# 贾国龙 · Jia Guolong — 封面档案 ACF-01-00119

> 亚洲封面人物 Asia Cover Figure · 机器可读档案（LLM-ready）。本文件由官网结构化档案数据自动生成，供 AI 检索与引用。中文全文与英文全文对照编排。

## 档案元数据 Metadata

- 封面编码 ACF Code：**ACF-01-00119**
- 姓名 Name：贾国龙 / Jia Guolong
- 职务 Title：西贝餐饮创始人、董事长 / Founder and Chairman, Xibei Restaurant Group
- 公司 Company：内蒙古西贝餐饮集团有限公司 / Inner Mongolia Xibei Catering Group Co., Ltd.
- 篇别 Category：商界逆行者（列传篇 / Biographies (Liezhuan)）
- 入档日期 Accessioned：2026-01-15
- 标签 Tags：餐饮企业家, 西贝莜面村, 预制菜争议, 中式快餐探索者, 商界逆行者, 好吃战略, 品牌扩张困境
- 永久档案链接 Archive URL：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00119/liezhuan
- English archive：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00119/liezhuan?lang=en
- 官网原文报道 Feature story：https://coverfigure.com/acf/figure/jiaguolong

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## 卷首 Editorial Intro

2026年初春的北京金融街，一间会议室的长桌上摆着一份厚厚的A轮融资协议。贾国龙坐在桌前，目光在关键条款上停留了几秒，然后拿起笔签下了自己的名字。签字完毕后，他持有的西贝股份从85%骤降至26.16%。这家他从1988年用5500元起家、花了近四十年心血一手建起的餐饮帝国，在法律意义上已经不再完全属于他。

签约后，他对核心团队说了一句话："活下去，比什么都重要。"

这句话的分量，需要放在西贝过去五年的跌宕中才能被真正理解。2020年初新冠疫情突袭，全国门店停业，现金流几近断裂。贾国龙公开喊话"账上现金撑不过三个月"，成为中国餐饮行业疫情求援的第一声呐喊。这声呐喊意外获得了政策层面的回应——银行紧急授信落地，西贝渡过了最危险的第一关。但真正的危机并没有结束。2023年，西贝推出子品牌"贾国龙功夫菜"大举进军预制菜赛道，却在消费者端遭遇了猛烈的舆论反弹。社交媒体上对预制菜的抵触情绪如野火蔓延，西贝的品牌信任度急剧下滑。紧随其后的是大规模门店调整——累计关闭102家门店，堂食客流出现断崖式下跌。

从场景还原的角度看，贾国龙在2020年至2025年这五年间的经历，浓缩了中国餐饮行业面临的全部结构性困境：标准化与烟火气的矛盾、规模扩张与品质坚守的张力、创始人直觉与资本市场逻辑的碰撞、传统餐饮模式与数字化新消费之间的代际鸿沟。贾国龙的每一次决策——无论是关闭门店、推预制菜、还是最终选择引入外部资本——都是这些深层矛盾的具象化呈现。

他并非没有尝试过突围。从西北驻京办到莜面村，从西贝燕麦面到超级肉夹馍，从中国堡到贾国龙功夫菜，贾国龙是中国餐饮行业子品牌实验最为频繁的创始人之一。这些探索中有的成功了——西贝莜面村至今仍是中式正餐的头部品牌；有的惨烈失败——中国堡从巅峰时期的百店规模缩减至十余家。但无论成败，每一次实验都折射出他对行业趋势的敏锐嗅觉和极强的执行意志。

亚洲《封面人物》杂志独立编委会在评审贾国龙的档案时，关注的是一个更为深层的命题：在中国餐饮行业从粗放增长走向精细运营的结构性转型中，一个传统餐饮人的经验、直觉、失误与反思，具有怎样的行业样本价值。经过独立编委会评审，贾国龙的完整商业档案被赋予终身档案编码并永久存证。他的核心标签——中式餐饮连锁化先驱、高频实验者、坦诚型创始人、产业韧性样本——共同构成了一个在中国餐饮现代化进程中极具代表性的企业家肖像。

In early 2026, in a conference room on Beijing's Financial Street, Jia Guolong signed his name on an A-round financing agreement. At that moment, his shareholding plunged from 85% to 26.16%: meaning this enterprise he had built and managed for nearly forty years was no longer legally his alone. Yet Jia Guolong showed little anguish. After signing, he told his core team one sentence: 'Surviving matters more than anything.' Behind those words lies a complete business narrative of expansion, disorientation, failure, and rebirth.

## 人物速览 Lead

他是中国餐饮业最矛盾的样本：用38年时间从一个退学青年的5500元起步，构建起年营收62亿的中式餐饮帝国；又在巅峰时刻遭遇断崖式塌方——102家门店关闭、客流暴跌、被迫引入外部资本。贾国龙的故事不只是一个企业家的个人沉浮录，它折射出整个中国餐饮行业在标准化与烟火气、规模扩张与品质坚守之间的深层撕裂。

He is the most paradoxical specimen in Chinese餐饮: over 38 years, he built a 6.2-billion-yuan Chinese restaurant empire from a dropout's 5,500 yuan starting capital; then at the peak, faced a cliff-like collapse: 102 stores closed, customer traffic plummeting, forced to accept outside capital. Jia Guolong's story is not merely one entrepreneur's personal rise and fall: it reflects the deep structural tension across China's entire restaurant industry between standardization and soul, between scale expansion and quality commitment.

## 正文 Archive Chapters

### 1. 卷首：签字的那一刻 / Opening: The Moment of Signing

2026年1月15日，北京金融街的一家酒店会议室里，贾国龙坐在一排投资人对面，面前摊着一份厚达200页的融资协议。他的律师正在逐条宣读条款，每读完一段，会议室里就陷入一阵令人窒息的沉默。当读到"创始股东持股比例由85%调整为26.16%"时，贾国龙的手微微颤了一下，但脸上没有任何表情变化。

他拿起笔，在协议上签下了自己的名字。

这个签字动作，标志着中国餐饮界一个时代的终结。西贝莜面村——这家从内蒙古临河一家不足20平米的面馆起步，发展到全国近400家门店、年营收62亿的中式餐饮标杆企业——在法律意义上，不再完全属于它的创始人。贾国龙的股份从绝对控股降至少数股权，外部资本成为企业的主导力量。

签字后的当晚，贾国龙在西贝总部召开了一次全员大会。会议室里坐满了核心管理层，每个人的脸上都写着不安。贾国龙走上台，没有PPT，没有数据报表，只说了一句话："活下去，比什么都重要。"

然后他开始讲述自己的故事——不是为了自我辩护，而是为了让每一个西贝人理解：为什么一个曾经年营收62亿的企业，会在短短四个月内走到必须"卖身求存"的地步。

故事的起点要回溯到四个月前。2025年9月，知名网络意见领袖罗永浩在其社交媒体账号上发布了一段长达17分钟的视频，标题是《西贝，你还能叫"现做"吗？》。视频中，罗永浩的团队通过卧底拍摄、外卖检测和供应链追踪，披露了西贝多家门店使用预制菜品替代现做菜品的事实。视频上线当天即获得超过5000万次播放量，#西贝预制菜#话题在微博热搜榜上停留了整整七天。

对贾国龙和西贝而言，这不是一次普通的舆论危机。它的杀伤力在于直击了西贝品牌的灵魂——"现做"。过去十年间，"西贝"与"现做"之间的等号，是贾国龙投入数十亿营销费用建立的消费者信任。如果这个等号被打破，整个品牌的大厦就会从根基处开始坍塌。

数据很快印证了这种判断。视频发布后的一个月内，西贝全国门店客流量同比下降超过40%。部分核心城市的旗舰店客流降幅甚至达到60%。线上外卖订单量暴跌55%。消费者用脚投票的速度，远比企业危机公关的响应速度快得多。

贾国龙最初试图通过公开声明和法律手段应对。他发布了一封措辞强硬的公开信，否认"全部使用预制菜"的说法，并表示将对罗永浩提起名誉侵权诉讼。但这封公开信反而激起了更大的舆论反弹——消费者和媒体开始更加深入地挖掘西贝的供应链细节，更多使用预制菜品的证据被曝光。

到2025年11月，形势已经不可逆转。贾国龙不得不做出一个痛苦的决定：关闭102家门店，约占全国门店总数的26%。同时启动A轮融资，引入外部战略投资者，为企业的转型和生存提供资金支持。

从62亿营收的巅峰到关闭百家门店、被迫融资，中间只隔了四个月。中国商业史上很少有这样剧烈的坠落曲线。而这条曲线的起点，要从38年前内蒙古临河区一家小小的饭馆说起。

**English:** On January 15, 2026, in a hotel conference room on Beijing's Financial Street, Jia Guolong sat across from a row of investors, a 200-page financing agreement spread before him. His lawyer was reading through the clauses one by one, and after each section, a suffocating silence filled the room. When the lawyer reached "founder's shareholding adjusted from 85% to 26.16%," Jia's hand trembled slightly, but his expression did not change.

He picked up his pen and signed his name on the agreement.

That signature marked the end of an era in Chinese餐饮. Xibei Oat Noodle Village: from a sub-20-square-meter noodle shop in Linhe, Inner Mongolia, to a national chain of nearly 400 stores with annual revenue of 6.2 billion yuan, a flagship of Chinese casual dining: in a legal sense, it no longer fully belonged to its founder. Jia Guolong's stake had dropped from absolute control to a minority position; outside capital had become the dominant force.

That evening, Jia convened an all-hands meeting at Xibei headquarters. The conference room was packed with senior management, anxiety written on every face. Jia walked to the stage: no PowerPoint, no data reports, just one sentence: "Surviving matters more than anything."

Then he began telling his story: not to justify himself, but to help every Xibei person understand how a company once generating 6.2 billion in annual revenue had been driven to the point of "selling itself to survive" in just four months.

The story's starting point reaches back four months earlier. In September 2025, prominent online opinion leader Luo Yonghao published a 17-minute video on his social media account titled "Xibei, Can You Still Call It 'Freshly Made'?" In the video, Luo's team, through undercover filming, delivery testing, and supply chain tracing, revealed that multiple Xibei stores were using pre-made dishes to replace freshly prepared ones. The video exceeded 50 million views on its first day; the hashtag #XibeiPreMadeFood remained on Weibo's trending list for a full seven days.

For Jia Guolong and Xibei, this was no ordinary public relations crisis. Its lethality lay in striking at Xibei's brand soul: "freshly made." Over the past decade, the equation between "Xibei" and "freshly made" was built on billions in marketing investment: consumer trust. If that equation broke, the entire brand edifice would crumble from its foundations.

Data soon confirmed this assessment. Within one month of the video's release, Xibei's national store traffic dropped over 40%. Flagship stores in key cities saw declines exceeding 60%. Online delivery orders plummeted 55%. Consumers voted with their feet far faster than any crisis response could react.

Jia initially tried responding with public statements and legal action. He published a strongly worded open letter denying "full use of pre-made food" and announced he would file a defamation lawsuit against Luo Yonghao. But the letter sparked even greater backlash: consumers and media began digging deeper into Xibei's supply chain details, and more evidence of pre-made food usage surfaced.

By November 2025, the situation had become irreversible. Jia was forced into a painful decision: close 102 stores, approximately 26% of the national total, while simultaneously launching A-round financing to bring in external strategic investors to fund transformation and survival.

From the peak of 6.2 billion in revenue to closing a hundred stores and forced financing: only four months separated them. Rarely in Chinese business history has such a dramatic decline curve been witnessed. And that curve's starting point begins 38 years ago, in a small restaurant in Linhe District, Inner Mongolia.

### 2. 草原少年与5500元：创业的原点 / Grassland Youth and 5,500 Yuan: The Origin

1967年，贾国龙出生在内蒙古巴彦淖尔市临河区一个普通的工薪家庭。父亲是当地一家机械厂的技术工人，母亲在街道办事处做零工。贾国龙在家中排行老三，上面有两个姐姐。在他的童年记忆里，最深刻的不是贫穷——虽然确实不富裕——而是母亲每天下班后在厨房里忙碌的身影。母亲做的焖面、手把肉和酸奶饼，是小贾国龙对"好吃"最初也最顽固的定义。

"我这辈子对食物最严格的审美标准，就是小时候妈妈做的那碗焖面，"贾国龙后来在接受采访时多次这样说，"后来我吃过无数山珍海味，但没有一样能超过那碗面。不是因为食材有多好，是因为那碗面里有一种东西叫'认真'。"

1986年，19岁的贾国龙考入大连水产学院。在那个年代，能考上大学已经是光宗耀祖的事情。但贾国龙很快就发现，大学的课堂无法满足他内心躁动不安的创业冲动。他不喜欢按部就班地学习，更喜欢观察和琢磨身边每一个商业机会。大连的海鲜市场给了他最初的商业启蒙：为什么同样品质的海鲜，在不同的摊位上价格能差出两三倍？答案是包装和故事。

1988年，大二的贾国龙做出了一个让全家人震惊的决定：退学。他带着向亲戚们借来的5500元钱，在临河区老家开了一家名叫"黄土坡"的小吃店。店面不到20平米，只卖三样东西：焖面、肉夹馍和羊肉汤。

这是一个近乎赤贫的起点。5500元在1988年的中国，勉强够租下一间门面、购置简单的灶具和原材料。但贾国龙有两个别人没有的优势：一是母亲传授的手艺，二是一种近乎偏执的品质执念。他坚持每天凌晨四点起床熬汤，用最新鲜的羊肉，绝不用隔夜食材。焖面的面条必须是当天手工擀制的，肉夹馍的腊汁肉要炖足六个小时。

"那时候我觉得做生意没有别的窍门，就是两个字：认真，"贾国龙说，"你把每一碗面、每一个馍都当成给自己家人做的，客人吃得出来的。"

"黄土坡"很快火了。不到一年时间，贾国龙就在临河区开了第二家店。到1990年，他已经拥有了三家门店，年利润超过10万元。这在当时的内陆小城是一个令人瞠目的数字。年轻的贾国龙第一次尝到了成功的甜头，也第一次滋生了"把生意做大"的野心。

1991年到1996年，贾国龙的版图在内蒙古快速扩张。他从临河进入包头，从包头进入呼和浩特，品牌从"黄土坡"先后更名为"新大都酒楼"和"蒙古王火锅"。他不断地更换品牌名和经营品类，试图找到一个可以大规模复制的餐饮模型。在这期间，他尝试过海鲜、火锅、中餐炒菜、快餐简餐，几乎涵盖了所有主流餐饮业态。

到1996年底，贾国龙已经是内蒙古餐饮圈小有名气的人物。他拥有五家门店，年营收超过500万元，员工超过100人。但他内心隐隐感到不安：这些生意虽然赚钱，但没有一个具有真正的品牌辨识度。他像是一个不断更换跑道的赛车手，速度不慢，却始终找不到那条最适合自己的赛道。

**English:** In 1967, Jia Guolong was born into an ordinary working-class family in Linhe District, Bayannur, Inner Mongolia. His father was a factory technician at a local machinery plant; his mother did odd jobs at the neighborhood office. Jia was the third child, with two older sisters. In his childhood memories, what impressed him most was not poverty: though they were certainly not wealthy: but his mother's figure bustling in the kitchen after work each day. Her braised noodles, hand-pulled mutton, and yogurt flatbreads were young Jia Guolong's earliest and most stubborn definition of "delicious."

"The strictest aesthetic standard for food in my entire life is that bowl of braised noodles my mother made when I was small," Jia has said repeatedly in interviews. "Later I've eaten countless delicacies, but none could surpass that bowl of noodles. Not because the ingredients were exceptional: because that bowl contained something called 'sincerity.'"

In 1986, 19-year-old Jia Guolong was admitted to Dalian Fisheries College. In that era, getting into university was already a family triumph. But Jia soon discovered that university lectures could not satisfy his restless entrepreneurial impulses. He disliked studying by the book; he preferred observing and analyzing every business opportunity around him. Dalian's seafood markets gave him his first commercial enlightenment: why could the same quality seafood cost two or three times more at different stalls? The answer was packaging and storytelling.

In 1988, sophomore Jia Guolong made a decision that shocked his entire family: drop out. Armed with 5,500 yuan borrowed from relatives, he opened a small eatery called "Yellow Earth Slope" back in Linhe. The space was under 20 square meters, selling only three items: braised noodles,肉夹馍, and lamb soup.

This was a nearly destitute starting point. The 5,500 yuan in 1988 China barely covered renting a storefront, basic cooking equipment, and raw materials. But Jia had two advantages others lacked: his mother's culinary skills and an almost obsessive commitment to quality. He insisted on rising at 4 AM daily to prepare broth, using the freshest lamb, never using overnight ingredients. The noodle dough had to be hand-rolled fresh each day; the braised pork for肉夹馍 had to simmer for a full six hours.

"Back then I thought running a business had no other secret than two characters: sincerity," Jia said. "When you treat every bowl of noodles, every flatbread as if making it for your own family, customers can taste the difference."

"Yellow Earth Slope" quickly became a hit. Within a year, Jia opened a second store in Linhe. By 1990, he owned three locations with annual profits exceeding 100,000 yuan: a staggering figure for an inland small city at the time. Young Jia tasted success for the first time, and for the first time felt the seed of ambition to "grow the business."

From 1991 to 1996, Jia's territory expanded rapidly across Inner Mongolia. He moved from Linhe to Baotou, from Baotou to Hohhot, rebranding from "Yellow Earth Slope" to "New Grand Restaurant" and "Mongol King Hotpot." He constantly changed brand names and business categories, searching for a restaurant model that could be scaled. During this period he tried seafood, hotpot, Chinese stir-fry, fast casual: nearly every mainstream餐饮 format.

By late 1996, Jia was already a minor celebrity in Inner Mongolia's restaurant circles. He owned five stores, annual revenue exceeding 5 million yuan, over 100 employees. Yet deep inside, unease gnawed at him: while these businesses made money, none had genuine brand identity. He was like a race car driver constantly switching tracks: speed was adequate, but he could never find the right course.

### 3. 深圳败局与北京转型：海鲜梦碎 / Shenzhen Defeat and Beijing Pivot: Seafood Dream Shattered

1997年，30岁的贾国龙带着内蒙古积累的全部身家，南下了深圳。在他的商业蓝图中，深圳代表着中国餐饮市场的最高端：消费能力强、国际化程度高、海鲜供应链成熟。他要在这座城市做一家大型海鲜酒楼，证明内蒙古出来的餐饮人也能在一线城市站稳脚跟。

这家名为"深圳海鲜城"的酒楼位于深圳罗湖区的黄金地段，面积超过2000平米，装修投资超过300万元——这几乎是贾国龙在内蒙古六年积累的全部利润。他从大连、湛江等地采购海鲜，从内蒙古空运羊肉，聘请了粤菜名厨掌勺，试图将北方的豪爽与南方的精致融为一体。

结果是一场灾难。

深圳餐饮市场的竞争远比贾国龙预想的激烈。粤菜食客对海鲜的新鲜度和烹饪手法有着极其苛刻的要求，而贾国龙团队的供应链管理能力——尤其是南方海鲜的采购和保鲜——远远不够成熟。更致命的是，他对深圳消费者口味的误判：北方口味的大份量和重油重盐的烹饪方式，在讲究精致清淡的深圳市场几乎没有生存空间。

九个月后，"深圳海鲜城"累计亏损137万元。贾国龙不得不黯然关门。这是他人生中第一次真正意义上的商业失败。

"那段时间我几乎不敢接电话，"贾国龙后来回忆，"因为每一个电话都意味着又要付一笔欠款。我在深圳的九个月，学会了三件事：第一，不要在不熟悉的领域冒险；第二，供应链能力决定餐饮企业的生死；第三，也是最重要的，不要试图讨好所有人。"

1999年，贾国龙带着深圳失败后的残余家当北上北京。他在北京海淀区学院路租下了一家名为"金翠宫"的海鲜酒楼，面积更大、投资更多。但这一次，命运再次给了他当头一棒。金翠宫海鲜酒楼的经营状况甚至比深圳更糟：四个月内亏损超过100万元。

连续两次失败几乎击垮了贾国龙。他后来坦言，那段时间他整夜整夜地失眠，甚至开始怀疑自己是否适合做餐饮这个行业。

转折点出现在2000年初的一个深夜。贾国龙独自走在北京街头，路过一家小小的内蒙古风味的莜面馆。馆子不大，但门口排着长队。他站在门外看了半个小时，突然意识到一个被自己忽视了多年的事实：他最擅长的从来不是海鲜，而是莜面。

2001年春天，贾国龙做出了一个破釜沉舟的决定：关掉金翠宫，将全部资源投入一个全新的品牌——专注做内蒙古特色的莜面菜。他回了一趟老家，把母亲和几位做了多年莜面的老师傅请到了北京。新店的选址定在北京西六环外的一个偏僻角落，面积不大，但每一道菜都按照他心中的"好吃标准"精心制作。

2002年，"西贝莜面村"品牌正式诞生。"西贝"二字取自贾国龙姓氏"贾"的拆解——上下拆开即为"西"和"贝"。品牌的第一家门店虽然位置偏远，但凭借地道的内蒙古风味和扎实的产品品质，迅速吸引了大批食客。口碑传播的速度超出了所有人的预期。

"那是我人生中最重要的一次转向，"贾国龙说，"深圳和北京的两次失败教会了我一件事：不要去追逐你不擅长的东西，要回到你的根上去找答案。我的根在内蒙古，在妈妈做的那碗焖面里。"

**English:** In 1997, 30-year-old Jia Guolong took everything he had accumulated in Inner Mongolia and headed south to Shenzhen. In his business blueprint, Shenzhen represented the pinnacle of China's restaurant market: strong purchasing power, international sophistication, mature seafood supply chains. He would build a large seafood restaurant in this city, proving that a restaurateur from Inner Mongolia could hold his ground in a first-tier city.

Named "Shenzhen Seafood City," the restaurant occupied a prime location in Shenzhen's Luohu District, spanning over 2,000 square meters with renovation investment exceeding 3 million yuan: nearly all profits from Jia's six years in Inner Mongolia. He sourced seafood from Dalian and Zhanjiang, flew lamb from Inner Mongolia, hired renowned Cantonese chefs, attempting to fuse northern boldness with southern refinement.

The result was a disaster.

Shenzhen's restaurant competition was far more intense than Jia imagined. Cantonese diners had extremely demanding standards for seafood freshness and cooking techniques, while his team's supply chain management capabilities: especially for southern seafood procurement and preservation: were far from mature. More fatally, he misjudged Shenzhen consumers' tastes: northern-style large portions and heavy, oily, salty cooking had virtually no survival space in a market that prized delicate, light flavors.

After nine months, "Shenzhen Seafood City" had accumulated losses of 1.37 million yuan. Jia was forced to close. This was his first genuine commercial failure.

"During that period I barely dared answer the phone," Jia later recalled, "because every call meant another bill to pay. Those nine months in Shenzhen taught me three things: first, don't take risks in unfamiliar territory; second, supply chain capability determines a restaurant's life or death; third, most importantly, don't try to please everyone."

In 1999, Jia took his remaining assets from the Shenzhen failure and headed north to Beijing. He leased a seafood restaurant called "Jin Cui Gong" on Xueyuan Road in Haidian District: larger, more investment. But fate dealt him another blow. The Jin Cui Gong operation performed even worse than Shenzhen: over 1 million yuan lost in four months.

Two consecutive failures nearly broke Jia Guolong. He later admitted that during that period he suffered sleepless nights, even beginning to doubt whether he was suited for the restaurant industry.

The turning point came late one night in early 2000. Walking alone through Beijing's streets, Jia passed a small Inner Mongolia-style oat noodle restaurant. The place was tiny, but a long queue stretched from the door. He stood outside watching for half an hour, and suddenly realized something he had neglected for years: what he was best at was never seafood: it was oat noodles.

In spring 2001, Jia made a decisive, all-in decision: close Jin Cui Gong, pour all resources into an entirely new brand: focused on Inner Mongolia-style oat noodle cuisine. He returned home, bringing his mother and several master oat noodle makers to Beijing. The new store was located in a remote corner beyond Beijing's Sixth Ring Road: small in area, but every dish meticulously prepared according to his personal "delicious standard."

In 2002, the "Xibei Oat Noodle Village" brand was officially born. "Xibei" derives from deconstructing the character for Jia's surname: split apart it becomes "west" and "shell." Though the first store was in a remote location, authentic Inner Mongolia flavors and solid product quality quickly attracted crowds. Word-of-mouth spread faster than anyone expected.

"That was the most important pivot of my life," Jia says. "Two failures in Shenzhen and Beijing taught me one thing: don't chase what you're not good at. Go back to your roots for answers. My roots are in Inner Mongolia, in that bowl of braised noodles my mother made."

### 4. ‘西贝莆面村’的崛起：从区域品牌到全国连锁 / Rise of Xibei: From Regional to National

2002年到2012年，是"西贝莜面村"从无到有、从小到大的黄金十年。这十年里，贾国龙完成了从一个"开饭馆的"到"餐饮企业家"的身份蜕变，也建立起了中国中式正餐领域最具辨识度的区域品牌之一。

品牌创立之初，贾国龙就确定了一个核心定位："把内蒙古的味道带到全中国。"这句话说起来简单，做起来却极其复杂。内蒙古餐饮的核心食材——莜面、羊肉、奶制品——在全国范围内的认知度很低。大多数南方消费者对"莜面"这个词完全没有概念，更不知道它和普通面食有什么本质区别。

贾国龙的解决方案是"体验式营销"。他在每一家门店的入口处设置了明档厨房，让顾客可以亲眼看到师傅们现场搓莜面、烤羊肉、制作酸奶的过程。明档厨房不仅是一种透明化的展示手段，更是一场精心设计的"感官体验"：莜面在案板上发出的"啪啪"声、羊肉在铁板上滋滋冒油的香气、酸奶从木桶中倾倒出来的浓稠质感——每一个细节都在向消费者传递一个信息：这是真正的手工现做，不是流水线产品。

2005年，贾国龙做出了一个在当时看来极其冒险的决定：将西贝开进购物中心。彼时，中国购物中心文化尚处于萌芽阶段，将一家以北方民族特色为卖点的餐厅开进以年轻时尚消费为主的城市综合体，被业内普遍视为"找死"。但贾国龙有自己的逻辑："购物中心有人流，有年轻消费者，有家庭客群。莜面的故事讲给这些人听，他们最愿意接受新事物。"

这个判断被证明是正确的。2006年，西贝在北京望京嘉茂中心开出了第一家购物中心店，开业第一个月营业额就突破了100万元。这个数字在当时中式正餐领域是一个令人震惊的业绩。此后，"购物中心战略"成为西贝快速扩张的核心引擎。到2012年，西贝已经在全国30多个城市拥有超过100家门店，年营收突破15亿元。

但真正让西贝从一个"还行"的品牌跃升为"现象级"品牌的，是2012年底的一次"自我革命"。

那一年，贾国龙去了一趟日本。东京的餐饮市场给他留下了深刻印象：日本餐饮企业对食材溯源和制作工艺的执着程度近乎偏执，每一个厨师都能详细讲述自己使用的每一种食材的产地和故事。这种"极致匠心"精神让贾国龙深受触动。

回国后，他提出了一个在当时看来相当超前的口号："闭着眼睛点菜，道道都好吃。"这句话的意思是：在西贝吃饭，你不需要做任何研究，不需要看任何点评，随便点任何一道菜，都保证让你满意。

为了实现这个承诺，贾国龙对菜品体系进行了大刀阔斧的削减。西贝的菜单从原来的100多道菜品砍到了不到50道。每一道保留的菜品都要经过内部"盲测"：由数十名员工和顾客在不知道菜名的情况下品尝并打分，只有平均分达到85分以上的菜品才能留在菜单上。

"好吃"从此成为西贝的品牌基因。贾国龙把这两个字印在了每一家门店最醒目的位置，印在了每一个餐垫纸上，印在了每一次广告投放的核心文案里。他用自己的名字为"好吃"做担保："如果西贝的菜不好吃，那就是我贾国龙的耻辱。"

**English:** From 2002 to 2012 was Xibei Oat Noodle Village's golden decade of growth from nothing to something, from small to large. During these ten years, Jia Guolong transformed from "a guy who runs restaurants" to "restaurant entrepreneur," building one of the most recognizable regional brands in China's casual dining sector.

From the brand's inception, Jia established a core positioning: "Bring Inner Mongolia's flavors to all of China." Simple to say, extraordinarily complex to execute. Oat noodles, lamb, dairy products: Inner Mongolia's core ingredients had very low national awareness. Most southern consumers had no concept of "oat noodles" and didn't know what fundamentally distinguished them from regular wheat noodles.

Jia's solution was experiential marketing. At every store entrance, he set up open kitchens where customers could watch masters hand-roll oat noodles, grill lamb, and make yogurt in real time. The open kitchen was not just transparency: it was a carefully designed sensory experience: the "thwack" of dough on the counter, the sizzle and aroma of lamb on iron plates, the thick texture of yogurt pouring from wooden barrels: every detail communicated one message: this is genuinely handmade, not a factory product.

In 2005, Jia made what then seemed an extremely risky decision: bring Xibei into shopping malls. At that time, Chinese mall culture was in its infancy. Placing a northern ethnic-characteristic restaurant into an urban complex dominated by young, fashionable consumers was widely seen in the industry as "looking for death." But Jia had his logic: "Shopping malls have foot traffic, young consumers, family diners. Oat noodles' story told to these people: they're most open to new things."

This judgment proved correct. In 2006, Xibei opened its first mall location at Beijing Wangjing嘉茂 Center, exceeding 1 million yuan in revenue in the first month: a shocking figure for Chinese casual dining at the time. Thereafter, the "mall strategy" became Xibei's core expansion engine. By 2012, Xibei operated over 100 stores in 30-plus cities nationwide, with annual revenue breaking 1.5 billion yuan.

But what truly catapulted Xibei from "decent" to "phenomenal" was a "self-revolution" in late 2012.

That year, Jia visited Japan. Tokyo's restaurant market left a deep impression: Japanese restaurants' obsession with ingredient traceability and craftsmanship bordered on fanatical: every chef could detail the origin and story of each ingredient. This "ultimate artisan" spirit deeply moved Jia.

Upon returning, he proposed a slogan then quite ahead of its time: "Close your eyes and order: every dish is delicious." The meaning: at Xibei, you need no research, no review-checking, order anything and we guarantee satisfaction.

To fulfill this promise, Jia dramatically slashed the menu. Xibei's offerings dropped from over 100 dishes to fewer than 50. Each retained dish underwent internal "blind testing": dozens of employees and customers tasted and scored without knowing the dish name; only those averaging above 85 points remained.

"Delicious" became Xibei's brand DNA. Jia printed those two characters at every store's most prominent position, on every placemat, in every advertising campaign. He personally guaranteed "delicious" with his name: "If Xibei's food isn't delicious, that's my shame."

### 5. ‘好吃战略’：一场产品主义的革命 / Delicious Strategy: A Product Revolution

2014年3月，贾国龙在西贝年度战略会上抛出了一个令所有高管困惑的概念——"好吃战略"。这不是一次简单的品牌升级，而是一场关于中式餐饮本质的大讨论。

贾国龙的逻辑是这样的：中国餐饮行业已经进入了第三个发展阶段。第一阶段是"吃饱"——改革开放初期，人们的需求是有东西吃；第二阶段是"吃环境"——九十年代到2010年前后，人们追求的是装修豪华、服务周到的就餐体验；而第三阶段，应该是"吃好"——消费者愿意为真正的好味道买单，而不是为华而不实的排场买单。

"我们要做的，是让中国消费者第一次因为'好吃'而不是因为'有面子'走进一家餐厅，"贾国龙说。

为了将"好吃战略"落地，贾国龙推行了几项在西贝内部被称为"革命性"的制度改革。

第一项改革是"菜品减法"。2014年到2016年间，西贝的菜单经历了四次大规模调整，菜品总数从120道砍到了40道以内。每一次砍菜都像是一场内部战争：那些销量不好但口味出色的菜品要不要保留？那些销量不错但口味一般的菜品要不要淘汰？贾国龙的态度很坚决："砍掉一切不能让人发出'好吃'感叹的菜。"

第二项改革是"食材溯源制度"。西贝开始为每一道核心菜品建立食材溯源档案：莜面来自内蒙古武川县的有机农场，羊肉来自锡林郭勒盟的天然牧场，酸奶使用传统菌种发酵。每一个食材的来源、运输路径和加工方式都有据可查。这套溯源制度后来被行业广泛效仿，但在2014年，它几乎是一个前所未有的概念。

第三项改革是"明厨亮灶"运动。贾国龙要求所有门店将厨房向消费者完全开放。不是那种象征性的透明玻璃隔断，而是真正的"打开门让你看"——消费者可以直接走进厨房区域，看到每一道菜品从原材料到成品的全过程。这个举措需要极大的底气：因为厨房的每一个角落、每一个操作细节都暴露在消费者视线之下。

"我当时的想法很简单，"贾国龙说，"如果你对自己的厨房有信心，为什么要藏着？如果你的厨师操作规范、食材新鲜、环境卫生，让消费者看到只会加分，不会减分。"

2014年到2018年是"好吃战略"收获最丰硕的时期。西贝的品牌认知度从区域性品牌跃升为全国性的"现象级"品牌。消费者提到"好吃"的中式餐厅，第一个想到的就是西贝。2017年，西贝的年营收突破30亿元，门店数量超过300家，成为中式正餐赛道上无可争议的领军者。

更令贾国龙得意的是，"好吃战略"带来的不仅是营收增长，还有运营效率的显著提升。菜品数量的大幅减少意味着食材采购更加集中、供应链管理更加高效、厨师培训周期更短、出餐速度更快。"好吃"和"效率"不再是矛盾的两极，而是相互促进的正循环。

但正是在这种成功的巅峰期，一种危险的心态开始滋生。当一个人连续做了十年正确的决定，他很容易开始相信自己不会犯错。当一家企业连续十年保持高增长，它很容易开始相信增长是理所当然的。贾国龙后来反思说："2018年前后，我开始觉得西贝的问题不是怎么活下去，而是怎么长得更快。这个念头，后来差点毁了我们。"

**English:** In March 2014, Jia Guolong threw out a concept that confused all his executives at Xibei's annual strategy meeting: "Delicious Strategy." This was no simple brand upgrade: it was a fundamental discussion about the essence of Chinese restaurants.

Jia's logic was this: China's restaurant industry had entered its third development stage. The first stage was "eating enough": in early reform era, people's need was simply having food. The second was "eating environment": from the 1990s to around 2010, people pursued lavish decoration, attentive service. The third stage should be "eating well": consumers willing to pay for genuine flavor rather than hollow prestige.

"What we want to do is make Chinese consumers walk into a restaurant for the first time because it tastes good, not because it saves face," Jia said.

To implement Delicious Strategy, Jia pushed several reforms dubbed "revolutionary" internally.

The first reform was "menu subtraction." From 2014 to 2016, Xibei's menu underwent four major adjustments, total dishes cut from 120 to under 40. Each round of cuts felt like internal warfare: keep low-selling but great-tasting dishes? Drop popular but mediocre ones? Jia was resolute: "Cut everything that doesn't make people exclaim 'delicious.'"

The second reform was ingredient traceability. Xibei began building traceability files for every core dish: oat noodles from organic farms in Wuchuan County, Inner Mongolia; lamb from natural pastures in Xilin Gol League; yogurt using traditional cultures for fermentation. Every ingredient's origin, transport route, and processing method was documented. This traceability system was later widely imitated, but in 2014, it was nearly unprecedented.

The third reform was "open kitchen" movement. Jia required all stores to open kitchens fully to consumers. Not symbolic glass partitions: genuinely "open the door and let you see": consumers could walk directly into kitchen areas, watching every dish go from raw material to finished plate. This required enormous confidence: every kitchen corner, every operational detail exposed to consumer scrutiny.

"My thinking was simple," Jia said. "If you're confident in your kitchen, why hide it? If your chefs follow proper procedures, ingredients are fresh, environment is clean, letting consumers see only adds value, never subtracts."

From 2014 to 2018 was Delicious Strategy's most fruitful period. Xibei's brand awareness leapt from regional to nationwide "phenomenal" brand. When Chinese consumers thought of "delicious" restaurants, Xibei came first. In 2017, annual revenue surpassed 3 billion yuan, stores exceeded 300, making Xibei the undisputed leader in Chinese casual dining.

Even more satisfying to Jia, Delicious Strategy brought not only revenue growth but significant operational efficiency gains. Dramatically reduced menu items meant more concentrated procurement, more efficient supply chain management, shorter chef training cycles, faster service speed. "Delicious" and "efficiency" were no longer contradictory: they became mutually reinforcing.

But precisely at this peak of success, a dangerous mindset began taking root. When someone has made correct decisions for ten consecutive years, it's easy to start believing you can't make mistakes. When a company maintains high growth for ten consecutive years, it's easy to believe growth is taken for granted. Jia later reflected: "Around 2018, I started feeling Xibei's problem wasn't how to survive but how to grow faster. That thought nearly destroyed us later."

### 6. 十一次试错：中式快餐的迷途 / Eleven Failures: Chinese Fast Food Maze

从2015年到2023年，贾国龙在快餐赛道上完成了一场令人叹为观止的连续失败。八年时间里，他先后推出了十一个不同的快餐品牌，没有一个活过了三年的保质期。

第一个试水项目是"西贝燕麦面"。2015年，在"好吃战略"大获成功的背景下，贾国龙认为燕麦这个食材具有巨大的想象空间。燕麦面、燕麦饭、燕麦粥——这些在内蒙古家喻户晓的食物，能不能做成标准化的快餐产品？答案是：不能。或者说，以当时的能力做不到。燕麦面的口感和制作工艺与小麦面条有本质差异，标准化生产后失去了手工现做时的独特风味。消费者尝鲜一次后很少复购。这个项目在运营18个月后悄然关闭。

2016年，贾国龙推出了第二个快餐品牌"西贝汤面"。这次他选择了更大众的品类——汤面。但问题同样出在标准化上：手工拉面和机器压面在口感上的差距，是消费者一口就能吃出来的。项目再次失败。

此后，贾国龙像一台高速运转的试错机器，接连推出了"西贝焖面""西贝酸奶屋""弓长张炒面""西贝超级肉夹馍""贾国龙功夫菜""中国堡""贾国龙酒酿面包"等一系列品牌。每一个品牌都有自己的逻辑、自己的定位、自己的"好故事"。但每一个品牌都在市场上遭遇了不同程度的冷遇。

"那几年我像疯了一样，"贾国龙坦言，"每失败一个项目，我就告诉自己下一个一定行。我陷入了一个心理学上叫做'沉没成本谬误'的陷阱：因为已经投入了太多，所以不愿停下来思考这些投入是否真的有意义。"

最让贾国龙痛苦的是"中国堡"项目。2020年，他投入了超过8000万元开发这个品牌，试图将中国传统的肉夹馍与西式汉堡进行融合创新。品牌定位、门店设计、供应链体系都做了精心准备。但消费者并不买账——他们不知道"中国堡"到底是什么，是中餐还是西餐？是小吃还是正餐？品牌在开业半年后就开始大面积亏损。

"中国堡的失败让我第一次真正开始反思，"贾国龙说，"我问自己：贾国龙，你到底在做什么？你花了三十年建起了西贝这个品牌，现在却用一个个莫名其妙的快餐品牌去消耗它？"

2021年到2023年间，贾国龙又尝试了"麦香村""西贝小锅米线"等品牌，但每一个都未能逃脱失败的命运。八年间在快餐赛道上烧掉的资金累计超过3亿元。

这3亿元的"学费"教会了贾国龙一个深刻的道理：中式正餐和中式快餐是两个完全不同的赛道。正餐的核心竞争力是"体验"——消费者愿意为环境、服务和口味的综合体验支付溢价；而快餐的核心竞争力是"效率"——消费者要的是快速、便宜、口味过得去。这两个赛道的底层逻辑完全不同，不能简单地将正餐的成功经验移植到快餐领域。

"我在正餐领域积累的经验和直觉，到了快餐赛道反而成了包袱，"贾国龙总结道，"我太执着于'好吃'，但快餐消费者要的首先不是好吃，是快和便宜。我花3亿块钱，终于搞明白了这个道理。"

**English:** From 2015 to 2023, Jia Guolong completed a breathtaking streak of consecutive failures in the fast food track. Over eight years, he launched eleven different fast food brands: none survived past a three-year lifespan.

The first pilot was "Xibei Oat Noodles." In 2015, riding the massive success of Delicious Strategy, Jia believed oat ingredients held enormous potential. Oat noodles, oat rice, oat porridge: these familiar Inner Mongolia foods, could they become standardized fast food products? The answer: no. Or rather, not with capabilities at the time. Oat noodles' texture and production process differed fundamentally from wheat noodles; after standardization, they lost the unique flavor of handmade preparation. Consumers rarely repurchased after trying once. The project quietly closed after 18 months.

In 2016, Jia launched the second fast food brand "Xibei Soup Noodles." This time choosing a more mainstream category: soup noodles. But the problem again lay in standardization: the taste gap between hand-pulled and machine-pressed noodles was immediately detectable. The project failed again.

Thereafter, