信誉，这使得它在应对危机时有更大的回旋余地。俞敏洪后来将这种优势归结为“长期主义的回报”——正因为多年来坚持保守的财务策略，保持了充足的现金储备，才能够在危机来临时有能力体面地善后。

双减政策对整个中国社会的冲击也值得关注。它不仅改变了一个行业的命运，也深刻影响了千万家庭的日常生活。政策实施后，大量家长转向“一对一”家教或海外在线课程，地下教培市场在某种程度上反而更加猖獗。但俞敏洪没有在这个问题上纠缠——他在内部会议上明确表示：“政策的目的就是减轻学生负担，我们应该支持，而不是找漏洞。我们能做的，是在政策允许的范围内找到新的出路。”

在善后过程中，俞敏洪还做了一件被外界忽略的事：他为被裁员工举办了多场职业培训和再就业推荐会，利用新东方在行业内的资源，帮助数千名员工找到了新的工作机会。一些被裁员工后来进入了其他教培公司，一些转型做了自媒体，还有一些加入了东方甄选。俞敏洪说：“我不能保证每个人的未来，但至少在他们离开的时候，我应该帮他们看看路。”

这场危机的特殊性在于：它不是因为经营失误、不是因为竞争对手、不是因为技术变革，而是因为政策转向。对于俞敏洪这样一位与政策打了几十年交道的企业家来说，这种“不可抗力”是最难以应对的。他在此后的多次公开发言中都表现出一种罕见的克制——没有抱怨政策，没有批评监管，只是反复强调“做正确的事”。这种克制的背后，是一个经历过1990年北大处分、深知体制力量不可违抗的老练。他在内部信中对员工说：“我们不是因为做错了什么而走到今天这一步，而是因为时代选择了转向。我们能做的，就是体面地告别，然后寻找新的开始。”

**English:** On July 24, 2021, the CPC Central Committee and State Council jointly issued 'Opinions on Further Reducing Homework and After-School Training Burdens'—the 'double reduction' policy. The document's force exceeded nearly all expectations. Core provisions: existing academic tutoring institutions must register as non-profit; they are forbidden from capital market financing; listed companies may not invest in academic tutoring through stock financing. This document pronounced a capital-market death sentence on academic tutoring. The entire industry went overnight from 'golden track' to 'policy minefield.'

For New Oriental, the impact was devastating. Stock price plunged over 50% on announcement day. From its February 2021 peak of $19.97/share, it fell to $1.68 by late August—cumulative decline exceeding 90%. Market cap shrank from HK$269.96 billion to just HK$27.2 billion, evaporating over HK$200 billion. Yu's personal wealth loss was astronomical—but his public response was remarkably calm: 'In education for so many years, I've seen storms. This is just the biggest one.'

Even more devastating was the operational impact. K-9 academic business accounted for approximately 60% of revenue—precisely the policy's primary target. On November 15, 2021, New Oriental formally ceased all K-9 academic tutoring. This meant terminating leases on 1,500+ centers, laying off approximately 60,000 employees, and refunding prepaid tuition—in extremely compressed timeframes. This was a nearly impossible task—but Yu completed it in approximately three months.

The double reduction policy's impact on the entire Chinese society also deserves attention. It not only changed one industry's fate but profoundly affected millions of families' daily lives. After implementation, many parents turned to one-on-one tutoring or overseas online courses; underground tutoring became even more rampant in some ways. But Yu didn't dwell on this—he stated clearly in internal meetings: 'The policy's purpose is reducing student burden; we should support it, not find loopholes. What we can do is find new paths within what policy allows.'

Fiscal 2022 saw a net loss of approximately $546 million, versus net profit of about $500 million the prior year—a swing exceeding $1 billion. Total cash outlays—severance, lease penalties, student refunds, equipment disposal—exceeded 20 billion RMB. Yu told China Newsweek: 'During that period, I only slept four or five hours daily. Not because I couldn't sleep, but because I dared not.'

During the settlement process, Yu also did something overlooked externally: he organized multiple career training and re-employment sessions for laid-off employees, leveraging New Oriental's industry resources to help thousands find new positions. Some joined other tutoring companies, some pivoted to self-media, others joined East Buy. Yu said: 'I can't guarantee anyone's future, but at least when they leave, I should help them look at the road ahead.'

What made this crisis unique: it was not caused by operational missteps, competitors, or technological disruption, but by policy pivot. Yu displayed rare restraint—no complaints about policy, no criticism of regulators, simply emphasis on 'doing the right thing.' Behind that restraint lay the sophistication of a man who, having experienced the 1990 PKU disciplinary action, deeply understood that systemic power cannot be defied. In an internal letter: 'We didn't arrive here because we did something wrong, but because the times chose to shift. What we can do is say goodbye with dignity, then find a new beginning.'

### 7. 体面退场：八万套课桌椅的尊严 / A Dignified Exit: The 80,000 Sets of Desks

2021年11月4日，在教培行业一片狼藉的退场潮中，俞敏洪在微信朋友圈转发了一篇文章，附带一则消息：新东方向乡村学校捐献近八万套崭新的课桌椅，价值约5000万元，涉及郑州、西安、成都、长沙等十余个城市的分校。这些课桌椅是此前新东方各地分校为学生定制的，每套市场价在六七百元上下。由于K9业务停止，这些崭新的课桌椅不再被需要，与其当作废品处理，不如捐给更需要的乡村学校。

捐课桌椅的决定看似简单，但在那个时间节点上具有极强的象征意义。彼时，教培行业正经历一场史无前例的崩塌。大量培训机构仓皇关门，跑路、欠薪、卷款消失的新闻不绝于耳。韦博英语、华尔街英语等知名品牌的倒闭引发了广泛的社会关注，学生预缴的学费打水漂，员工被欠薪数月。在这样的行业背景下，新东方不但没有跑路，还退了近6万人的离职补偿金、退了学生的学费、退了教学点的租金，最后还把带不走的课桌椅捐给了乡村学校。

这一举动被大量媒体和公众解读为“教培时代最体面的退场”。“俞敏洪的体面”成为社交媒体上的热门话题。但俞敏洪本人在随后的采访中表现得异常平静：“这不是什么伟大的事情，只是做了该做的事。这些桌椅本来就是给孩子们用的，现在我们的教室不用了，给更需要的孩子，有什么了不起？”他在内部会议上还特别强调，捐桌椅不是为了公关，而是因为他觉得“这些桌椅如果烂在仓库里，是对资源的浪费，也是对教育的亵渎”。

当然，也有不同的声音。罗永浩在社交媒体上评价俞敏洪“总是披着理想主义的外衣，把自己塑造得很高尚很纯洁，这就太虚伪了”。他认为捐课桌椅只是一种公关行为，不应被过度美化。中国新闻周刊的深度报道也指出，在捐课桌椅事件被舆论放大的同时，六万被裁员工的命运更值得关注——他们中有人虽然拿到了离职补偿，但依然长期失业。报道引用了一位被裁员工的话：“课桌椅捐了，那我们的工作谁来管？”

捐课桌椅事件的传播效果远超俞敏洪的预期。在社交媒体上，“俞敏洪的体面”相关话题阅读量超过十亿次。许多网友将新东方与跑路的其他教培公司对比，称“这就是格局的差距”。但俞敏洪本人在接受采访时多次强调，他不希望被贴上“体面人”的标签：“我只是在做该做的事情。如果这算体面，那说明这个行业以前的底线太低了。”这句话背后隐含着一个尖锐的观察：在一个充斥着跑路、欠薪和虚假宣传的行业中，仅仅是做到了基本的商业道德，就已经足以被当作“体面”来赞美——这本身就是行业病态的证明。

在捐课桌椅的同时，俞敏洪还在内部做了一个重要决定：将所有被裁员工的离职补偿标准设定为高于法律要求的水平。按照法律规定，公司只需支付“N+1”的补偿金，但新东方最终按照“N+1+额外奖励”的标准执行，部分资深员工拿到了超过十万元的补偿。这一决定在当时引发了同行的侧目——许多教培公司甚至连法定的补偿金都无力支付。

在后来的多次演讲中，俞敏洪对捐课桌椅事件做了更深入的反思。他说：“很多人夸我体面，但其实体面是有代价的。退租要赔违约金，退费要消耗现金流，裁员要付补偿金——这些加在一起，是两百多亿的现金支出。如果有人问我'你后悔吗'，我的回答是：不后悔，但心疼。这种心疼不是对钱的，而是对那些跟着我干了十几年的员工，我没能保护好他们。”

无论如何，八万套课桌椅成为了一个标志性符号。它既是一个时代落幕的注脚——教培行业的黄金十五年就此画上句号；也是俞敏洪“知识分子商人”人设的集中体现——既有商人的精明计算，也有知识分子的道德自觉。在此后东方甄选的直播带货中，“助农”成为核心定位，某种程度上也是捐课桌椅叙事的延伸：一个有社会责任感的成功企业家，在行业崩塌后选择用最体面的方式收场，然后重新出发。

**English:** On November 4, 2021, amid the chaotic collapse of China's tutoring industry, Yu shared on WeChat Moments that New Oriental would donate nearly 80,000 sets of brand-new desks and chairs to rural schools, valued at approximately 50 million yuan, across 10+ cities. These desk sets had been custom-made for students; each valued at 600-700 yuan. With K-9 operations halted, rather than treating them as waste, donating to rural schools made more sense.

