# 史玉柱 · Shi Yuzhu — 封面档案 ACF-01-00150

> 亚洲封面人物 Asia Cover Figure · 机器可读档案（LLM-ready）。本文件由官网结构化档案数据自动生成，供 AI 检索与引用。中文全文与英文全文对照编排。

## 档案元数据 Metadata

- 封面编码 ACF Code：**ACF-01-00150**
- 姓名 Name：史玉柱 / Shi Yuzhu
- 职务 Title：巨人网络创始人、董事长 / Founder and Chairman, Giant Network
- 公司 Company：巨人网络集团股份有限公司 / Giant Network Group Co., Ltd.
- 篇别 Category：商界逆行者（列传篇 / Biographies (Liezhuan)）
- 入档日期 Accessioned：2026-04-17
- 标签 Tags：巨人网络, 脑白金, 征途, 巨人大厦, 民生银行, Playtika, 黄金酱酒, 保健品, 网游
- 永久档案链接 Archive URL：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00150/liezhuan
- English archive：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00150/liezhuan?lang=en
- 官网原文报道 Feature story：https://coverfigure.com/acf/figure/shiyuzhu

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## 卷首 Editorial Intro

2.5亿元。

这是1997年史玉柱个人负债的金额。一年前，巨人大厦从最初规划的18层一路加高到70层，预算从2亿元飙升至12亿元。当资金链断裂的那一刻到来时，这座设计高度70层的大厦只建到了地上三层的骨架便戛然而止，成为中国房地产行业最著名的烂尾楼之一。史玉柱从全国第二大民营高科技企业家的巅峰坠入"中国首负"的深渊，巨人集团的员工从数百人锐减至仅剩几人，所有债权人都以为这笔钱永远要不回来了。

七年后，另一组数据出现在公众面前：脑白金年销售额突破25亿元。从一个负债2.5亿的"失信被执行人"，到年销售额25亿的消费品帝国，史玉柱用了不到七年时间。这不仅是中国商业史上最经典的逆袭案例之一，即便放在全球商业史的坐标系中，如此剧烈的反转也极为罕见。更令人震惊的是，这次逆袭的启动资金几乎为零——史玉柱在巨人大厦失败后借了50万元启动资金，从江苏江阴的一个县级市场开始，一个县一个县地做终端推广，用脑白金的终端动销回款来滚动投入，硬生生从废墟中重建了一个商业帝国。

但史玉柱带来的数据震撼远不止于此。2007年，他创办的网游公司征途网络在纽交所上市，市值一度超过42亿美元，成为中国最赚钱的网络游戏公司之一。征途游戏的月均ARPU值（每用户平均收入）长期位居行业首位，巅峰时期超过300元——这一数据即便在全球范围内也是顶尖水平。征途的成功密码在于史玉柱对人性需求的精准把握：他将自己在保健品行业积累的"免费体验+持续付费"模式移植到了游戏行业，创造了"给玩家发工资""装备保值"等一系列开创性的运营机制。

而在投资端，史玉柱的数据同样令人侧目。他在2003年前后开始大量买入民生银行H股，累计投入约15亿港元。到2014年前后分批减持时，这笔投资的总收益超过100亿港元。投资回报率接近7倍，持有周期超过十年。这不是一个赌徒的运气，而是一个对企业价值和资本周期有着深刻理解的投资者的长期收获。

这四组数据——2.5亿负债、25亿年销售额、42亿美元市值、100亿港元投资收益——构成了一个完整的商业叙事弧线：从谷底到巅峰，从消费品到互联网，从经营到投资。在中国企业家的群像中，没有任何一个人的人生数据拥有如此剧烈的波动幅度和如此多元的商业版图。

亚洲《封面人物》杂志独立编委会在评审史玉柱的档案时，关注的核心问题是：一个经历了中国商业史上最惨烈失败的企业家，如何能在如此短的时间内完成如此规模的逆转，并在此后的每一次商业决策中都展现出令人惊叹的精准度？经过独立编委会评审，史玉柱的完整商业档案被赋予终身档案编码并永久存证。他的核心标签——极致冒险主义者、废墟重建者、人性需求洞察者、资本周期猎手——共同构成了一个在中国民营经济史上极具传奇色彩和标本价值的企业家肖像。

In the history of China's private economy development, few people have experienced such dramatic rises and falls in such a short time — from China's second-largest private high-tech enterprise to 'China's most indebted' with 250 million yuan in debt, from Brain Gold's billion-yuan legend to Zhengtu gaming's NYSE listing. Each of Shi Yuzhu's falls was accompanied by earth-shattering collapse, and each rise created astonishing miracles. His life trajectory condenses the two most extreme dimensions of Chinese entrepreneurial spirit: the extreme of冒险ism and the extreme of conservatism, alternating dominance within the same person. This extreme duality makes his story transcend simple business success narratives, becoming a profound allegory about human nature, about resilience, about how to rebuild oneself from ruins.

## 人物速览 Lead

从4000元借款起步到中国首负再到百亿富豪，史玉柱的商业生涯是中国改革开放四十年来最具传奇色彩的创业史诗。他创造了汉卡帝国的辉煌，也经历了巨人大厦崩塌的至暗时刻；他用脑白金完成了中国商界最经典的逆袭，又在征途网游和民生银行投资中展现了资本猎手的敏锐嗅觉。他是一个赌徒，但从不打没有把握的赌。

From starting with a 4,000 yuan loan to China's most indebted to a hundred-billionaire, Shi Yuzhu's business career is the most legendary entrepreneurial epic in China's forty years of reform and opening-up. He created the glory of a Hanka empire and experienced the darkest moment of the Giant Building's collapse; he completed the most classic comeback in Chinese business with Brain Gold, and demonstrated a capital hunter's keen nose in Zhengtu gaming and Minsheng Bank investments. He is a gambler, but never makes bets without certainty.

## 正文 Archive Chapters

### 1. 数学系青年：从统计局到深圳的原始积累 / Math Department Youth: From Statistics Bureau to Shenzhen's Primitive Accumulation

1962年9月15日，史玉柱出生于安徽省蚌埠市怀远县。一个普通知识分子家庭的背景，为他提供了基本的教育条件和向上流动的通道。1980年，他以优异成绩考入浙江大学数学系——在那个年代，能够从县城考入名校数学系，足以证明他的天资与勤奋。1984年大学毕业后，史玉柱被分配至安徽省统计局工作。这份在旁人眼中体面而稳定的体制内工作，却无法满足他内心涌动的不安分。他每天从浙大宿舍跑到灵隐寺再跑回来，坚持了整整四年——这种近乎偏执的自律和韧性，日后将成为他商海沉浮中最核心的性格底色。

1986年，史玉柱作为'第三梯队'被送往深圳大学进修软科学管理硕士课程。深圳这座中国改革开放最前沿的城市，彻底打开了他的视野。彼时的深圳，到处都是创业的机会和暴富的神话，空气中弥漫着金钱与梦想的气息。史玉柱在这里第一次感受到了市场经济的脉搏，也第一次产生了下海经商的冲动。

1989年7月，27岁的史玉柱怀揣借来的4000元，从合肥飞抵深圳。这笔钱在当时并不算多，但对于一个没有任何商业经验的年轻人而言，这是他能筹集到的全部资本。他'混进'浙大学生宿舍和机房借用电脑，用赊账的方式购买了8500元的电脑设备（加价1000元延期付款），以深圳大学科技工贸公司电脑服务部为基地，开始了他的创业之路。他与钱宇、姜巨满、蔡玮四人用4000元承包了这个服务部——这就是日后庞大巨人帝国的最初起点。

史玉柱的核心竞争力从第一天就展现了出来：他是程序员出身，能够亲自开发产品。他开发的M-6401桌面中文处理系统（汉卡），具有固化字体、增加字库、批处理、所见即所得界面等创新特性，迅速在市场上获得了认可。更令人称奇的是他的营销天赋——他在只有4000元的情况下，用8400元的广告费在《计算机世界》上投放广告，先打广告后付款，15天期限，第13天收到1.582万元汇款。4个月回款100万元，半年回款400万元。这种'空手套白狼'式的营销能力，在此后的三十年里反复被验证，成为他最标志性的商业技能。

汉卡的生意越做越大。1991年，M-6403三个月后销量跃居全国第一，实现利润3500万元。史玉柱的营销天赋在这个阶段得到了充分展现：他邀请全国200多家经销商参加订货会，以此构建起覆盖全国的营销网络。柳传志后来评价他：'他意气风发，向我们请教，无非是表示一种谦虚的态度。'这种表面谦虚实则极度自信的性格，贯穿了史玉柱的整个商业生涯。1993年，中文手写电脑和软件销售额达到3.6亿元，巨人成为中国第二大民营高科技企业。1995年，史玉柱被《福布斯》列为大陆富豪第八位，是唯一高科技起家的企业家。从4000元起步到身价数亿，史玉柱只用了六年时间。

**English:** On September 15, 1962, Shi Yuzhu was born in Huaiyuan County, Bengbu City, Anhui Province. A background from an ordinary intellectual family provided him with basic educational conditions and a channel for upward mobility. In 1980, he was admitted to Zhejiang University's mathematics department with excellent grades — being able to get into a prestigious university's math program from a county town was sufficient proof of his intelligence and diligence. After graduating in 1984, Shi Yuzhu was assigned to work at the Anhui Provincial Bureau of Statistics. This stable government job, which others considered respectable, could not satisfy the restlessness surging within him. Every day he ran from his Zhejiang University dormitory to Lingyin Temple and back, persisting for a full four years — this near-obsessive discipline and resilience would later become the core character foundation during his business ups and downs.

In 1986, Shi Yuzhu was sent to Shenzhen University as part of the 'third echelon' to pursue a master's degree in soft science management. Shenzhen, China's foremost city of reform and opening-up, completely opened his horizons. At that time, Shenzhen was filled with entrepreneurial opportunities and get-rich-quick myths, the air thick with the scent of money and dreams. Here, Shi Yuzhu felt the pulse of the market economy for the first time, and the impulse to venture into business arose within him.

In July 1989, 27-year-old Shi Yuzhu flew from Hefei to Shenzhen with 4,000 yuan borrowed from friends. This amount was not much at the time, but for a young man with no business experience, it was all he could raise. He 'sneaked into' Zhejiang University student dormitories and computer labs to use computers, purchased 8,500 yuan worth of computer equipment on credit (adding 1,000 yuan for deferred payment), and began his entrepreneurial journey based at the Shenzhen University Science and Technology Industry and Trade Company Computer Service Department. Together with Qian Yu, Jiang Juman, and Cai Wei, he contracted this service department with 4,000 yuan — this was the earliest starting point of the later massive Giant empire.

Shi Yuzhu's core competitiveness was evident from day one: he was a programmer by training, able to develop products himself. His M-6401 desktop Chinese processing system (Hanka) featured innovations like fixed fonts, expanded character libraries, batch processing, and a WYSIWYG interface, quickly gaining market recognition. Even more remarkable was his marketing talent — with only 4,000 yuan, he placed 8,400 yuan worth of advertising in Computer World, advertising first and paying later, with a 15-day deadline. On the 13th day, he received a remittance of 15,820 yuan. Four months brought 1 million yuan in revenue; six months brought 4 million yuan. This 'getting something from nothing' marketing ability would be repeatedly validated over the subsequent three decades, becoming his most signature business skill.

The Hanka business grew larger and larger. In 1991, M-6403 sales leapt to number one nationally within three months, generating 35 million yuan in profit. Shi Yuzhu's marketing talent was fully displayed during this phase: he invited over 200 distributors nationwide to attend ordering conferences, thereby building a nationwide marketing network. Liu Chuanzhi later evaluated him: 'He was full of vim and vigor, coming to us for advice, merely as a show of modesty.' This personality of surface modesty masking extreme self-confidence ran through Shi Yuzhu's entire business career. In 1993, Chinese handwriting computers and software sales reached 360 million yuan, and Giant became China's second-largest private high-tech enterprise. In 1995, Forbes listed Shi Yuzhu as the eighth richest on the mainland — the only one who rose from high-tech origins. From 4,000 yuan starting capital to hundreds of millions in net worth, Shi Yuzhu needed only six years.

### 2. 珠海帝国：巨人大厦从15层到78层的疯狂 / Zhuhai Empire: The Giant Building's Madness from 15 to 78 Stories

1991年，29岁的史玉柱在珠海成立了巨人新技术公司。创立时仅有15名员工、120万资产，但M-6403汉卡产品三个月后便登顶全国销量第一，实现利润3500万元。这个数字在当时堪称天文数字，也让巨人公司迅速成为中国第二大民营高科技企业。1992年，巨人公司总部由深圳迁至珠海，升格为珠海巨人高科技集团公司，注册资金1.19亿元，规模扩大至100人。珠海市政府给予了巨人集团税收减免、50%分期付款土地等优惠政策，1993年杨尚昆、李鹏、田纪云、李铁映等党和国家领导人先后视察巨人集团，史玉柱本人也获珠海特区科技重奖特等奖，当选中国十大改革风云人物。

然而，辉煌之中已埋下了灾难的种子。史玉柱决定建造巨人大厦——最初规划仅15层，预算2亿元，作为集团的办公和研发基地。但在各方力量的推动下——地方政府的期望、媒体的高度关注、史玉柱本人好大喜功的性格——大厦的设计不断升级：从15层到38层，再到54层、64层、70层，最终定格在78层'中国第一高楼'。投资也从2亿元飙升至12亿元。珠海两次批给巨人约4万平方米土地，每平方米仅125元，这种近乎白送的土地价格，进一步刺激了史玉柱的野心。

更具灾难性的是，史玉柱坚持不向银行贷款，而是以集资和卖楼花的方式筹措资金。这种模式在房地产市场火热时尚能运转，一旦市场降温或工程延期，资金链就会立刻断裂。1994年巨人大厦破土动工，计划三年完工。但工程进展远比预期困难，而与此同时，巨人集团的保健品业务也因资金被大量抽调至大厦建设而迅速衰落。一批技术骨干因不满史玉柱独享名利而辞职，公司内部矛盾加剧。到1996年，巨人大厦投入3亿多元资金后告急，整个集团的资金链已近崩溃边缘。

巨人大厦的不断加码，折射出那个年代中国企业家群体性的焦虑和亢奋。在'大就是好'的时代氛围中，史玉柱并非唯一犯这种错误的人。但他是付出代价最惨重的一个。他的失败不仅仅是商业判断的失误，更是人格缺陷在商业决策中的集中体现——好大喜功、拒绝听取反对意见、把个人面子置于企业安全之上。这些性格弱点在巨人大厦的建设过程中被无限放大，最终导致了整个商业帝国的崩塌。

巨人大厦的悲剧并非孤例。同一时期，中国大量民营企业家在高速扩张中犯下类似错误——过度多元化、盲目追求规模、忽视现金流管理。但史玉柱的案例之所以特别有研究价值，是因为他跌得最深、爬得最高、反思得最彻底。他的失败和成功，构成了一个完美的商业教学闭环。

**English:** In 1991, 29-year-old Shi Yuzhu founded Giant New Technology Company in Zhuhai. With only 15 employees and 1.2 million yuan in assets at founding, the M-6403 Hanka product topped national sales within three months, generating 35 million yuan in profit. This figure was astronomical at the time, and Giant quickly became China's second-largest private high-tech enterprise. In 1992, Giant's headquarters moved from Shenzhen to Zhuhai, upgraded to Zhuhai Giant High-Tech Group Company, with registered capital of 119 million yuan and staff expanded to 100. The Zhuhai municipal government gave Giant preferential policies including tax exemptions and 50% installment land payments. In 1993, Party and state leaders including Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Tian Jiyun, and Li Tieying visited Giant in succession. Shi Yuzhu himself won the Zhuhai Special Zone Science and Technology Grand Prize, and was elected one of China's Top Ten Reform Figures.

However, seeds of disaster were already planted amid the glory. Shi Yuzhu decided to build the Giant Building — initially planned at only 15 stories with a 200 million yuan budget, as the group's office and R&D base. But driven by various forces — local government expectations, intense media attention, Shi Yuzhu's own love of grandeur — the building design kept escalating: from 15 to 38 stories, then 54, 64, 70, finally settling at 78 stories as 'China's tallest building.' Investment skyrocketed from 200 million to 1.2 billion yuan. Zhuhai granted Giant approximately 40,000 square meters of land in two batches, at only 125 yuan per square meter — this near-free land price further stimulated Shi Yuzhu's ambitions.

Even more disastrously, Shi Yuzhu insisted on not taking bank loans, instead raising funds through集资 and selling off-plan apartments. This model could function while the real estate market was hot, but once the market cooled or construction was delayed, the capital chain would immediately break. In 1994, the Giant Building broke ground with a planned three-year completion. But construction proved far more difficult than expected, while simultaneously, Giant's health supplement business rapidly declined as funds were massively diverted to building construction. A group of technical backbone staff resigned, dissatisfied with Shi Yuzhu monopolizing fame and profit, and internal company tensions intensified. By 1996, after investing over 300 million yuan, the Giant Building faced a funding crisis, and the entire group's capital chain was on the verge of collapse.

The Giant Building's constant escalation reflects the collective anxiety and euphoria of Chinese entrepreneurs in that era. In an atmosphere where 'bigger is better,' Shi Yuzhu was not the only one to make this mistake. But he was the one who paid the heaviest price. His failure was not merely a business judgment error, but a concentrated manifestation of personality flaws in business decision-making — love of grandeur, refusal to hear opposing views, placing personal face above corporate security. These character weaknesses were infinitely magnified during the Giant Building's construction, ultimately leading to the collapse of the entire business empire.

The Giant Building's tragedy was not an isolated case. During the same period, many Chinese private entrepreneurs made similar errors during rapid expansion — excessive diversification, blind pursuit of scale, neglecting cash flow management. But Shi Yuzhu's case is particularly valuable for study because he fell the deepest, climbed the highest, and reflected the most thoroughly. His failure and success constitute a perfect business teaching loop.

### 3. 中国首负：2.5亿负债与彻底的保守主义 / China's Most Indebted: 250 Million Yuan in Debt and Thorough Conservatism

1997年初，巨人大厦正式停工。此时仅完成了桩基、承载平台、地下三层和地上二层，而投入的3亿多元资金已经耗尽。更致命的是，史玉柱将保健品业务的全部资金调往了巨人大厦，导致保健品业务因资金'抽血'过量而迅速衰落。资金流完全瘫痪，债主们纷纷上门。史玉柱回忆：'刚给高管配的手机全都收回变卖，整个公司里只有我一人有手机用，大家很长时间没领过一分钱工资。'巨人集团名存实亡，史玉柱个人负债高达2.5亿元，从'中国首富'候选人沦为'中国首负'。

2001年，珠海市中级人民法院将巨人大厦在建工程及土地使用权裁定给19个债权人。这19个权益人所持权益比例从0.088%到24.39%不等，产权关系极其复杂。此后二十多年间，巨人大厦一直烂尾在珠海市中心寸土寸金的核心地段，先后沦为废品收购站和驾校停车场。2018年平安银行曾拍卖约6.9%的权益份额，1372.8万元流拍。直到2021年，珠海正方盛世投资才以4.02亿元拍下巨人大厦。

史玉柱后来反思这段经历：'好大喜功，我真是昏了头！'他用'彻底的保守主义者'来形容此后的心态转变。'账上有5个亿趴着，心里就不再害怕'——这种对现金流的极端重视，成为他日后所有商业决策的第一原则。巨人大厦的崩塌，不仅是一次商业失败，更是一次深刻的人生教育。它教会了史玉柱三条铁律：第一，永远不要把鸡蛋放在一个篮子里；第二，永远不要把短期资金投入长期项目；第三，永远不要为了面子牺牲里子。这三条铁律，在此后脑白金的创业和民生银行的投資中，被反复验证和强化。巨人大厦的废墟，成为中国商业史上最著名的烂尾楼之一，也是史玉柱永远的商业警钟。

这段从巅峰到谷底的经历，成为中国商业史上最经典的失败案例之一。但真正让史玉柱与众不同的是他面对失败的态度——他没有逃避，没有推卸责任，而是选择了一条最难的路：还清所有债务。这种选择在此后的脑白金创业中获得了巨大的回报，因为债权人看到了他的诚信，经销商愿意信任他，消费者也愿意原谅他。从这个意义上说，2.5亿元的债务不是负担，而是史玉柱用真金白银买来的商业信誉——这笔无形的资产，在此后二十年的商业生涯中持续产生回报。

值得注意的是，在史玉柱负债期间，他曾登上珠穆朗玛峰，差点迷路冻死。这种对极限挑战的执着，恰恰反映了他内心深处的赌徒性格。一个真正被打倒的人不会去攀登珠峰。史玉柱在最艰难的时刻选择了最危险的运动，这既是逃避，也是自我重建。

**English:** In early 1997, the Giant Building officially halted construction. At that point, only the piling foundation, load-bearing platform, three underground levels, and two above-ground levels were completed, while over 300 million yuan invested had been exhausted. Even more fatally, Shi Yuzhu had diverted all funds from the health supplement business to the Giant Building, causing the supplement business to rapidly decline from excessive capital 'bloodletting.' The cash flow chain completely paralyzed, and creditors came knocking one after another. Shi Yuzhu recalled: 'The mobile phones just allocated to executives were all collected and sold off. I was the only one in the entire company with a phone. Everyone went without salary for a very long time.' Giant Group existed in name only. Shi Yuzhu's personal debt reached 250 million yuan, transforming from 'China's richest' candidate to 'China's most indebted.'

In 2001, the Zhuhai Intermediate People's Court ruled the Giant Building's construction-in-progress and land use rights to 19 creditors. These 19 rights holders held stakes ranging from 0.088% to 24.39%, making property rights extremely complex. Over the next two decades, the Giant Building remained an unfinished eyesore in Zhuhai's city center prime location, successively becoming a scrap collection yard and driving school parking lot. In 2018, Ping An Bank attempted to auction approximately 6.9% equity share for 13.728 million yuan — it went unsold. Not until 2021 did Zhuhai Zhengfang Shengshi Investment acquire the Giant Building for 402 million yuan.

Shi Yuzhu later reflected on this period: 'I was consumed by grandiose ambitions. I truly lost my mind!' He described his subsequent mindset transformation as becoming a 'thorough conservative.' 'Having 500 million yuan lying idle in the account — then I'm no longer afraid' — this extreme emphasis on cash flow became the first principle of all his subsequent business decisions. The Giant Building's collapse was not just a business failure, but a profound life lesson. It taught Shi Yuzhu three iron rules: first, never put all your eggs in one basket; second, never commit short-term funds to long-term projects; third, never sacrifice substance for face. These three iron rules were repeatedly validated and reinforced in his later Brain Gold entrepreneurship and Minsheng Bank investments. The Giant Building's ruins became one of the most famous unfinished buildings in Chinese business history, and Shi Yuzhu's eternal business alarm bell.

This experience from peak to valley became one of the most classic failure cases in Chinese business history. But what truly distinguished Shi Yuzhu from others was his attitude toward failure — he didn't evade, didn't shift blame, but chose the hardest path: paying off all debts. This choice yielded enormous returns in the subsequent Brain Gold entrepreneurship, because creditors saw his integrity, distributors were willing to trust him, and consumers were willing to forgive him. In this sense, the 250 million yuan debt was not a burden but business reputation that Shi Yuzhu bought with real money — this intangible asset continued generating returns throughout the subsequent two decades of his business career.

Notably, during his debt period, Shi Yuzhu climbed Mount Everest and nearly got lost and frozen to death. This obsession with extreme challenges precisely reflects his deep-seated gambler nature. A person truly defeated wouldn't climb Everest. Shi Yuzhu chose the most dangerous sport at his most difficult moment — this was both escape and self-rebuilding.

### 4. 脑白金传奇：50万元撬动百亿市场 / Brain Gold Legend: 500,000 Yuan Leveraging a 10 Billion Market

1998年，背负2.5亿债务的史玉柱仓皇逃离珠海，爬珠穆朗玛峰差点迷路冻死后，蜗居到江苏江阴县城。他向朋友借了50万元，决定从头再来。这一次，他选择了保健品市场——确切地说，他选择了一个全新的产品概念：脑白金。

脑白金的核心成分是褪黑素（Melatonin），与通便口服液组合。但史玉柱真正卖的不是成分，而是概念——他把脑白金定义为'礼品'，精准锁定了中国社会的送礼文化。'今年过节不收礼，收礼只收脑白金'——这句后来成为中国广告史上最洗脑的广告语，正是出自史玉柱本人之手。他的营销策略堪称教科书级别：首先是软文轰炸，10名软文高手封闭创作十天，每人每天两篇，反复修改筛选。软文发在科技版、社会版、新闻版，绝不发广告版面——'人类可以长生不老吗？''两颗生物原子弹''一天不大便等于抽三包烟'——这些以科普面目出现的文章，让读者在不知不觉中接受了产品概念。

其次是电视广告的密集轰炸，尤其是黄金时段和县级电视台的高频次播放。史玉柱深谙中国二三线城市消费者的媒体接触习惯——他们不看报纸广告，但一定会看电视剧。于是脑白金的广告出现在每一个县级电视台的黄金时段，'今年过节不收礼'的旋律反复播放。第三是坚决不赊账，保证资金链安全。史玉柱从巨人大厦的教训中学到，现金流比利润更重要。他要求经销商先付款后发货，宁可少卖也不赊账。

这套组合拳的效果惊人。1997年7月脑白金在江阴试销成功，1999年公司更名为上海健特从南京迁至上海，2000年脑白金销售额突破13亿元，成为保健品市场的绝对霸主。2001年，史玉柱还清了2.5亿元巨人大厦债务，被视为'诚信典范'。到2008年，脑白金销售11年销量突破100亿元。吴晓波在《激荡三十年》中将史玉柱列为唯一标本人物，评价他做对了三件事：稳扎稳打打透一个市场、坚决不赊账保证资金链、广告轰炸策略。

脑白金的成功，本质上是史玉柱对人性的深刻洞察与中国社会文化的精准把握的结合体。他把一个成分平平的保健品，通过'礼品'的定位和'软文+硬广'的组合营销，变成了一个年销售额超10亿的消费品牌。这个案例至今仍被商学院反复研究。但脑白金也并非没有争议——2002年《南方周末》发表《脑白金真相》长文质疑其产品功效，史玉柱前夜飞赴广州在编辑部坐到凌晨协商未果。然而脑白金的销量并未受到太大冲击，被外界形容为'百毒不侵'。这种现象本身，就是史玉柱营销能力最好的证明。

**English:** In 1998, burdened with 250 million yuan in debt, Shi Yuzhu fled Zhuhai in panic. After nearly getting lost and frozen to death climbing Mount Everest, he holed up in Jiangyin county town, Jiangsu Province. He borrowed 500,000 yuan from a friend and decided to start over. This time, he chose the health supplement market — specifically, an entirely new product concept: Brain Gold (Naobaijin).

Brain Gold's core ingredient was melatonin, combined with a laxative oral liquid. But what Shi Yuzhu was really selling was not ingredients but concepts — he positioned Brain Gold as a 'gift,' precisely targeting China's gift-giving culture. 'Don't accept gifts during holidays; the only gift is Brain Gold' — this tagline, which later became one of the most brainwashing advertising slogans in Chinese advertising history, was written by Shi Yuzhu himself. His marketing strategy was textbook-level: first, soft article bombing. Ten soft article masters were sequestered for ten days of creation, each writing two pieces daily, with反复 revision and selection. Articles were published in science, society, and news sections — never in advertising sections. 'Can humans live forever?' 'Two biological atomic bombs' 'One day without bowel movement equals smoking three packs of cigarettes' — these articles disguised as popular science allowed readers to absorb product concepts without realizing it.

Second, intensive television advertising bombardment, especially high-frequency播放 during prime time on county-level TV stations. Shi Yuzhu understood Chinese second and third-tier city consumers' media habits — they don't read newspaper ads but definitely watch TV dramas. So Brain Gold ads appeared during prime time on every county-level station, the 'Don't accept gifts' melody playing repeatedly. Third, absolutely no credit sales, ensuring cash flow safety. From the Giant Building lesson, Shi Yuzhu learned that cash flow matters more than profit. He required distributors to pay first and deliver later, preferring to sell less rather than extend credit.

This combination's effect was astonishing. In July 1997, Brain Gold's trial sales in Jiangyin succeeded. In 1999, the company was renamed Shanghai Giant and relocated from Nanjing to Shanghai. By 2000, Brain Gold sales exceeded 1.3 billion yuan, making it the absolute dominant force in the health supplement market. In 2001, Shi Yuzhu paid off his 250 million yuan Giant Building debt, being hailed as a 'model of integrity.' By 2008, Brain Gold's 11-year cumulative sales exceeded 10 billion yuan. Wu Xiaobo in 'Thirty Years of Turbulence' listed Shi Yuzhu as the sole case study subject, evaluating that he did three things right: steadily penetrating one market, never extending credit to ensure cash flow, and advertising bombardment strategy.

Brain Gold's success was essentially the combination of Shi Yuzhu's profound insight into human nature and precise grasp of Chinese social culture. He transformed a health supplement with ordinary ingredients into a consumer brand with annual sales exceeding 1 billion yuan through 'gift' positioning and 'soft articles plus hard advertising' combined marketing. This case is still repeatedly studied in business schools today. But Brain Gold was not without controversy — in 2002, Southern Weekend published a long article 'Brain Gold Truth' questioning its product efficacy. Shi Yuzhu flew to Guangzhou the night before and sat in the editorial office until midnight to negotiate without result. Yet Brain Gold's sales were not significantly impacted, described by outsiders as 'immune to all poisons.' This phenomenon itself is the best proof of Shi Yuzhu's marketing ability.

### 5. 征途网游：穿运动服上纽交所的赌徒 / Zhengtu Gaming: The Gambler in Sportswear at the NYSE

2004年，史玉柱进军网络游戏行业，成立征途网络。这个决定看似跨行，实则源于他多年玩游戏的深刻体验。史玉柱玩网游超过20年，在《传奇》中注册用户名'收礼只收脑白金'，曾花3000元买区域最高级账号。他敏锐地发现，当时的网游行业存在巨大漏洞：竞争对手陈天桥和丁磊都不玩游戏，无法深切感受玩家需求。而史玉柱自己就是最挑剔的玩家——他知道玩家要什么，也知道什么会让玩家离开。

《征途》的商业模式彻底颠覆了行业规则。史玉柱宣布游戏免费，将收费转移至装备、道具和增值服务。这种'免费+内购'的模式后来成为整个网游行业的标配，但在2006年是极具争议的创新。为了推广游戏，史玉柱组建了数千人的地推团队，铺进全国上千座二三线城市的网吧。这种'农村包围城市'的营销策略，与脑白金时期的县级电视台轰炸如出一辙。

更具争议的是，史玉柱挖角了盛大《英雄年代》项目组成员，该项目组几乎集体辞职转投征途。竞争对手陈天桥曾热情接待史玉柱，结果几乎被全组挖走。《征途》的内核也因此被认为与《英雄年代》高度相似。

2006年4月《征途》开始运营，最高同时在线人数达210万。2007年11月，巨人网络在纽约证券交易所上市，发行价15.5美元，融资10.45亿美元，创下中国登陆美国最大IPO民营企业纪录。史玉柱穿运动服出现在纽交所，引来异样目光——纽交所甚至'特批'他穿运动服入场。'我穿运动服来，当地人都觉得奇怪，纽交所可能是第一次让不穿西服的人进来'——这个细节成为他特立独行性格的经典注脚。上市后史玉柱身价突破500亿元，2008年以28亿美元净资产成为福布斯全球互联网首富。

征途的成功让史玉柱再次证明了他的核心能力：他不需要发明全新的东西，只需要比所有人都更深刻地理解消费者的真实需求。在游戏领域，这个需求就是'被尊重'和'掌控感'——征途鼓励玩家'劫镖'、设置排行榜、提供付费特权，让付费玩家获得压倒性的优势。这种设计虽然饱受道德争议，但精准击中了核心付费用户的心理需求。2025年征途IP迎来二十周年，旗舰手游《原始征途》月均流水稳定1亿元。史玉柱为征途二十周年打出80分，核心要求三点：会玩、好玩、耐玩。这个评价标准本身，就体现了他对游戏产品最朴素也最本质的理解。

《征途》的另一个创新在于其对二三线市场的精准覆盖。当时的网游公司多关注一线城市玩家，而史玉柱凭借在脑白金时期建立的'农村包围城市'经验，率先将推广触角延伸到全国上千座二三线城市的网吧。这种渠道下沉能力，是其他互联网企业家所不具备的。

**English:** In 2004, Shi Yuzhu entered the online gaming industry, founding Zhengtu Network. This decision seemed like a cross-industry move, but actually stemmed from his deep experience playing games over many years. Shi Yuzhu had played online games for over 20 years, registering the username 'Accept only Brain Gold as gifts' in Legend of Mir, once spending 3,000 yuan to buy the highest-level account in a region. He astutely discovered a huge gap in the gaming industry: competitors Chen Tianqiao and Ding Lei didn't play games themselves, unable to deeply understand player needs. But Shi Yuzhu was the most demanding player himself — he knew what players wanted and what would make them leave.

Zhengtu's business model completely disrupted industry rules. Shi Yuzhu announced the game was free, shifting charges to equipment, props, and value-added services. This 'free + in-app purchase' model later became the standard across the entire gaming industry, but in 2006 it was a highly controversial innovation. To promote the game, Shi Yuzhu assembled a ground team of thousands, deploying across more than 1,000 second and third-tier city internet cafes nationwide. This 'rural surrounding cities' marketing strategy was identical to the county-level TV station bombardment from the Brain Gold era.

Even more controversially, Shi Yuzhu poached Shanda's Heroic Age project team members, who collectively resigned en masse to join Zhengtu. Competitor Chen Tianqiao had once warmly received Shi Yuzhu, only to have nearly his entire team poached away. Zhengtu's core was therefore considered highly similar to Heroic Age.

In April 2006, Zhengtu began operations, reaching a peak of 2.1 million concurrent players. In November 2007, Giant Network listed on the New York Stock Exchange at $15.50 per share, raising $1.045 billion, setting the record for the largest Chinese private enterprise IPO on American exchanges. Shi Yuzhu appeared at the NYSE in sportswear, attracting strange looks — the NYSE even 'specially approved' him to enter in sportswear. 'I came in sportswear and the locals thought it was strange. The NYSE probably let someone not in a suit in for the first time' — this detail became a classic annotation of his unconventional personality. After listing, Shi Yuzhu's net worth exceeded 50 billion yuan. In 2008, with 2.8 billion dollars in net assets, he became Forbes' world's richest internet entrepreneur.

Zhengtu's success once again proved Shi Yuzhu's core competency: he didn't need to invent something entirely new, just needed to understand consumers' real needs more profoundly than everyone else. In the gaming domain, this need was 'being respected' and 'sense of control' — Zhengtu encouraged players to 'rob caravans,' set up leaderboards, provided paid privileges, giving paying players overwhelming advantages. This design, while morally controversial, precisely hit core paying users' psychological needs. In 2025, the Zhengtu IP celebrated its twentieth anniversary, with flagship mobile game Original Zhengtu maintaining stable monthly revenue of 100 million yuan. Shi Yuzhu scored Zhengtu's twentieth anniversary at 80 points, with three core requirements: playable, fun, enduring. This evaluation standard itself reflects his most basic yet essential understanding of gaming products.

Another Zhengtu innovation was its precise coverage of second and third-tier markets. While gaming companies at the time focused on first-tier city players, Shi Yuzhu leveraged his 'rural surrounding cities' experience from the Brain Gold era to pioneer extending promotion reach to internet cafes across thousands of second and third-tier cities nationwide. This channel penetration capability is something other internet entrepreneurs simply don't possess.

### 6. 民生银行猎手：85次增持与错过的茅台 / Minsheng Bank Hunter: 85 Accumulations and the Moutai Missed

如果说脑白金和征途是史玉柱实业上的两次巅峰，那么在民生银行的投资则展现了他作为资本猎手的敏锐嗅觉。2011年3月至9月，史玉柱开始了第一轮民生银行增持：A股46次增持共斥资38亿元，H股32次增持共斥资约14.6亿港元。2012年第二轮增持，A股和H股合计斥资约2.5亿元。两轮增持合计85次单笔交易，合计耗资约55亿元。他公开承诺'3年内不减持民生银行'。

史玉柱的投资节奏精准得令人叹服。2012年9月，当专业机构做空民生银行时，史玉柱闷头扫货。他在微博上嘲笑做空者'内裤都输掉了'。到2013年初，他的民生银行持仓浮盈约26亿元，A股增持均价5.88元/股，溢价率38%。证券时报评价他'完胜专业投资机构'，称其为'最佳投资人'。

然而，史玉柱的资本嗅觉并非没有失误。2013年白酒行业陷入低谷，茅台股价跌至88至151元，市盈率仅约30倍。当被问是否买入茅台时，史玉柱公开说'不买茅台'，理由是'民生银行市盈率4倍，增速还更快'。这个判断后来被证明是一个巨大的失误——茅台随后开启了十倍行情，从2014年的100元涨至2019年的1000元以上。史玉柱后来承认'当初看走眼了'。2020年1月，他在茅台镇成立黄金酒业（黄金酱酒），自己做'类茅台'产品。这个'赌气式'的回应，恰恰暴露了他对错过茅台的耿耿于怀。从投资者视角看，史玉柱的核心能力在于对金融股的深刻理解和对市场情绪的精准把握，但他对消费品行业的判断力则明显逊色。这种能力的不均衡，也成为他后来资本运作中反复出现风险的根源之一。

民生银行投资的故事，揭示了史玉柱作为投资者的两个核心特质：第一，逆向思维——别人恐惧时他贪婪，别人贪婪时他恐惧；第二，极强的执行力——一旦看准方向，就毫不犹豫地下重注。但同时，这个故事也暴露了他的局限性：他过于依赖单一维度的分析框架（低市盈率加高增长），对行业趋势的判断力不足。错过茅台的教训说明，即使是最聪明的投资者，也需要不断扩展自己的能力圈。史玉柱后来在黄金酱酒上的投入，某种程度上就是对错过茅台的一种补偿心理——既然买不了真正的茅台，那就自己做一个。这种心态是否健康另当别论，但它确实推动史玉柱进入了白酒这个全新的领域。

从更大的视角看，史玉柱的投资逻辑始终围绕着'确定性'三个字。无论是脑白金的礼品定位、征途的免费模式、还是民生银行的高分红策略，他追求的都是现金流的可预测性。这种对确定性的偏好，既是巨人大厦创伤的后遗症，也是他作为企业家的核心特质。

**English:** If Brain Gold and Zhengtu were Shi Yuzhu's two peaks in physical industry, then the Minsheng Bank investment showcased his keen nose as a capital hunter. From March to September 2011, Shi Yuzhu began his first round of Minsheng Bank accumulation: 46 A-share purchases totaling 3.8 billion yuan, plus 32 H-share purchases totaling approximately 1.46 billion HK dollars. A second round in 2012 added about 250 million yuan across A-shares and H-shares. The two rounds totaled 85 individual transactions consuming approximately 5.5 billion yuan. He publicly committed to 'not reducing Minsheng Bank holdings for 3 years.'

Shi Yuzhu's investment timing was breathtakingly precise. In September 2012, when professional institutions shorted Minsheng Bank, Shi Yuzhu quietly loaded up. He mocked the shorters on Weibo, saying they 'lost even their underwear.' By early 2013, his Minsheng Bank position showed approximately 2.6 billion yuan in floating profits, with A-share average purchase price at 5.88 yuan per share, a 38% premium. Securities Times评价 him as 'completely defeating professional investment institutions,' calling him the 'best investor.'

However, Shi Yuzhu's capital instincts were not without mistakes. In 2013, the baijiu industry fell into a trough, with Moutai stock prices dropping to 88-151 yuan, PE ratio around 30 times. When asked whether to buy Moutai, Shi Yuzhu publicly said 'not buying Moutai,' reasoning that 'Minsheng Bank's PE is 4 times, with even faster growth.' This judgment later proved to be a huge mistake — Moutai subsequently embarked on a ten-fold rally, rising from 100 yuan in 2014 to over 1,000 yuan by 2019. Shi Yuzhu later admitted he 'misjudged it.' In January 2020, he established Golden酒业 (Golden Sauce Liquor) in Maotai Town, creating his own 'Moutai-like' product. This 'spiteful' response precisely revealed his lingering regret about missing Moutai. From an investor's perspective, Shi Yuzhu's core competency lies in deep understanding of financial stocks and precise grasping of market sentiment, but his judgment in the consumer goods industry was noticeably inferior. This uneven distribution of capabilities also became one of the root causes of recurring risks in his later capital operations.

The Minsheng Bank investment story reveals two core characteristics of Shi Yuzhu as an investor: first, contrarian thinking — being greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy; second, extremely strong execution — once a direction is identified, betting heavily without hesitation. Simultaneously, this story also exposes his limitations: over-reliance on a single-dimensional analytical framework (low PE ratio plus high growth), with insufficient judgment of industry trends. The lesson of missing Moutai demonstrates that even the smartest investors need to continuously expand their circle of competence. Shi Yuzhu's later investment in Golden Sauce Liquor was, to some extent, a compensatory psychology for missing Moutai — since he couldn't buy the real Moutai, he would make his own. Whether this mentality is healthy is debatable, but it did push Shi Yuzhu into the entirely new field of baijiu.

From a broader perspective, Shi Yuzhu's investment logic has always revolved around the three characters of 'certainty.' Whether it's Brain Gold's gift positioning, Zhengtu's free model, or Minsheng Bank's high-dividend strategy, what he pursues is predictability of cash flow. This preference for certainty is both a sequela of the Giant Building trauma and his core characteristic as an entrepreneur.

### 7. 305亿收购Playtika：高杠杆的资本赌局 / 30.5 Billion Playtika Acquisition: A High-Leverage Capital Gamble

2016年，史玉柱通过借壳世纪游轮重返A股，市值最高冲至1600亿元。几乎同时，他抛出了一个更为大胆的资本计划：以305亿元收购Alpha公司（主体为以色列游戏公司Playtika）。Playtika 2017年营收77.1亿元，净利润20.02亿元，旗下《Slotomania》贡献营收超45%。但收购的杠杆率高达93%——3.3亿美元自有外汇加上42.7亿美元借款。交易对方还未进行业绩承诺，这意味着几乎全部风险由巨人网络承担。

收购过程一波三折。2018年8月，因'人身安全威胁'等原因，巨人网络撤回了Playtika重组申请。此后方案反复调整：2018年11月调整方案、2019年7月变更为收购42.30%股份、2019年11月终止现金收购。直到2020年7月，才以'曲线收购'方式完成：巨堃网络收购重庆赐比（持有Alpha 42.04%股权），而重庆赐比为史玉柱控制的企业。民生银行给予并购银团贷款70亿元。

这笔高杠杆收购的后遗症至今未消。巨堃网络由巨人网络持股49%、巨人投资持股51%，前期因收购Playtika母公司Alpha Frontier股权形成的并购贷款至今仍在偿还中。2026年，巨人网络借壳上市9年来首次在二级市场减持，史玉柱从上市公司体系累计套现已超80亿元，减持理由为'还银行贷款'。从资本操作节奏看，史玉柱一贯遵循'卖在人声鼎沸时'的原则：脑白金爆火时卖脑白金、金融危机前大幅减持银行股、巨人网络业绩高点时多次套现还债。这种'高杠杆资本运作加套现再投资'的模式，是他一贯的商业风格——激进而精准，但也伴随着持续的风险。

Playtika收购的教训在于：即使是最精明的资本操盘手，也可能被自己的贪婪所困。93%的杠杆率意味着几乎没有任何容错空间。史玉柱为此付出的代价是：巨人网络市值从1600亿元跌至400亿元，自己累计套现80亿元还债，多次被法院列为被执行人。2026年，巨人大厦突然宣布重启，珠海市公布改造提升及公共停车场项目备案信息，总投资16.67亿元，计划2029年12月完工。这座烂尾近三十年的建筑，终于有了重生的可能。但对于史玉柱而言，真正的'巨人大厦'重建不在珠海，而在他自己的商业信誉和资本信誉之中。

2026年Q1，巨人网络营收23.29亿元，同比增长221.70%；归母净利润10.80亿元，增长210.58%。《超自然行动组》等新游戏贡献了主要增量。2026年上半年营收46.89亿元，归母净利润21.44亿元。巨人网络的业绩回暖，使史玉柱有了喘息的空间。但他的个人担保纠纷仍未完全了结，截至2026年仍有约3.51亿元被执行金额。

从更宏观的角度审视，Playtika收购案是中国企业海外并购浪潮中的一个典型样本。高杠杆、长周期、复杂的交易结构——这些特征几乎出现在每一个大型跨境并购中。史玉柱的经历提醒后来者：资本运作的能力再强，也无法替代对风险的敬畏。

**English:** In 2016, Shi Yuzhu returned to A-shares through a backdoor listing via Century Cruise, with market cap peaking at 160 billion yuan. Almost simultaneously, he unveiled an even bolder capital plan: acquiring Alpha company (entity being Israeli gaming company Playtika) for 30.5 billion yuan. Playtika's 2017 revenue was 7.71 billion yuan, net profit 2.002 billion yuan, with Slotomania contributing over 45% of revenue. But the acquisition leverage ratio reached 93% — 330 million dollars in self-owned foreign exchange plus 4.27 billion dollars in loans. The counterparties made no performance commitments, meaning nearly all risk was borne by Giant Network.

The acquisition process was tortuous. In August 2018, due to 'personal safety threats' and other reasons, Giant Network withdrew its Playtika restructuring application. The plan was repeatedly adjusted: November 2018 plan adjustment, July 2019 change to acquiring 42.30% shares, November 2019 termination of cash acquisition. Not until July 2020 was it completed through a 'curve acquisition': Jukun Network acquired Chongqing Cibi (holding 42.04% of Alpha equity), with Chongqing Cibi being an enterprise controlled by Shi Yuzhu. Minsheng Bank provided a 7 billion yuan acquisition syndicated loan.

The aftereffects of this highly leveraged acquisition persist to this day. Jukun Network is held 49% by Giant Network and 51% by Giant Investment, with acquisition loans from the Alpha Frontier equity acquisition still being repaid. In 2026, nine years after the backdoor listing, Giant Network made its first secondary market share reduction. Shi Yuzhu has cumulatively cashed out over 8 billion yuan from the listed company system, with the reduction reason being 'repaying bank loans.' From the capital operation rhythm, Shi Yuzhu has consistently followed the principle of 'selling when the crowd is loudest': selling Brain Gold at peak sales, massively reducing bank stock holdings before the financial crisis, cashing out multiple times at Giant Network performance peaks to repay debt. This 'high-leverage capital operations plus cashing out for reinvestment' model is his consistent business style — aggressive yet precise, but accompanied by persistent risks.

The Playtika acquisition's lesson is that even the most shrewd capital operator can be trapped by their own greed. A 93% leverage ratio means virtually zero room for error. The price Shi Yuzhu paid was: Giant Network market cap dropping from 160 billion to 40 billion yuan, personally cashing out 8 billion yuan cumulatively to repay debt, and being listed as a person subject to enforcement by courts multiple times. In 2026, the Giant Building suddenly announced a restart, with Zhuhai City publishing renovation and public parking project filing information, total investment 1.667 billion yuan, planned completion December 2029. This building, unfinished for nearly thirty years, finally has the possibility of rebirth. But for Shi Yuzhu, the real 'Giant Building' rebuilding is not in Zhuhai, but in his own business reputation and capital credibility.

In Q1 2026, Giant Network revenue reached 2.329 billion yuan, up 221.70% year-over-year; net profit attributable to parent was 1.080 billion yuan, up 210.58%. New games like 'Supernatural Task Force' contributed major increments. In the first half of 2026, revenue reached 4.689 billion yuan with net profit of 2.144 billion yuan. Giant Network's performance recovery gave Shi Yuzhu room to breathe. But his personal guarantee disputes remain unresolved, with approximately 351 million yuan in enforcement amounts as of 2026.

From a more macroscopic perspective, the Playtika acquisition is a typical sample in the wave of Chinese enterprise overseas M&A. High leverage, long cycles, complex transaction structures — these characteristics appear in virtually every large cross-border acquisition. Shi Yuzhu's experience reminds later comers: no matter how strong one's capital operation ability, it cannot replace reverence for risk.

### 8. 黄金酱酒与近年：从高调到低调的转身 / Golden Sauce Liquor and Recent Years: The Turn from High-profile to Low-key

2020年1月，史玉柱在贵州仁怀市茅台镇成立了黄金酒业股份有限公司。巨人集团控股，生产基地位于茅台镇核心产区，拥有标准窖池500余口，年产大曲酱香近5000吨，基酒储存2万吨。由中国首届名酒大师龙则河担任酒体总设计师。黄金酱酒从诞生到销售额突破10亿元仅用了两年时间，成立半年即达到7.5亿元销量。这是史玉柱'三板斧'营销策略在白酒领域的又一次应用：品质加品牌加背书。

但黄金酱酒也面临争议。有业内人士指出其实际为贴牌酒，品质宣传存在水分。史玉柱曾宣称'五名茅台镇专家盲品，三人选错'，暗示其品质不输茅台，但这一说法缺乏独立验证。从商业模式看，黄金酱酒更像是史玉柱个人IP的变现工具——利用他的知名度和营销能力，在白酒这个高毛利行业中分一杯羹。五年规划是五年、50亿、上市。但白酒行业已经进入了存量竞争时代，黄金酱酒能否真正实现这一目标，仍待观察。

近年来，史玉柱越来越低调。他几乎不再接受媒体采访，不参加行业论坛，不公开露面。2022年7月，他公开露面，这是三年未出上海后的首次离开。出售Playtika是为了'一年内把负债清成零'。他表示黄金酱酒和征途是他的事业，'绝对不会卖掉'。从'中国首负'到东山再起，再到逐渐淡出——史玉柱的人生轨迹，像极了他自己说过的一句话：'我是一个赌徒，但我从不打没有把握的赌。'

黄金酱酒的未来取决于两个关键因素：一是能否真正建立起独立于史玉柱个人IP的品牌认知；二是能否在品质上经受住消费者和行业的检验。从目前的公开信息看，这两个方面都还存在不确定性。但史玉柱从来不缺少争议，也从来不缺少在争议中逆势增长的案例。黄金酱酒能否复制脑白金式的成功，时间会给出答案。

2025年，史玉柱回归研发一线，亲自参与《原始征途》手游研发六个多月，提出400多条修改意见。该游戏首日登顶iOS免费榜及畅销榜前20，新增用户超百万，首日流水超千万，首月流水突破三亿，累计流水超十亿。这个成绩证明了史玉柱即使在63岁的年纪，依然保持着对产品和市场的敏锐判断力。2026年5月，巨人网络第七届董事会第一次会议选举史玉柱为董事长，新一届董事会由史玉柱等4人组成。征途二十周年之际，史玉柱重新回到了一线管理岗位——这个曾经'混进'浙大机房写程序的年轻人，在四十年的商海浮沉后，依然选择站在风暴中心。

**English:** In January 2020, Shi Yuzhu established Guizhou Renhuai Golden酒业 Co., Ltd. in Maotai Town. Giant Group holds a controlling stake, with production facilities in Maotai Town's core production area, possessing over 500 standard cellar pits, annual Daqu sauce-flavor production of nearly 5,000 tons, and 20,000 tons of base liquor storage. China's first batch famous liquor master Long Zehe serves as chief liquor body designer. Golden Sauce Liquor went from birth to breaking 1 billion yuan in sales in just two years, reaching 750 million yuan in sales within half a year of establishment. This was another application of Shi Yuzhu's 'three tricks' marketing strategy in the baijiu field: quality plus brand plus endorsement.

But Golden Sauce Liquor also faces controversy. Industry insiders point out it is actually a white-label product, with quality claims lacking substance. Shi Yuzhu once claimed 'five Maotai Town experts did blind tasting, three chose wrong,' implying quality comparable to Moutai, but this claim lacks independent verification. From a business model perspective, Golden Sauce Liquor resembles more of a personal IP monetization tool — leveraging his fame and marketing ability to take a share of the high-margin baijiu industry. The five-year plan is five years, 5 billion, IPO. But the baijiu industry has entered a stock competition era, and whether Golden Sauce Liquor can truly achieve this goal remains to be seen.

In recent years, Shi Yuzhu has become increasingly low-key. He almost no longer accepts media interviews, doesn't participate in industry forums, and doesn't make public appearances. In July 2022, he made a public appearance — his first time leaving Shanghai in three years. Selling Playtika was to 'clear all debts to zero within one year.' He stated that Golden Sauce Liquor and Zhengtu are his enterprises and he will 'absolutely not sell them.' From 'China's most indebted' to rising again to gradually fading out — Shi Yuzhu's life trajectory closely resembles a phrase he once said: 'I am a gambler, but I never make bets without certainty.'

Golden Sauce Liquor's future depends on two key factors: first, whether it can truly build brand recognition independent of Shi Yuzhu's personal IP; second, whether quality can withstand consumer and industry scrutiny. From currently available public information, both aspects still carry uncertainty. But Shi Yuzhu has never lacked controversy, nor has he lacked cases of counter-trend growth amid controversy. Whether Golden Sauce Liquor can replicate Brain Gold-style success — time will tell.

In 2025, Shi Yuzhu returned to the R&D frontline, personally participating in Original Zhengtu mobile game development for over six months, proposing more than 400 modification suggestions. The game topped the iOS free chart on its first day and reached the top 20 of the grossing chart, with over a million new users, first-day revenue exceeding 10 million, first-month revenue breaking 300 million, and cumulative revenue exceeding 1 billion. This achievement proves that even at 63, Shi Yuzhu maintains sharp product and market judgment. In May 2026, Giant Network's 7th board of directors' first meeting elected Shi Yuzhu as chairman, with the new board consisting of Shi Yuzhu and 3 others. On Zhengtu's twentieth anniversary, Shi Yuzhu returned to frontline management — this young man who once 'sneaked into' Zhejiang University's computer lab to write programs, after forty years of business ups and downs, still chooses to stand at the eye of the storm.

### 9. 时代标本：一个赌徒的四个商业纪元 / Era Specimen: A Gambler's Four Business Epochs

史玉柱是中国改革开放后最具传奇色彩、最富争议也最具研究价值的商业人物之一。吴晓波在《激荡三十年》中将他列为唯一标本人物，这不是偶然。在他身上，浓缩了中国民营企业四十年发展历程中几乎所有关键命题：技术创业、多元化扩张、过度冒险、资金链断裂、诚信还债、重新崛起、资本运作、产业转型。每一个命题都可以独立成书，但在史玉柱身上它们是连续发生的，构成了一部完整的企业家成长史诗。

他的核心能力可以总结为五个方面：第一，敏锐的市场嗅觉与产品定义能力；第二，天才般的营销能力——'中国人做软文推广，史玉柱认第二，没人敢认第一'；第三，对人性（消费心理）的深刻洞察与利用；第四，超强的抗挫折能力与学习能力；第五，娴熟的资本运作技巧。这五种能力的组合，使他在每一个进入的领域都能迅速建立优势。

但他也有明显的短板：好大喜功导致巨人大厦悲剧，过度自信导致错过茅台，高杠杆资本运作导致持续的担保纠纷和股权冻结。2021年至2024年间，他因帮朋友担保屡遭股权冻结，2023年新增被执行人信息17.65亿元。他发微博自嘲：'多请朋友吃火锅，不给朋友做担保。'这句玩笑话背后，是数十亿真金白银的代价。

2026年4月，重庆证监局对巨人网络出具警示函，原因是2020年的一笔关联交易未履行审议程序和信息披露义务。时隔近六年才被追责，说明资金穿透式监管正在揭示潜藏的风险。但对史玉柱而言，真正重要的不是这些监管处罚，而是他如何定义自己的一生。他曾在纽交所说：'恰恰是一段失败的经历，使他赢得了华尔街的信任。没有失败经历的创业者，不知道什么是风险。'这句话或许是对他自己最好的人生注脚。

回望史玉柱四十年的商业生涯，我们看到的是一个不断在废墟上重建的人。从4000元到3.6亿元，从2.5亿负债到百亿富豪，从纽交所到被执行人——每一次跌倒后，他都以更强势的姿态站起来。这种韧性，在中国企业家群体中极为罕见。他也许不是最聪明的，不是最有远见的，但毫无疑问是最顽强的。正如他自己所说：'没有失败经历的创业者，不知道什么是风险。'

史玉柱的故事告诉我们：在中国的商业环境中，失败不是终点，而是起点。真正决定一个人历史定位的，不是他曾经跌到过什么位置，而是他每次跌倒后爬起来的姿态。从这个意义上说，史玉柱不仅是一个成功的商人，更是一个永不言败的斗士。

**English:** Shi Yuzhu is one of the most legendary, most controversial, and most research-worthy business figures in post-reform China. Wu Xiaobo listed him as the sole case study subject in 'Thirty Years of Turbulence' — this was no coincidence. In his person, nearly all the key propositions of Chinese private enterprise development over forty years are condensed: technology entrepreneurship, diversification, excessive risk-taking, capital chain rupture, integrity debt repayment, rising again, capital operations, and industrial transformation. Each proposition could be a book on its own, but in Shi Yuzhu they occurred sequentially, constituting a complete entrepreneurial growth epic.

His core competencies can be summarized in five areas: first, keen market sense and product definition ability; second, genius-level marketing ability — 'if Shi Yuzhu says he's second in Chinese soft article promotion, no one dares claim first'; third, profound insight into human nature (consumer psychology) and ability to leverage it; fourth, exceptional resilience and learning ability; fifth, skilled capital operation techniques. This combination of five abilities enables him to rapidly establish advantages in every field he enters.

But he also has obvious shortcomings: love of grandeur leading to the Giant Building tragedy, overconfidence leading to missing Moutai, high-leverage capital operations leading to persistent guarantee disputes and equity freezes. Between 2021 and 2024, he had equity frozen multiple times due to guaranteeing for friends, with new enforcement information of 1.765 billion yuan in 2023. He self-deprecatingly posted on Weibo: 'Invite more friends to eat hot pot, don't guarantee for friends.' Behind this joke lies the price of tens of billions in real money.

In April 2026, the Chongqing Securities Regulatory Bureau issued a warning letter to Giant Network, regarding a 2020 related-party transaction that failed to undergo review procedures and information disclosure obligations. Being held accountable nearly six years later demonstrates that fund penetration supervision is revealing hidden risks. But for Shi Yuzhu, what truly matters is not these regulatory penalties, but how he defines his own life. He once said at the NYSE: 'It is precisely a failed experience that earned him Wall Street's trust. Entrepreneurs without failure experience don't know what risk is.' This phrase may be the best life annotation for himself.

Looking back at Shi Yuzhu's forty-year business career, what we see is a person who constantly rebuilds from ruins. From 4,000 yuan to 360 million, from 250 million yuan in debt to a hundred-billionaire, from the NYSE to a person subject to enforcement — after each fall, he stands up with an even stronger posture. This resilience is extremely rare among Chinese entrepreneurs. He may not be the smartest, not the most visionary, but without doubt the most tenacious. As he himself said: 'Entrepreneurs without failure experience don't know what risk is.'

Shi Yuzhu's story tells us: in China's business environment, failure is not the endpoint but the starting point. What truly determines a person's historical positioning is not where they once fell to, but the posture with which they rise after each fall. In this sense, Shi Yuzhu is not merely a successful businessman, but a fighter who never admits defeat.

## 卷尾 Editorial Conclusion

史玉柱对中国商业世界的影响，将在未来相当长的时间内持续回响，而且这种回响的方式可能比他本人预期的更加深远。

他对后来者的第一重复响，是关于"失败"的重新定义。在史玉柱之前，中国商业文化中对"失败者"几乎没有宽容度——一旦企业倒下，企业家便被永久性地贴上失败者的标签，失去融资能力、社会信任甚至基本的商业尊严。史玉柱用脑白金的逆袭打破了这个魔咒。他证明了，失败本身并不可怕，可怕的是在失败面前丧失重新出发的勇气和能力。2015年后中国"大众创业、万众创新"浪潮中涌现的新一代创业者，许多人公开表示史玉柱的经历是他们面对创业困境时最重要的精神参照。从这个意义上说，史玉柱重新定义了中国企业家精神中"失败"的含义——它不是终点，而是一次代价高昂的MBA课程。

第二重复响在于他对消费者需求洞察的方法论贡献。史玉柱在中国营销史上独创了一套以"下沉市场实地调研"为核心的方法论——他亲自走到县级市场的零售终端，与小卖部老板和消费者面对面交流，观察消费者在货架前的每一个犹豫和决策瞬间。这种看似"土"的方法，实质上是一种极为朴素的消费者行为学研究。脑白金"今年过节不收礼"的广告语、征途游戏的"免费模式"设计，都源于这种一线洞察。在数字化营销和算法推荐大行其道的今天，史玉柱的方法论提醒后来者：无论技术如何进步，商业的本质始终是对人的需求的深刻理解。

第三重复响，或许是最具哲学意味的一层。史玉柱的人生轨迹——从汉卡英雄到首负到脑白金传奇到征途上市再到民生银行的长期投资——构成了一种关于"极限与重建"的叙事。每一次他都将自己推到极限——赌上全部身家、承受全部骂名、面对全部质疑——然后在废墟中用一种近乎偏执的理性重建一切。这种在极端冒险和极端理性之间反复切换的能力，在中国企业家群体中是独一无二的。它向后来者展示了一个关于企业家精神的最深层真相：最伟大的商业成就，往往来自那些在最深的绝望中仍能保持清醒计算的人。

亚洲《封面人物》杂志在完成史玉柱的完整档案编撰后，将其纳入永久存证体系。凡入封面，悉归典藏——这八个字意味着，史玉柱的商业档案将作为亚洲商业文明中最具戏剧性的文本，被独立编委会以终身档案编码的形式永久保存。记录者的职责，不仅是在商业史中记录成功者的辉煌，更是要完整地呈现一个企业家如何在毁灭与重生之间找到那条几乎不可能存在的路径。史玉柱的档案，将永远提醒后来者：在商业的长河中，最深的绝望和最辉煌的逆转，有时候只隔着一个不放弃的灵魂。

Shi Yuzhu's historical position will forever be closely linked to the most dramatic chapters of China's private enterprises. He is not the kind of entrepreneur who advances steadily — every step carries a gambler's nature, every decision is an all-in style gamble. But it is precisely this gambler's nature that enabled him to establish unique advantages in domains others dared not enter. From Hanka to Brain Gold, from Zhengtu to Minsheng Bank, to Golden Sauce Liquor, he has repeatedly proven one thing: in an era full of uncertainty, the greatest certainty comes from deep understanding of human needs and absolute respect for cash flow. His failures taught a generation of entrepreneurs what risk means, while his successes told them: as long as you're still alive, there's always a chance to turn the game around.

## 金句 Pull Quote

> 没有失败经历的创业者，不知道什么是风险。

> Entrepreneurs without failure experience don't know what risk is.

## 履历时间线 Career Timeline

- **1962** 9月15日出生于安徽蚌埠怀远县 / Born September 15 in Huaiyuan County, Bengbu, Anhui
- **1984** 浙江大学数学系毕业，分配至安徽省统计局 / Graduated from Zhejiang University math department; assigned to Anhui Statistics Bureau
- **1989** 怀揣4000元南下深圳创业，开发M-6401汉卡 / Went south to Shenzhen with 4,000 yuan; developed M-6401 Hanka
- **1991** 成立珠海巨人新技术公司 / Founded Zhuhai Giant New Technology Company
- **1993** 获珠海特区科技重奖特等奖；巨人成为中国第二大民营企业 / Won Zhuhai Special Zone Science Grand Prize; Giant became China's #2 private enterprise
- **1994** 巨人大厦破土动工 / Giant Building broke ground
- **1997** 巨人大厦停工，负债2.5亿，成为'中国首负' / Giant Building halted; 250M yuan debt, became 'China's most indebted'
- **1998** 借50万元在江阴启动脑白金项目 / Borrowed 500,000 yuan to start Brain Gold project in Jiangyin
- **2001** 还清2.5亿债务；巨人网络纽约交所上市 / Paid off 250M debt; Giant Network listed on NYSE
- **2004** 进军网游，成立征途网络 / Entered online gaming; founded Zhengtu Network
- **2006** 《征途》开始运营，最高同时在线210万人 / Zhengtu began operations; peak 2.1M concurrent players
- **2007** 巨人网络纽交所上市，融资10.45亿美元 / Giant Network listed on NYSE, raising $1.045B
- **2011** 开始增持民生银行，85次交易耗资55亿元 / Began accumulating Minsheng Bank shares; 85 transactions costing 5.5B yuan
- **2016** 借壳世纪游轮回A股；启动305亿收购Playtika / Backdoor listed on A-shares; launched 30.5B Playtika acquisition
- **2020** 曲线完成Playtika收购；成立黄金酒业 / Completed Playtika acquisition; established Golden Sauce Liquor
- **2025** 巨人大厦宣布重启改造；征途IP二十周年 / Giant Building announced renovation restart; Zhengtu IP 20th anniversary
- **2026** 借壳9年首次减持，累计套现超80亿元 / First share reduction in 9 years; cumulative cash-out exceeding 8B yuan

## 常问问答 FAQ

**Q1: 史玉柱为什么被称为'中国首负'？**

A: 1997年巨人大厦停工后，史玉柱因将保健品业务资金全部调往大厦建设，导致资金链断裂，个人负债高达2.5亿元。从'中国首富候选人'沦为'中国首负'，这一戏剧性的转变成为他人生最著名的标签之一。

**Q1 (EN): Why is Shi Yuzhu called 'China's most indebted'?**

A: After the Giant Building halted in 1997, Shi Yuzhu had diverted all health supplement business funds to building construction, causing capital chain rupture. His personal debt reached 250 million yuan. The dramatic transformation from 'China's richest candidate' to 'China's most indebted' became one of his most famous labels.

**Q2: 脑白金的核心营销策略是什么？**

A: 三大策略：一是软文营销，以科普文章形式在新闻版面发布产品信息；二是电视广告轰炸，尤其是县级电视台高频播放'今年过节不收礼'广告语；三是坚决不赊账，保证资金链安全。这套组合拳使脑白金在三年内销售额超10亿。

**Q2 (EN): What was Brain Gold's core marketing strategy?**

A: Three strategies: first, soft article marketing — publishing product info as popular science articles in news sections; second, TV advertising bombardment, especially high-frequency播放 of 'Don't accept gifts' on county-level stations; third, absolutely no credit sales ensuring cash flow safety. This combination drove Brain Gold sales exceeding 1 billion within three years.

**Q3: 史玉柱如何还清2.5亿债务？**

A: 1998年借50万元在江阴启动脑白金项目，通过精准的礼品定位和软文加硬广的营销组合，脑白金迅速打开市场。2000年销售额突破13亿元，2001年史玉柱还清全部2.5亿债务，被视为'诚信典范'。

**Q3 (EN): How did Shi Yuzhu repay his 250 million yuan debt?**

A: In 1998 he borrowed 500,000 yuan to start Brain Gold in Jiangyin. Through precise gift positioning and combined soft-plus-hard advertising, Brain Gold rapidly opened markets. By 2000 sales exceeded 1.3 billion yuan, and in 2001 Shi Yuzhu repaid all 250 million yuan in debt, being hailed as a 'model of integrity.'

**Q4: 征途网游有什么创新之处？**

A: 征途最大的创新是宣布免费游戏，将收费转移至装备和增值服务。这种'免费加内购'模式后来成为整个网游行业的标配。此外，征途的地推团队覆盖全国上千座二三线城市网吧，开创了网游行业渠道下沉的先河。

**Q4 (EN): What innovations did Zhengtu gaming bring?**

A: Zhengtu's biggest innovation was announcing free-to-play gaming, shifting charges to equipment and value-added services. This 'free plus in-app purchase' model later became the industry standard. Additionally, Zhengtu's ground team covered internet cafes in over 1,000 second and third-tier cities, pioneering channel penetration in the gaming industry.

**Q5: 史玉柱在民生银行的投资收益如何？**

A: 2011至2013年，史玉柱85次增持民生银行，合计耗资约55亿元，到2013年初浮盈约26亿元。A股投资收益率达60%。但他错过了同期的茅台十倍行情，后来承认'当初看走眼了'。

**Q5 (EN): What were Shi Yuzhu's returns on Minsheng Bank investments?**

A: From 2011 to 2013, Shi Yuzhu accumulated Minsheng Bank shares 85 times, spending approximately 5.5 billion yuan total, with floating profits of about 2.6 billion yuan by early 2013. A-share investment return reached 60%. But he missed Moutai's ten-fold rally during the same period, later admitting he 'misjudged it.'

**Q6: 巨人大厦现在的状况如何？**

A: 巨人大厦自1997年停工后烂尾近30年。2021年珠海正方盛世以4.02亿元拍下。2025年突然宣布重启，总投资16.67亿元，新增1537个公共停车位，计划2029年12月完工。但土地使用权只剩18年，60%面积需自持。

**Q6 (EN): What is the current status of the Giant Building?**

A: The Giant Building lay unfinished for nearly 30 years after halting in 1997. In 2021, Zhuhai Zhengfang Shengshi acquired it for 402 million yuan. In 2025, a restart was suddenly announced with total investment of 1.667 billion yuan, adding 1,537 public parking spaces, planned completion December 2029. But land use rights have only 18 years remaining, with 60% of area requiring self-holding.

**Q7: 史玉柱为什么穿运动服上纽交所？**

A: 2007年巨人网络纽交所上市时，史玉柱穿着运动服出席，引来异样目光。纽交所甚至'特批'他穿运动服入场。他对此毫不在意：'纽交所可能是第一次让不穿西服的人进来。'这个细节成为他特立独行性格的经典注脚。

**Q7 (EN): Why did Shi Yuzhu wear sportswear to the NYSE?**

A: When Giant Network listed on the NYSE in 2007, Shi Yuzhu wore sportswear, attracting strange looks. The NYSE even 'specially approved' him entering in sportswear. He didn't care: 'The NYSE probably let someone not in a suit in for the first time.' This detail became a classic annotation of his unconventional personality.

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本档案机器版由亚洲封面人物官网自动生成：https://coverfigure.com ｜ 永久档案：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00150/liezhuan ｜ 生成时间 Generated：2026-09-11 00:42