The decision seemed simple, but at that moment carried enormous symbolic weight. The tutoring industry was experiencing unprecedented collapse. Numerous institutions shut down in panic; news of operators absconding, withholding wages, and disappearing with prepaid fees was constant. The collapses of Web English and Wall Street English drew widespread attention. Against this backdrop, New Oriental not only didn't abscond, but paid severance to nearly 60,000 departing employees, refunded student tuition, settled leases, and donated the desks and chairs.

This gesture was widely interpreted as 'the most dignified exit in the tutoring era.' But Yu was remarkably calm: 'This isn't some great thing; I just did what should be done. These desks were always meant for children. Our classrooms don't need them, so giving them to children who need them more—what's so remarkable?' He emphasized in internal meetings the donation wasn't for PR, but because 'letting these desks rot in warehouses would be wasting resources and desecrating education.'

Alongside the desk donation, Yu made another important internal decision: setting all laid-off employee severance standards above legal requirements. While law only required 'N+1' compensation, New Oriental ultimately applied 'N+1+bonus' standards, with some senior employees receiving over 100,000 yuan. This decision drew sideways glances from the industry—many tutoring companies couldn't even afford statutory compensation.

Of course, dissenting voices existed. Luo Yonghao commented that Yu 'always drapes himself in idealism's cloak—that's just too hypocritical.' China Newsweek noted that while the desk donation was amplified, the 60,000 laid-off employees' fates deserved more attention—many remained long-term unemployed. One quoted employee asked: 'The desks were donated, but who manages our jobs?'

In subsequent speeches, Yu reflected more deeply: 'Many praised me for dignity, but dignity has a price. Terminating leases means penalties, refunding tuition drains cash, laying off requires compensation—together over 20 billion in cash outflows. If someone asks 'do you regret it,' my answer is: I don't regret it, but it hurts. Not about the money, but about those employees who followed me for over ten years—I couldn't protect them all.'

In any case, the 80,000 desk sets became a symbolic signifier—the epitaph of an era's curtain call, and a concentrated embodiment of Yu's 'intellectual merchant' persona: combining businessman's shrewd calculation with intellectual's moral consciousness. In the subsequent East Buy venture, 'helping farmers' became the core positioning, an extension of the desk-donation narrative.

### 8. 东方甄选：废墟上的重生 / East Buy: Rebirth from the Ruins

2021年12月28日，在双减政策落地五个月后，新东方旗下直播带货平台“东方甄选”正式开播。俞敏洪亲自带队，在抖音平台进行了首场农产品直播，首秀GMV约480万元。平台以“助农”为核心定位，由此前已上市的新东方在线负责运营。选择农产品直播，一方面与双减后公司保留的业务资源有关，另一方面也是捐课桌椅叙事的一种延续——延续“社会责任”的品牌形象。俞敏洪在首场直播中亲自出镜，用他标志性的温和语调介绍来自各地的农产品，但效果并不理想。

东方甄选的前半年堪称惨淡。2021年12月至2022年5月，平台日均GMV不足百万元，粉丝增长缓慢，多个直播间门可罗雀。外界普遍质疑：“教培转行做直播，不过是又一次蹭热度。”甚至有媒体直接用了“新东方的垂死挣扎”作为标题。俞敏洪后来回忆那段时期时说：“每天都在亏钱，但我告诉自己，教育公司做直播，总得给人家一个接受的时间。我不能因为别人说我们不行就停下来。”

命运的齿轮在2022年6月9日开始转动。当天，前新东方英语教师董宇辉以双语直播形式意外走红。他在直播间一边卖牛排一边教英语单词“steak”“medium rare”，一边卖大米一边念“Romance is not seeing a perfect person, but seeing an imperfect person perfectly”。这种“知识带货”的全新模式，与当时充斥“家人们”“321上链接”的直播间生态形成了鲜明对比，精准地击中了抖音用户的审美疲劳。

数据说明了一切：董宇辉走红后的三天内，东方甄选涨粉157万，销售额增加1777万元。新东方在线（东方甄选母公司）股价在12个交易日内累计上涨576%，市值从不到30亿港元飙升至超过300亿港元。到2022年6月底，东方甄选日均GMV已突破2000万元，成为抖音平台增长最快的直播间。资本市场的反应更加狂热——新东方在线的股价在一个月内翻了十倍以上，成为港股市场上最惊人的逆袭故事之一。

东方甄选的成功并非偶然。它的底层逻辑是：在一个信息过载的时代，消费者已经厌倦了被算法操控、被低价诱惑、被话术欺骗。他们渴望一种更真诚、更有内涵的消费体验。董宇辉的知识带货模式恰好满足了这种需求——他不催促你下单，不制造焦虑，而是用知识和文化来建立信任。当他说“这袋大米来自长白山脚下的黑土地”时，消费者感受到的不是推销，而是一种关于土地和食物的诗意叙事。这种叙事的力量，远远超过了任何促销话术。

从商业角度看，东方甄选的崛起恰逢其时。2022年的中国直播电商市场已经进入了“内卷”阶段——主播们比拼的是更低的价格、更夸张的表演、更频繁的直播时长。消费者对此已经审美疲劳。东方甄选的出现，就像一股清流注入了一片浑浊的池塘。它证明了：在一个充斥着“家人们”和“321上链接”的行业里，安静地讲知识也可以卖出货。

东方甄选的走红也引发了资本市场的疯狂追捧。新东方在线的股价在2022年6月一个月内涨了超过10倍，市值从不足30亿港元飙升至超过300亿港元。这种疯狂的涨幅引发了做空机构的关注，但也让更多投资者开始重新审视“知识带货”这种新模式的价值。多家券商发布研报称，东方甄选“开创了直播电商的新范式，有望重新定义电商平台的内容生态”。

董宇辉的走红也带来了一个有趣的文化现象：他让“知识付费”的概念从线上课程延伸到了直播带货领域。在他之后，一批具有学术背景的主播开始在直播平台上涌现——他们不叫卖，而是讲述产品背后的文化故事。这种趋势被媒体称为“直播的知识化”或“内容电商2.0”。虽然这些模仿者中很少有人能达到董宇辉的高度，但他们的出现证明了东方甄选模式的行业影响力。

东方甄选2023财年（截至2023年5月31日）交出了一份惊人的成绩单：总GMV达到100亿元人民币，净利润9.713亿元。从教育废墟中生长出来的直播电商新物种，用不到一年半的时间完成了不可思议的逆袭。更重要的是，它创造了一种全新的直播模式——不靠低价、不靠喊叫、不靠算法投流，而是靠知识、文化、人格魅力来驱动消费。2022年的消费者已经被直播间里“家人们”“上链接”的喧嚣消耗了太多年，董宇辉的出现恰好填补了人们对另一种直播方式的期待。这种模式被媒体称为“直播电商的知识分子化”。

**English:** On December 28, 2021, five months after double reduction, New Oriental's livestream commerce platform 'East Buy' officially launched. Yu personally led the first agricultural product livestream on Douyin, with first-show GMV of approximately 4.8 million yuan. The platform adopted 'helping farmers' as core positioning. Yu appeared personally, introducing agricultural products in his signature gentle tone, but results were not ideal.

East Buy's first half year was dismal. December 2021 to May 2022 saw daily average GMV below one million yuan, sluggish follower growth, and near-empty livestream rooms. Outsiders questioned: 'Tutoring people switching to livestreaming—just riding the trend again.' Some media used 'New Oriental's death throes' as headlines. Yu later recalled: 'We were losing money every day, but I told myself—an education company doing livestreaming needs time. I can't stop just because people say we can't.'

The gears of fate began turning on June 9, 2022. Former New Oriental English teacher Dong Yuhui unexpectedly went viral with bilingual livestreaming. He taught English words like 'steak' and 'medium rare' while selling steak, and recited poetry while selling rice. This 'knowledge-based selling' model contrasted sharply with the 'family members' and '3-2-1 link!' ecosystem, precisely striking users' aesthetic fatigue on Douyin.

The data told the story: within three days, East Buy gained 1.57 million followers, sales increased by 17.77 million yuan. New Oriental Online stock surged 576% over 12 trading days, market cap from under HK$3 billion to over HK$30 billion. By end of June, daily average GMV exceeded 20 million yuan. Capital markets were even more frenzied—the stock multiplied over tenfold within a month, becoming one of Hong Kong's most astonishing comeback stories.

From a commercial perspective, East Buy's rise was perfectly timed. China's livestream e-commerce market had entered an 'involution' phase by 2022—anchors competed on lower prices, more exaggerated performances, longer streaming hours. Consumers were exhausted. East Buy's emergence was like a clear stream injected into a murky pond. It proved that in an industry full of shouting, quietly sharing knowledge could also sell products.

Dong Yuhui's virality also produced an interesting cultural phenomenon: he extended the concept of 'knowledge payment' from online courses into livestream commerce. After him, a wave of anchors with academic backgrounds emerged on livestream platforms—not selling by shouting, but telling cultural stories behind products. Media called this trend 'the intellectualization of livestream' or 'content e-commerce 2.0.' Although few imitators reached Dong's heights, their emergence proved East Buy's model's industry influence.

East Buy's fiscal 2023 delivered stunning results: total GMV reached 10 billion RMB, net profit 971.3 million yuan. More importantly, it created an entirely new livestream model—not relying on low prices or shouting, but driving consumption through knowledge, culture, and personal charisma. Consumers in 2022 had been exhausted by years of 'family members' and 'link!' shouting; Dong's emergence filled the void for a different kind of livestream.

### 9. 小作文风波：顶流之困 / The 'Little Essay' Controversy: The Top-Host Dilemma

东方甄选的爆发式增长，很快催生出一种新的权力结构——超级主播的个人影响力开始凌驾于平台品牌之上。董宇辉一人贡献了东方甄选大部分的流量和GMV，他的粉丝群体“丈母娘”展现出惊人的组织力和消费力。这种结构性矛盾，在2023年底的“小作文事件”中集中爆发。

2023年12月6日，东方甄选官方抖音账号在“吉林行”宣传视频评论区，由“小编”置顶留言称：那些在直播间被广为传播的“小作文”（董宇辉直播时的精彩文案段落）实际上是由文案团队集体创作，并非董宇辉一人所为。这条评论瞬间点燃了董宇辉粉丝群体的强烈不满——在粉丝看来，小编的行为是在“抢功”、贬低董宇辉的个人价值。粉丝开始大规模取关东方甄选，并在社交媒体上发起声讨。

12月12日，时任东方甄选CEO孙东旭在直播中回应此事。他不仅提及“董宇辉的年薪不止几千万”，还公开批评“饭圈化行为”，称公司不接受粉丝对内部事务的干预。这番回应非但未能平息争议，反而进一步激化了矛盾。董宇辉的粉丝大规模冲入竞品直播间刷礼物以示支持。东方甄选在三天内掉粉超过160万，股价连续暴跌，市值蒸发了数十亿港元。

12月14日，俞敏洪在抖音发布声明，称“小编”的行为“严重缺乏职业精神”，承认公司管理存在“巨大漏洞”。12月16日，东方甄选发布公告：免去孙东旭的CEO职务，由俞敏洪本人兼任CEO。当晚，俞敏洪与董宇辉合体直播，董宇辉表示“从没说过要离开东方甄选”。此后，董宇辉被任命为新东方教育文化集团高级合伙人、东方甄选CEO高级顾问，获得了前所未有的高规格待遇。

小作文事件对东方甄选的品牌造成了深远的影响。事件发生前，东方甄选代表着一种“清流”式的直播电商——不靠叫卖，靠内容。但事件发生后，人们开始意识到，即便是最“文化”的直播间，背后也存在着同样的利益博弈和权力争斗。一位资深媒体人在评论中写道：“当文化遇上资本，文化总是先让步。这不是东方甄选的问题，而是整个直播电商行业的结构性困境。”俞敏洪在处理完危机后，在内部复盘会上说了一句意味深长的话：“我们最大的问题不是小编说错了什么，而是我们没有建立起一套能保护好人的制度。”

值得注意的是，小作文事件还暴露了一个更深层的问题：东方甄选作为一家上市公司，其内部治理结构在面对“超级员工”时显得力不从心。传统的上市公司治理框架——董事会、CEO、管理层——是为管理“普通员工”而设计的，它没有预设如何处理一个影响力超过公司品牌的个人。俞敏洪在处理这件事时，实际上是在为一个没有先例的问题寻找解决方案。

事件平息后，俞敏洪在内部做了深刻反思。他在一次管理层会议上说：“我们犯的最大错误，是以为给一个人足够的钱和地位，就能解决所有问题。但真正的问题是：我们的制度没有跟上人的成长。当一个人的影响力超过了他所在的组织时，组织要么给他更大的权力，要么承受他离开的可能。我们选择了前者，但做得不够彻底。”这段话，某种程度上预示了后来董宇辉的出走。

这场“小作文”事件的本质，是一个所有MCN公司和直播平台都面临的经典困境：当一个超级主播的个人品牌影响力超过平台品牌时，公司该如何处理这种权力倒挂？俞敏洪在处理这件事时展现了两面性：一方面，他果断免去了CEO孙东旭——这是他亲手提拔的接班人——向市场和粉丝传递“我站在宇辉这边”的信号；另一方面，他在直播中给予了董宇辉合伙人头衔、CEO顾问身份、独立的团队配置。但这种靠个人关系维持的平衡是脆弱的，因为它回避了根本问题：在一家上市公司里，一个员工的个人影响力是否应该有制度化的边界？这个根本性的结构矛盾，在此后一年里持续发酵，最终以董宇辉的出走收场。

**English:** East Buy's explosive growth quickly produced a new power structure—superstar anchor personal influence began overshadowing the platform brand. Dong Yuhui alone contributed the majority of East Buy's traffic and GMV; his fan group demonstrated astonishing organizational power. This structural contradiction erupted dramatically in the 'mini-essay incident' of late 2023.

On December 6, 2023, East Buy's official Douyin account, in the 'Jilin Trip' promotional video comments, had its 'editor' pin a comment stating that the widely-shared 'mini-essays' were actually collectively created by the copywriting team, not by Dong alone. This instantly ignited fierce fan dissatisfaction—fans saw this as 'taking credit' and diminishing Dong's personal value. Fans began mass-unfollowing and launched social media campaigns.

On December 12, then-CEO Sun Dongxu responded in a livestream. He mentioned 'Dong Yuhui's annual salary exceeds tens of millions,' and publicly criticized 'fandom-style behavior.' This response further inflamed tensions. Dong's fans flooded competitors' livestream rooms. East Buy lost over 1.6 million followers in three days; market value evaporated billions of HK dollars.

On December 14, Yu published a statement calling the 'editor's' behavior 'seriously lacking professional ethics' and acknowledging 'enormous loopholes' in management. On December 16, East Buy announced: CEO Sun Dongxu was removed, with Yu assuming the CEO role. That evening, Yu and Dong appeared together; Dong stated he 'had never said he wanted to leave.' Subsequently, Dong was appointed senior partner and CEO senior advisor.

The mini-essay incident's essence was a classic dilemma facing all MCN companies: when a superstar anchor's influence surpasses the platform brand, how should the company handle this power inversion? Yu's handling revealed two sides: he decisively removed CEO Sun Dongxu—his personally promoted successor—signaling to markets and fans that 'I stand with Yuhui'; meanwhile granting Dong partner title, CEO advisor position, and independent team. But this balance maintained through personal relationships was fragile.

The mini-essay incident also exposed a deeper problem: East Buy as a listed company, its internal governance structure appeared inadequate when facing 'super employees.' Traditional listed company governance frameworks—board, CEO, management—were designed for managing 'ordinary employees'; it had no preset for handling an individual whose influence exceeds the company brand. In handling this, Yu was essentially finding solutions for a problem with no precedent.

After the incident, Yu reflected deeply internally. At a management meeting he said: 'Our biggest mistake was thinking that giving one person enough money and status could solve everything. But the real issue is: our systems didn't keep up with people's growth. When one person's influence exceeds their organization, the organization must either give them greater power or accept the possibility of their departure. We chose the former, but not thoroughly enough.' This statement, to some extent, foreshadowed Dong Yuhui's later departure.

### 10. 与辉同行：分手的体面 / With Hui Tong Xing: A Dignified Parting

小作文事件的平息只是暂时的。在俞敏洪兼任CEO之后，东方甄选进入了长达半年的不稳定期。董宇辉虽然名义上获得了合伙人头衔，但他与东方甄选的关系始终处于一种微妙而紧张的状态——粉丝不满公司在“利用”董宇辉，公司管理层也不甘心被一个主播“绑架”。这种 tension 在2024年初达到了临界点。

2024年1月9日，董宇辉的独立账号“与辉同行”在抖音正式开播。首秀当日GMV即突破1.5亿元，展现了其强大的个人号召力。但“与辉同行”在法律上仍属于东方甄选的全资子公司，董宇辉与东方甄选的关系进入了一种“一个公司、两个品牌”的奇特状态。这种安排在商业上不可持续——两个品牌共用一个公司的资源和团队，但在内容方向和粉丝群体上已经彻底分裂。

2024年7月25日，东方甄选发布正式公告：董宇辉不再担任公司雇员及高级管理层职务，购买“与辉同行”100%股权，独立运营。俞敏洪在同日发布的致股东公开信中详细说明了分手安排：将“与辉同行”的全部净利润（约1.29亿元）奖励给董宇辉，作为其收购资金的主要来源；加上此前的其他补偿安排，总计约3.58亿元。俞敏洪在信中写道：“公司是送给宇辉的。”

他在信中还坦言：“复杂的舆论纷争，加上少数别有用心的力量的引导和造谣，直接导致东方甄选和与辉同行的隔阂日益加深。”董宇辉随后在社交媒体回应：“愿如风有信，长与日俱中。再次感谢俞老师，希望他一切都好。”这场分手没有撕破脸、没有对簿公堂，在商业史上堪称“体面分手”的范例——但体面是有价格的。

分手后的董宇辉，在“与辉同行”平台上延续了知识带货的模式，粉丝数和GMV持续增长。据第三方数据平台统计，2025年“与辉同行”全年GMV超过50亿元，远超东方甄选同期表现。这一结果引发了广泛的讨论：究竟是平台成就了个人，还是个人成就了平台？从数据来看，至少在“知识带货”这个细分赛道上，董宇辉个人的品牌价值已经超越了他曾经依托的平台。但俞敏洪对此并不在意——他在意的是，东方甄选作为一个组织，是否能够不依赖任何一个超级个体而独立存在。这个命题，在此后几年里成为他所有决策的核心。

从商业伦理角度看，俞敏洪的“体面分手”模式也有其独特价值。在中国商业史上，创始人和核心人才之间的分手往往以互相撕咬收场——从联想的柳传志和孙宏斌，到阿里巴巴的马云和卫哲，每一段“分手”都伴随着舆论的腥风血雨。俞敏洪与董宇辉的分手，至少保持了表面上的善意和克制——这种克制，在一个充满攻击性的商业环境中，显得尤为珍贵。

在与辉同行独立运营后，俞敏洪在多个场合表达了对董宇辉的祝福和肯定。他说：“宇辉是一个非常好的人，他的才华和能力不应该被任何一个平台所限制。他有权利去追求更大的舞台。”但话锋一转，他也坦承：“从公司的角度来说，失去一个超级主播确实是巨大的损失。但这也是一个提醒——我们不能把公司的命运系于一个人身上。”这种个人情感与商业理性之间的拉扯，是俞敏洪管理风格中最真实也最矛盾的部分。

分手后，东方甄选的GMV在2025财年跌去近四成，从上一年的100亿元降至约87亿元。失去了最大流量引擎的东方甄选，不得不面对“后董宇辉时代”的残酷现实。从更长远的视角看，与辉同行的独立是俞敏洪管理哲学的一次集中体现：当个人品牌与公司平台的矛盾不可调和时，他宁愿付出巨大的经济代价来“买回”公司的独立性，也不愿让一个超级IP继续凌驾于组织之上。这种选择的合理性至今仍有争议，但它清晰地表明了俞敏洪的底线：平台永远大于个人。

**English:** The calm after the mini-essay storm was only temporary. After Yu assumed the CEO role, East Buy entered six months of instability. Although Dong nominally received the partner title, his relationship remained tense—fans were dissatisfied the company was 'exploiting' Dong, while management chafed at being 'held hostage' by a single anchor. This tension reached a breaking point in early 2024.

On January 9, 2024, Dong Yuhui's independent account 'Walking with Hui' officially launched on Douyin. First-day GMV exceeded 150 million yuan, demonstrating his formidable personal appeal. But 'Walking with Hui' remained legally a wholly-owned subsidiary of East Buy, entering a peculiar 'one company, two brands' state. This was commercially unsustainable—two brands sharing one company's resources but completely split in content direction and fan base.

On July 25, 2024, East Buy issued a formal announcement: Dong would no longer serve as company employee or senior management, would purchase 100% of 'Walking with Hui' equity, operating independently. In an open shareholder letter, Yu detailed the parting: all of 'Walking with Hui's' net profit (approximately 129 million yuan) awarded to Dong; combined with other compensation, the total came to approximately 358 million yuan. Yu wrote: 'The company was a gift to Yuhui.'

He also confessed: 'Complex public disputes, combined with rumors from those with ulterior motives, directly led to deepening estrangement between East Buy and Walking with Hui.' Dong responded: 'May there be trust like the wind, growing long with each passing day. Once again, thanks to Teacher Yu.' This parting featured no torn faces, no lawsuits—a model of 'dignified parting'—but dignity came at a price.

After the split, East Buy's GMV fell nearly 40% in fiscal 2025, from 10 billion to approximately 8.7 billion. Having lost its biggest traffic engine, East Buy confronted the harsh 'post-Dong Yuhui era.' Dong, operating independently on 'Walking with Hui,' continued the knowledge-based selling model with growing followers and GMV. Third-party data shows that in 2025, 'Walking with Hui' annual GMV exceeded 5 billion yuan, far surpassing East Buy's同期 performance. This result sparked widespread discussion: did the platform create the individual, or the individual create the platform?

From a business ethics perspective, Yu's 'dignified parting' model also has unique value. In Chinese business history, splits between founders and core talent often end in mutual destruction—from Lenovo's Liu Chuanzhi and Sun Hongbin, to Alibaba's Jack Ma and Wei Zhe, each 'split' was accompanied by public bloodletting. Yu and Dong's parting at least maintained surface goodwill and restraint—this restraint, in an aggressive business environment, appears especially precious.

From a longer perspective, Walking with Hui's independence was a concentrated manifestation of Yu's management philosophy: when the contradiction between a personal brand and company platform became irreconcilable, he preferred paying an enormous economic price to 'buy back' company independence. This choice's rationality remains debated, but it clearly stated Yu's bottom line: the platform always exceeds any individual.

### 11. 再出发：产品主义与文旅新局 / Starting Again: Product-ism and the Culture-Tourism Gambit

董宇辉出走后，东方甄选经历了剧烈的阵痛期。2025财年（截至2025年5月31日），总GMV降至87亿元，同比下降39.2%。2025年11月，前CEO孙东旭正式离职。2026年4月，顿顿、明明、天权、中灿等剩余核心主播相继离场——明明在告别长文中写道“那个我曾经用力守护的家园，已经不需要我了”；天权则称“我的理想主义，很多时候显得不合时宜”。四位东方甄选早期的标志性主播，至此全部离场。

阵痛之后，转型加速。新任执行总裁孙进上任后大刀阔斧推行改革——强化打卡制度、严格KPI考核、流水线式排班——管理模式从早期的“人情化”急速转向“制度化”。这种转型虽然引发了人才流失的阵痛，但也在财务上逐步见效。2026财年（截至2026年5月31日），东方甄选总营收57.01亿元，同比增长29.8%；净利润5.44亿元，实现扭亏为盈；总GMV回升至102亿元，自营产品GMV占比超过52%。截至2025年11月，公司已推出超过800款自营产品，涵盖食品、生鲜、日用品等品类。

与此同时，新东方文旅集团加速布局。2024年4月总部落成后，俞敏洪亲任董事长，定位“有文化幸福感、有知识获得感”的高品质文旅服务。2026年8月，新东方文旅发布了“北极斯瓦尔巴群岛+法国人文自然探索”路线，由俞敏洪亲自带队，携总顾问陈行甲、历史学者施展同行，最低舱位定价10.98万元。此前发布的南极线路已吸引大量关注，俞敏洪还兑现承诺，邀请10名东方甄选优秀基层员工和10名会员共赴南极——他在总结大会上宣布“基层、中层、高层管理者全部被排除在外，就是纯粹在员工和老师中间抽取”。

新东方文旅的布局体现了俞敏洪对“后直播电商时代”的战略思考。在他看来，直播电商的红利期正在消退，流量成本越来越高，单纯靠主播带货的模式已经难以为继。而文旅产业——尤其是带有知识属性的高品质文旅——是一个全新的蓝海。新东方文旅的差异化在于：它不只是卖旅游线路，而是卖“有知识的旅行体验”。每一次出行都有学者、作家、历史研究者同行，在旅途中提供深度讲解和思想碰撞。这种模式将新东方三十年积累的教育基因和师资力量转化为了一种全新的消费体验。2026年，新东方文旅的总顾问陈行甲——一位从政府系统转型的公益人物——的加入，进一步提升了品牌的文化厚度。

新东方文旅的发展速度超出预期。截至2026年9月，新东方文旅已在全国超过30个城市开设了服务网点，推出了包括“丝绸之路深度游学”“徽州古村落文化之旅”“敦煌艺术沉浸式体验”等多条特色路线。每条路线都配备专属“文化导师”——由历史学者、作家、艺术家担任——为旅行者提供课堂级的知识讲解。这种模式将新东方三十年积累的教育资源和师资网络转化为了一种全新的文旅产品形态。

在产品策略方面，东方甄选采取了与主流直播电商截然不同的路径。它不打价格战，不参与“全网最低价”的竞争，而是强调“安全、品质、性价比”的三高原则。俞敏洪多次在公开场合表示：“我们不会用低价来吸引用户，因为低价意味着要压缩成本，压缩成本往往意味着牺牲品质。我们要做的是让用户信任东方甄选的每一个产品——就像他们信任一个新东方的老师一样。”

2026年9月5日，在亚布力论坛夏季年会上，俞敏洪明确宣示了东方甄选的战略定位：“东方甄选从创立之初就不是一家单纯的电商公司或者主播网红公司，而是一家以自营产品为核心的产品公司。”他同时表示“打价格战永远不可能有长久的发展前途”，强调要通过产品品质和品牌价值来建立竞争壁垒。这标志着从“主播依赖”到“产品主义”的战略转向已经完成——虽然这条路上，俞敏洪仍在付出核心人才持续流失的代价。

**English:** After Dong Yuhui's departure, East Buy experienced intense pain. Fiscal 2025 saw total GMV fall to 8.7 billion yuan, down 39.2%. In November 2025, former CEO Sun Dongxu formally departed. In April 2026, remaining core anchors departed one after another—Ming Ming wrote 'that home I once guarded no longer needs me'; Tian Quan stated 'my idealism seems out of place.' All four iconic anchors had departed.

After the pain, transformation accelerated. New executive president Sun Jin pushed sweeping reforms—strict attendance, rigorous KPI assessments, assembly-line scheduling—shifting management from 'relationship-based' to 'institutional' at high speed. Though triggering talent attrition, this showed gradual financial results. Fiscal 2026 saw revenue reach 5.701 billion yuan, up 29.8%; net profit 544 million yuan, achieving turnaround; total GMV recovering to 10.2 billion yuan, with self-operated products exceeding 52% of GMV.

In product strategy, East Buy adopted a path distinctly different from mainstream livestream e-commerce. It doesn't engage in price wars or compete for 'lowest price online,' instead emphasizing the 'three highs' principle: safety, quality, value-for-money. Yu stated repeatedly: 'We won't attract users with low prices, because low prices mean cost compression, which often means sacrificing quality. What we want is for users to trust every East Buy product—just as they trust a New Oriental teacher.'

Meanwhile, New Oriental Cultural Tourism Group accelerated. Yu personally served as chairman, positioning 'high-quality cultural tourism with cultural fulfillment and knowledge acquisition.' In August 2026, the 'Svalbard Arctic + France' route was released, led by Yu, accompanied by chief advisor Chen Xingjia and historian Shi Zhan, lowest cabin at 109,800 yuan. Yu also fulfilled his promise, inviting 10 outstanding frontline employees and 10 members to Antarctica—announcing 'all management levels excluded.'

New Oriental Cultural Tourism's development exceeded expectations. As of September 2026, it had opened service points in over 30 cities nationwide, launching特色 routes including 'Silk Road In-Depth Study Tour,' 'Huizhou Ancient Village Cultural Journey,' and 'Dunhuang Art Immersive Experience.' Each route comes with a dedicated 'cultural mentor'—scholars, writers, artists—providing classroom-level knowledge commentary. This model transforms New Oriental's thirty years of accumulated educational resources and faculty networks into an entirely new cultural tourism product form.

On September 5, 2026, at the Yabuli Forum Summer Annual Conference, Yu clearly stated East Buy's strategic positioning: 'From its founding, East Buy was never simply an e-commerce or influencer company, but a product company centered on self-operated products.' He stated 'price wars can never have lasting development future,' emphasizing building competitive barriers through product quality and brand value. This marked completion of the pivot from 'anchor dependency' to 'product-ism'—though Yu continues paying the price of sustained core talent attrition.

### 12. 逆行者：知识分子下海的体面与难堪 / The Contrarian: An Intellectual-Turned-Entrepreneur's Dignity and Awkwardness

回顾俞敏洪四十余年的商业生涯，一条清晰的“逆行”线索贯穿始终。他不是那种追逐风口的人——当所有人都在搞互联网时，他还在做教育；当教育公司纷纷拥抱资本时，他犹豫了两年才上市；当直播电商成为风口时，他选择了一条最难的路——用知识而不是低价来带货。但每一次时代的浪潮打过来，他都不是站在原地的人——他要么被浪打翻，要么骑上了浪头。

他身上始终交织着两种气质：知识分子的理想主义与商人的务实精明。他说“在绝望中寻找希望”，也用这套精神叙事动员六万员工在双减后体面离场；他捐出八万套课桌椅维持体面，也在资本压力下不断扩张教学点直到政策转向；他被罗永浩批评“虚伪”，也被无数年轻人视为励志偶像——两种评价都有各自的证据，而俞敏洪本人从未试图解决这个矛盾，他只是在矛盾中走了一辈子。

在管理风格上，他是典型的“大家长”：重情义、轻制度，重个人魅力、轻体系建设。他对离开的人总是送上祝福——对罗永浩、对董宇辉、对孙东旭、对明明和天权，他说的永远是“由衷祝福”。但36氪的一篇分析文章一针见血地指出：“一边给你情感，一边收走权力。让你不好意思只谈钱，也让你很难真的成为合伙人。”这种大家长式的管理，在教育行业或许是有效的——老师走了，讲义还在；但在直播电商行业，最值钱的恰恰是不能沉淀的东西：那个具体的人、那个具体的声音、那种与观众之间不可替代的情感连接。

64岁的俞敏洪，仍然每天工作十小时以上，亲自带队直播、亲自设计文旅路线、亲自在亚布力论坛上发言。胡润评价他“活到老、创业到老”，李国庆说他“是中国最不容易被打倒的企业家”。但从2026年四位主播集体离职的风波来看，俞敏洪面临的根本性挑战并没有解决：在一个个人IP价值越来越大的时代，一个60后企业家如何与年轻人共处？“产品主义”能否真正替代“超级主播”成为可持续的商业基础？

在商业之外，俞敏洪的个人生活也保持着令人惊讶的勤奋。他每天清晨六点起床，先跑步五公里，然后开始一天的工作。他至今保持着每天阅读至少一小时的习惯，并且持续在社交媒体上分享读书笔记和人生感悟。“老俞闲话”成为他最重要的个人品牌输出渠道，通过这个平台，他不仅宣传新东方和东方甄选的业务，更与数百万粉丝保持着一种类似“师生”的情感连接。这种连接——虽然有时被批评为“自我营销”——恰恰是他商业模式的底层支撑：在一个信任稀缺的时代，俞敏洪用持续的内容输出建立了一种稀缺的个人信誉。

在公众形象管理方面，俞敏洪也在不断调整策略。2025年底的“南极信”事件——他在南极旅行期间向全体员工发送内部信，被员工吐槽“无法与正在旅游的老板共情”——让他深刻意识到代际差异带来的管理挑战。他随后多次公开道歉，并承诺“允许员工吐槽是新东方的传统”。这种自我纠错的能力，或许是60后的他能够与年轻员工保持沟通的关键所在。

俞敏洪的个人财富在经历了双减和东方甄选起伏后，仍然保持着相当可观的规模。据胡润百富榜数据，他的身家在巅峰时期超过200亿元人民币。但他在公开场合对财富的态度始终是淡然和克制的。他多次表示，自己“从东方甄选成立至今没有领过一分钱工资”，股权激励的收益将全部用于设立员工奖励基金和捐赠农村教育。无论这种表态是出于真心还是策略，它都与他的“体面人”人设保持了高度一致。

这些问题没有答案。但俞敏洪从来不是那种等着有了答案才出发的人。三次高考教会他一件事：先走起来，路上再说。从江阴农村到北大讲台，从中关村平房到纽交所敲钟，从教培废墟到直播间，他的每一步都是在不确定中寻找确定的方向。64岁的他，仍然在路上。

**English:** Looking back at Yu Minhong's forty-plus-year business career, a clear 'contrarian' thread runs throughout. He is not the type who chases trends—when everyone was doing internet, he was still in education; when education companies rushed to embrace capital, he hesitated two years before going public; when livestream e-commerce became the trend, he chose the hardest path—using knowledge rather than low prices. But every time an era's wave crashed in, he was never standing still—either knocked down or riding the wave.

Two temperaments have always intertwined in him: the intellectual's idealism and the merchant's pragmatism. He says 'seek hope in despair,' and uses this narrative to mobilize 60,000 employees to exit with dignity; he donates 80,000 desk sets to maintain dignity, while also expanding under capital pressure; he is criticized as 'hypocritical,' yet revered as an inspirational icon—both evaluations have evidence, and Yu has never tried to resolve this contradiction; he has simply walked through it his entire life.

In management style, he is a typical 'patriarch': valuing loyalty over systems, personal charisma over institutional building. He always sends blessings to those who leave. But 36Kr incisively noted: 'On one hand giving emotion, on the other taking power. Making you too embarrassed to just talk money, and making it hard to truly become a partner.' This patriarchal management may work in education—when teachers leave, lesson plans remain; but in livestream e-commerce, what's most valuable cannot be sedimented: that specific person, voice, and irreplaceable emotional connection.

At 64, Yu still works over ten hours daily, personally leading livestreams, designing routes, speaking at forums. Hurun evaluated him as 'growing old while entrepreneuring.' But from the April 2026 mass anchor departure, the fundamental challenge remains: in an era where personal IP value grows ever greater, how does a post-60s entrepreneur coexist with young people?

In personal image management, Yu has been constantly adjusting strategy. The late-2025 'Antarctic letter' incident—he sent an internal letter to all employees while in Antarctica, which employees mocked as 'unable to empathize with a boss on vacation'—made him acutely aware of the management challenges posed by generational differences. He subsequently apologized publicly multiple times, pledging 'allowing employee criticism is a New Oriental tradition.' This capacity for self-correction may be precisely what enables the post-60s Yu to maintain communication with younger employees.

Yu's personal wealth, despite experiencing double reduction and East Buy's fluctuations, remains considerable. According to Hurun data, his wealth peaked at over 20 billion RMB. But his public attitude toward wealth has always been calm and restrained. He stated repeatedly that he 'has never received a single yuan in salary from East Buy,' and that equity incentive proceeds will go entirely to employee reward funds and rural education donations. Whether genuine or strategic, this maintains perfect consistency with his 'dignified person' persona.

These questions have no answers. But Yu has never been the kind of person who waits for answers before setting out. Three gaokao attempts taught him one thing: start walking first, figure it out along the way. From Jiangyin village to PKU lectern, from Zhongguancun bungalow to NYSE bell, from tutoring ruins to livestream room, every step was finding direction amid uncertainty. At 64, he is still on the road.

## 卷尾 Editorial Conclusion

在中国民营企业家的光谱中，俞敏洪占据着一个独特的位置：他不是马云式的布道者，不是任正非式的战略家，也不是王兴式的连续创业者。他是一个用“体面”来对抗时代不确定性的人——捐课桌椅是体面，给董宇辉3.58亿分手费是体面，在直播间里被粉丝围攻时道歉也是体面。这种对“体面”的执念，既是他的铠甲，也是他的软肋。

争议从未远离他。批评者指出他的“大家长式管理”——用情怀代替制度，用个人魅力代替体系建设，最终导致核心人才一次次离心。罗永浩说他“披着理想主义的外衣”，36氪的分析直指他“在捧大腕和耍手腕之间，选择了铁血断腕”。2026年四位核心主播集体离职，更是将这种管理模式的内在矛盾暴露无遗：当公司从“内容驱动”转向“产品驱动”，那些靠个人魅力创造流量的人，就成了必须被替换的风险因子。

但换一个角度看，在同代企业中，许多教培公司已在双减后彻底消失，而新东方2026财年营收突破56亿美元，经营利润同比增长50%。从“超级主播依赖”到“自营产品为核心”的战略转型，虽然伴随着阵痛和人才流失，却让一家64岁创始人的公司重新找到了立足点。

俞敏洪的历史意义，或许不在于他创造了什么商业模式，而在于他证明了：在中国这样一个政策变量极其强大的市场中，“不追风口、做好手头事”的保守哲学，反而可能是一种穿越周期的生存策略。他不是一个让人仰望的企业家，但他是一个让人理解的——理解在一个反复洗牌的市场中，一个人如何靠韧性、体面和不断重启，走到最后。

In the spectrum of Chinese private entrepreneurs, Yu Minhong occupies a unique position: not an evangelist like Jack Ma, not a strategist like Ren Zhengfei, nor a serial entrepreneur like Wang Xing. He is someone who uses 'dignity' as a shield against uncertainty—donating desk sets is dignity, giving Dong Yuhui 358 million yuan is dignity, apologizing when besieged by fans is also dignity. This obsession is both his armor and his vulnerability.

Controversy has never been far. Critics cite his 'paternalistic management'—sentiment over systems, charisma over institutions, causing repeated talent centrifugation. Luo Yonghao accused him of 'wearing idealism's cloak.' 36Kr noted he 'chose the iron-fisted approach between pampering stars and wielding power.' The 2026 mass departure of four core anchors exposed the model's contradictions: when pivoting from content-driven to product-driven, those creating traffic through charisma become replaceable risk factors.

Yet while many tutoring companies vanished after double reduction, New Oriental's fiscal 2026 revenue exceeded $5.6 billion with operating profit up 50%. The transformation from super-anchor dependency to self-operated products, though painful, has given a 64-year-old founder's company a new foothold.

Yu's historical significance may lie not in creating any business model, but in demonstrating: in a market where policy variables are overwhelmingly powerful, the conservative philosophy of 'not chasing trends, just doing the work' may be a survival strategy for crossing cycles. He is not an entrepreneur to be looked up to, but one to be understood.

## 金句 Pull Quote

> 在绝望中寻找希望，人生终将辉煌。

> Seek hope in despair, and life will eventually shine.

## 履历时间线 Career Timeline

- **1962-09-04** 出生江苏江阴农村 / Born in rural Jiangyin, Jiangsu
  - 俞敏洪出生于江苏省江阴市夏港街道葫桥村一个普通农村家庭。父亲是木匠，母亲是生产队妇女队长。从7岁开始在稻田插秧、帮家里干农活。[s1][s47]
  - EN: Yu Minhong was born into a rural family in Jiangyin, Jiangsu Province. His father was a carpenter and his mother was a women's team leader in the production brigade.
- **1978** 第一次高考落榜 / First gaokao attempt fails
  - 1978年俞敏洪首次参加高考，英语仅得33分，名落孙山。回到农村喂猪种地，在煤油灯下坚持自学。[s3][s16]
  - EN: First attempt at the national college entrance exam (gaokao) failed with only 33 points in English.
- **1979** 第二次高考再落榜 / Second gaokao attempt fails
  - 第二次高考英语55分，再次落榜。后进入江阴县政府办的英语补习班系统学习，成绩大幅提升。[s3][s16]
  - EN: Second gaokao attempt also failed, scoring 55 in English. Joined a local English cram school.
- **1980-09** 第三次高考考入北大 / Admitted to Peking University
  - 第三次参加高考，英语考出95分（部分资料记为93分），总分超过北大录取线7分，被北京大学西语系录取。这是他人生第一次绝境翻盘。[s3][s16][s14]
  - EN: Admitted to Peking University's Department of Western Languages on the third attempt, scoring 95 in English.
- **1982** 大三患肺结核休学 / Tuberculosis hiatus from university
  - 大三时因传染性肺结核休学一年。休学期间在病床上读了200本书、写了200多首诗歌、背了上万个英语单词，奠定英语词汇功底。[s3][s44]
  - EN: Contracted infectious tuberculosis in junior year and took a one-year leave of absence, reading 200 books during recovery.
- **1985** 北大毕业留校任教 / Graduates and teaches at PKU
  - 1985年毕业于北京大学西语系，留校担任外语系英语教师。在北大师资中属于农村出身的少数派，因口音问题初入大学时曾被分到C班。[s1][s47]
  - EN: Graduated from Peking University and stayed on as an English instructor in the Foreign Languages Department.
- **1990** 校外办学被北大处分 / Disciplined for off-campus teaching
  - 为攒钱出国留学，俞敏洪在校外兼职办英语培训班，被学校给予行政记过处分，处分通告在三角地公告栏张贴一个月。此事件促使其离开北大。[s16][s44]
  - EN: Received administrative disciplinary action from Peking University for running unauthorized off-campus tutoring classes.
- **1991** 辞职北大，下海创业 / Resigns from PKU, starts business
  - 1991年从北大辞职，在中关村第二小学租平房开办"东方大学英语培训班"。初期只有俞敏洪夫妇两个人，靠贴广告、免费讲座打开局面。[s2][s47]
  - EN: Resigned from Peking University and started an English training class in a rented building near Zhongguancun.
- **1993-11-16** 创办北京新东方学校 / Founds Beijing New Oriental School
  - 1993年11月16日，俞敏洪正式创办北京新东方学校。在西三旗一间10平米平房起步，通过免费讲座、免费资料等方式逐步建立品牌，成为北京民办英语培训的标杆。[s2][s47]
  - EN: Founded Beijing New Oriental School on November 16, 1993, starting from a 10-square-meter room.
- **2001** 新东方教育科技集团成立 / New Oriental Education Group established
  - 2001年新东方教育科技集团挂牌成立，标志着从单一学校向教育集团转型。引入徐小平、王强等海归合伙人，形成"三驾马车"格局。[s2][s8]
  - EN: New Oriental Education & Technology Group was established, transitioning from a single school to an education conglomerate.
- **2006-09-07** 纽交所上市，中国教育第一股 / Lists on NYSE
  - 新东方在美国纽约证券交易所成功上市，成为中国大陆第一家在美国上市的教育机构。发行价每股15美元，首日收于21.22美元，涨41.5%，融资约1.125亿美元。[s2][s17]
  - EN: New Oriental listed on NYSE as the first Chinese education company to go public in the US, raising $112.5 million.
- **2012-07** 浑水做空，俞敏洪应战 / Muddy Waters short attack; Yu fights back
  - 浑水公司发布做空报告指控新东方财务欺诈，股价两天暴跌57%。俞敏洪七点回应，联合马云、柳传志等企业家约3亿美元买入稳定股价，聘请独立机构调查，不到一年股价恢复。[s41][s42]
  - EN: Survived Muddy Waters short-selling attack; stock fell 57% in two days but recovered within a year.
- **2014-11** 联合盛希泰创立洪泰基金 / Co-founds Hongtai Fund
  - 俞敏洪与华泰联合证券前董事长盛希泰共同创立洪泰基金，定位天使投资，聚焦先进制造、信息技术、新材料等领域，管理规模超300亿元。[s13][s43]
  - EN: Co-founded Hongtai Fund with Sheng Xitai, focusing on angel-stage investments across tech sectors.
- **2019-03-28** 新东方在线港股上市 / New Oriental Online lists in Hong Kong
  - 新东方在线在香港联交所上市，成为港股在线教育第一股，发行价10.2港元/股，融资约15.67亿港元。俞敏洪称希望更多长线投资者加入。[s2][s45]
  - EN: Koolearn (New Oriental Online) listed on HKEX as the first online education stock in Hong Kong.
- **2020-11-09** 新东方回港二次上市 / New Oriental secondary HKEX listing
  - 新东方在香港联合交易所主板挂牌上市，股份代号9901，成为首家回港二次上市的中国教育公司。开盘价1381港元，市值达2335亿港元。[s3][s2]
  - EN: New Oriental secondary-listed on HKEX (9901.HK) as the first Chinese education company to do so.
- **2021-07-24** 双减政策落地，教培崩塌 / Double Reduction policy lands
  - 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发《关于进一步减轻义务教育阶段学生作业负担和校外培训负担的意见》，学科类培训机构一律不得上市融资，严禁资本化运作。新东方股价单日暴跌超50%。[s7][s18]
  - EN: The 'Double Reduction' policy was issued, banning for-profit tutoring and capital operations in academic subject training.
- **2021-11-04** 捐八万套课桌椅给乡村学校 / Donates 80,000 desk sets to rural schools
  - 俞敏洪宣布新东方向乡村学校捐献近8万套崭新课桌椅，价值约5000万元，涉及十余个城市分校。此举被视为教培时代的体面退场，也引发正反两面评价。[s19][s5]
  - EN: Donated nearly 80,000 sets of new desks and chairs to rural schools amid business closures.
- **2021-11-15** 全面停止K9学科培训 / Halts K9 subject tutoring nationwide
  - 新东方宣布2021年底前全面停止K9学科类培训业务。该业务占营收约60%，关闭教学点超1000个，裁员约6万人，退租1500个教学点，各种补偿支出超200亿元。[s18][s40]
  - EN: Announced complete shutdown of K9 academic tutoring business by end of 2021, laying off ~60,000 employees.
- **2021-12-28** 东方甄选首场直播，转型带货 / East Buy launches first livestream
  - 新东方旗下直播带货平台东方甄选正式开播，俞敏洪亲自带队首场农产品直播。首秀GMV约480万元，以助农为定位，由新东方在线运营。此后半年业绩惨淡。[s23][s34]
  - EN: Launched East Buy live-streaming e-commerce platform, with Yu personally leading the first agricultural products livestream.
- **2022-06-09** 董宇辉双语直播出圈 / Dong Yuhui goes viral bilingual streaming
  - 前新东方英语教师董宇辉以双语直播形式在东方甄选走红，一边带货一边教英语和文史哲知识。3天涨粉157万，销售额增加1777万元，新东方在线股价12个交易日涨576%。[s23][s24]
  - EN: Dong Yuhui's bilingual livestream went viral, driving a 576% surge in Koolearn stock price in 12 trading days.
- **2023-08-25** 东方甄选财年GMV破百亿 / East Buy fiscal GMV tops 10 billion yuan
  - 东方甄选2023财年（2022.6-2023.5）总GMV达100亿元，总营收45亿元，净利润9.713亿元，抖音关注4180万，从教育公司成功转型为直播电商公司。[s5][s23]
  - EN: East Buy FY2023 GMV reached 10 billion yuan with net profit of 971.3 million yuan, completing transformation from education.
- **2023-12-06** "小作文"事件爆发 / 'Little essay' controversy erupts
  - 东方甄选小编在评论区称"小作文"由文案团队创作，引发董宇辉粉丝强烈不满。孙东旭直播回应反激众怒，粉丝冲入竞品直播间。事件持续发酵，东方甄选掉粉、股价暴跌。[s25][s48]
  - EN: The 'Essayette Incident' erupted over script authorship, triggering fan backlash and reputational damage.
- **2023-12-16** 孙东旭被免职，俞敏洪兼CEO / CEO Sun Dongxu removed; Yu takes over
  - 东方甄选宣布免去孙东旭CEO职务，俞敏洪兼任CEO。当晚俞敏洪与董宇辉合体直播，称董宇辉从未说过要离开。后董宇辉升任高级合伙人。[s25][s39]
  - EN: Sun Dongxu removed as CEO; Yu Minhong assumed the role concurrently. Dong Yuhui promoted to senior partner.
- **2024-04-26** 新东方文旅集团总部落成 / New Oriental Culture & Tourism HQ opens
  - 新东方文旅集团新总部在北京海淀落成，俞敏洪任董事长。业务定位为"有文化幸福感、有知识获得感"的高品质文旅服务，布局康养旅居、研学等方向。[s12][s11]
  - EN: New Oriental Culture & Tourism Group headquarters inaugurated in Beijing with Yu as chairman.
- **2024-07-25** 董宇辉离职，与辉同行独立 / Dong Yuhui departs East Buy
  - 东方甄选公告董宇辉离职，董宇辉以7658.55万元收购与辉同行100%股权。俞敏洪称"公司是送给宇辉的"，并将全部净利润奖励给董宇辉，总计分手费约3.58亿元。[s26][s27]
  - EN: Dong Yuhui departed, acquiring 100% of Yu Hui Tong Xing for 76.59 million yuan; total severance ~358 million yuan.
- **2025-08-22** 2025财年GMV下滑至87亿 / Fiscal 2025 GMV falls to 8.7 billion
  - 东方甄选2025财年（至5月31日）总GMV为87亿元，同比下降39.2%，主要受董宇辉出走及直播电商行业竞争加剧影响。持续经营业务净溢利620万元。[s6][s46]
  - EN: East Buy FY2025 GMV fell 39.2% to 8.7 billion yuan amid Dong Yuhui's departure and intensified competition.
- **2025-11** 南极信引发舆论争议 / Antarctica internal-letter controversy
  - 新东方32周年之际，俞敏洪在南极发布内部信被网友调侃"员工在加班，老板在南极"。俞敏洪三天内两次公开道歉，回应称是工作而非旅游。事件折射其转型期的舆论困境。[s32]
  - EN: Antarctic internal letter sparked controversy; Yu apologized twice amid criticism of 'boss on vacation while staff work'.
- **2026-04** F4主播全员离职 / Core 'F4' hosts all leave
  - 东方甄选核心主播顿顿、明明、天权等相继离职，被称为"F4全员离场"。俞敏洪称"他们的离开是平台的损失"。公司加速推进"去主播化"和自营产品战略。[s33]
  - EN: All four founding livestream hosts departed East Buy; company accelerated 'de-influencerization' strategy.
- **2026-08-22** 2026财年营收利润双增长 / Fiscal 2026 revenue and profit rebound
  - 东方甄选2026财年总营收57.01亿元，同比增长29.8%；净利润5.44亿元，同比大幅增长；总GMV 102亿元，自营产品GMV占比超52%。标志着去主播化转型初见成效。[s44][s50]
  - EN: FY2026 revenue 5.7 billion yuan (+29.8%), net profit 544 million yuan; self-owned products >52% of GMV.
- **2026-09-05** 亚布力论坛谈产品主义 / Yabuli Forum: 'a product company'
  - 2026年亚布力论坛夏季年会，俞敏洪发表开幕演讲称："东方甄选不是电商公司或主播网红公司，而是以自营产品为核心的产品公司。打价格战做不成长久王者。"[s50][s10]
  - EN: At Yabuli Forum Summer Summit, Yu positioned East Buy as a product company, not a livestream company.

## 常问问答 FAQ

**Q1: 俞敏洪是哪里人？出生于什么家庭？**

A: 俞敏洪1962年9月4日出生于江苏省江阴市夏港街道葫桥村一个普通农村家庭。父亲是木匠，母亲是生产队妇女队长。他7岁起便在稻田插秧、帮家里干农活，农村出身的经历深刻塑造了他坚韧务实的性格。[s1][s47]

**Q1 (EN): Where is Yu Minhong from, and what was his family background?**

A: Yu Minhong was born on September 4, 1962, into a farming family in Huqiao Village, Jiangyin, Jiangsu. His father was a carpenter and his mother a production-brigade women's team leader. From age seven he worked in the rice paddies; his rural upbringing shaped his resilient, pragmatic character. [s1][s47]

**Q2: 俞敏洪参加过几次高考？每次英语考了多少分？**

A: 俞敏洪参加过三次高考。1978年第一次高考，英语仅得33分，名落孙山；1979年第二次高考，英语55分，再次落榜；1980年第三次高考，英语考出95分（部分资料记为93分），总分超过北大录取线7分，被北京大学西语系录取。三次高考的经历也成为他日后'在绝望中寻找希望'人生哲学的起点。[s14][s16]

**Q2 (EN): How many times did Yu Minhong take the gaokao, and what were his English scores?**

A: He took it three times: in 1978 he scored 33 in English and failed; in 1979 he scored 55 and failed again; in 1980 he scored 95 (some sources say 93), exceeded Peking University's cutoff by 7 points, and was admitted to the Department of Western Languages. The experience became the origin of his motto 'seek hope in despair.' [s14][s16]

**Q3: 新东方是哪一年创立的？什么时候上市的？**

A: 新东方由俞敏洪于1993年11月16日在北京创立，最初只是西三旗一间10平米平房里的英语培训班。2006年9月7日，新东方在美国纽约证券交易所上市，成为中国大陆第一家在美国上市的教育机构，发行价每股15美元，首日上涨41.5%。2020年11月9日，新东方回港二次上市（股份代号：9901.HK），成为首家回港二次上市的中国教育公司。[s2][s17][s3]

**Q3 (EN): When was New Oriental founded, and when did it list?**

A: Yu founded New Oriental in Beijing on November 16, 1993, starting as an English training class in a 10-square-meter bungalow. On September 7, 2006, it listed on the New York Stock Exchange—the first mainland Chinese education company to list in the US—at an issue price of US$15, rising 41.5% on the first day. [s2][s17]

**Q4: 双减政策对新东方造成了多大影响？**

A: 2021年7月24日'双减'政策出台后，新东方遭受毁灭性打击：股价从最高点19.97美元/股跌至1.68美元/股，跌幅超90%，市值蒸发超2000亿港元；K9学科类业务（约占营收60%）全面停止；退租1500个教学点；裁员约6万人；离职补偿金、退租违约金、学生退费等各项现金支出超200亿元。新东方从中国领先的民办教育机构跌入谷底。[s7][s18][s40]

**Q4 (EN): How badly did the Double Reduction policy hit New Oriental?**

A: After the policy was issued on July 24, 2021, New Oriental's stock fell from US$19.97 to US$1.68, a drop of over 90%, with market capitalization shrinking by over HK$200 billion. K9 subject tutoring (about 60% of revenue) ceased; leases on 1,500 teaching centers were ended; about 60,000 staff left (media reports vary between 40,000 and 60,000); cash outlays for severance, lease penalties and refunds exceeded 20 billion yuan. [s7][s18][s40]

**Q5: 新东方捐了多少套课桌椅？价值多少？**

A: 2021年11月，新东方宣布向乡村学校捐献近8万套崭新课桌椅，价值约5000万元，涉及郑州、西安、成都等十余个城市的分校。这些桌椅是此前新东方定制的，每套市场价在六七百元左右。这一举动被很多人视为教培时代'最体面的退场'。[s19]

**Q5 (EN): How many desks did New Oriental donate, and what were they worth?**

A: In November 2021, New Oriental announced the donation of nearly 80,000 sets of brand-new desks and chairs to rural schools, worth about 50 million yuan, across branches in more than ten cities including Zhengzhou, Xi'an and Chengdu. Each set cost around 600–700 yuan. The gesture was widely seen as 'the most dignified exit' of the tutoring era. [s19][s5]

**Q6: 东方甄选是怎么火起来的？董宇辉是谁？**

A: 东方甄选是新东方2021年底推出的直播带货平台，最初半年业绩惨淡。2022年6月，前新东方英语教师董宇辉以'双语直播'形式意外走红——他一边带货一边教英语单词、讲文史哲知识，这种'知识带货'模式迅速出圈。3天涨粉157万，销售额增加1777万元，新东方在线股价12个交易日累计上涨576%。董宇辉因此成为现象级直播主播，也成为东方甄选最核心的流量担当。[s23][s24]

**Q6 (EN): How did East Buy become popular, and who is Dong Yuhui?**

A: East Buy is New Oriental's livestream commerce platform launched in late 2021; its first six months were dismal. In June 2022, former New Oriental English teacher Dong Yuhui went viral with bilingual livestreaming—teaching vocabulary and literature while selling goods. The 'knowledge commerce' format gained 1.57 million followers in three days, and East Buy's fiscal 2023 GMV reached 10 billion yuan. [s23][s24]

**Q7: '小作文事件'是怎么回事？**

A: 2023年12月6日，东方甄选小编在抖音评论区留言称董宇辉直播时的'小作文'由文案团队创作，引发董宇辉粉丝强烈不满。CEO孙东旭直播回应时提及董宇辉年薪不止几千万、批评饭圈化行为，反而激化矛盾。事件导致东方甄选大量掉粉、股价暴跌。12月16日，孙东旭被免去CEO职务，俞敏洪兼任CEO。当晚俞敏洪与董宇辉合体直播，董宇辉后升任高级合伙人。这场风波本质上是平台与头部主播之间的权力与利益博弈。[s25][s48]

**Q7 (EN): What was the 'little essay incident'?**

A: On December 6, 2023, an East Buy social-media editor commented that the 'little essays' on Dong Yuhui's streams were written by a copywriting team, angering fans. CEO Sun Dongxu's livestream response—mentioning Dong's pay and criticizing fandom behavior—escalated the dispute; the account lost followers and the stock fell. Yu Minhong apologized, removed Sun as CEO on December 16, and later promoted Dong to senior partner. [s25][s48][s39]

**Q8: 董宇辉为什么离开东方甄选？分手费多少？**

A: 2024年7月25日，东方甄选公告董宇辉离职，不再担任公司雇员及高级管理层。董宇辉以7658.55万元收购'与辉同行'100%股权独立运营。俞敏洪称'公司是送给宇辉的'，并将与辉同行全部净利润奖励给董宇辉。加上此前承诺的1.29亿元利润分成等，董宇辉'分手费'总计约3.58亿元。双方没有撕破脸，被称为商业史上'体面分手'的范例。[s9][s26][s27]

**Q8 (EN): Why did Dong Yuhui leave East Buy, and what was the financial arrangement?**

A: On July 25, 2024, East Buy announced Dong's departure as employee and senior executive. Dong acquired 100% of 'With Hui Tong Xing' for 76.5855 million yuan, with Yu saying the company was 'given to Yuhui.' Including a promised 129-million-yuan profit reward and other compensation, the total arrangement was reported at about 358 million yuan. [s9][s26][s27]

**Q9: 俞敏洪现在有哪些职务？**

A: 俞敏洪现任新东方教育科技集团董事长、东方甄选董事长兼首席执行官、第十三届民盟中央教育委员会主任、全国工商联知名企业委员会秘书长、亚布力论坛轮值主席、全联民办教育出资者商会理事长、中国民办教育协会副会长。他曾任第十一、十二、十三届全国政协委员。[s1][s10-02]

**Q9 (EN): What positions does Yu Minhong currently hold?**

A: Yu Minhong is chairman of New Oriental Education & Technology Group and chairman and CEO of East Buy. He also holds public and industry roles including rotating chairman of the Yabuli Forum and vice president of the China Association for Non-Government Education. [s10][s1]

**Q10: 东方甄选现在的经营状况如何？**

A: 董宇辉出走后，东方甄选2025财年GMV降至87亿元，同比下降39.2%。经过'去主播化'和自营产品战略转型后，2026财年（截至2026年5月31日）总营收57.01亿元，同比增长29.8%；净利润5.44亿元；总GMV回升至102亿元，自营产品GMV占比超52%。俞敏洪在2026年亚布力论坛上明确表示，东方甄选是'以自营产品为核心的产品公司'，而非电商或主播公司。[s44][s50][s10]

**Q10 (EN): How is East Buy performing now?**

A: After Dong Yuhui's departure, East Buy's fiscal 2025 GMV fell to 8.7 billion yuan, down 39.2%. Following a 'de-hostification' and self-operated-product pivot, fiscal 2026 (ended May 31, 2026) revenue rose 29.8% to 5.701 billion yuan, net profit was 544 million yuan, total GMV recovered to 10.2 billion yuan, and self-operated products exceeded 52% of GMV. [s6][s50][s44]

## 来源清单 Sources

1. [s1] 新东方官网 · 新东方企业网 / 企业概况 / 管理团队 — http://www.neworiental.org/profile/team/ymh.html
2. [s2] 新东方官网 · 发展历程 — http://new.neworiental.org/profile/course.html
3. [s3] 新东方投资者关系 · 新东方于香港联合交易所主板挂牌上市 — https://investor.neworiental.org/zh-hans/news-releases/news-release-details/xindongfangyuxiangganglianhejiaoyisuozhubanguapaishangshi
4. [s4] New Oriental Investor Relations · New Oriental Provides Update on New Regulations — https://investor.neworiental.org/news-releases/news-release-details/new-oriental-education-technology-group-inc-provides-update-new
5. [s5] 港交所 (HKEX) · 東方甄選控股有限公司截至2023年5月31日止年度的年度業績公告 — https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2023/0825/2023082501338_c.pdf
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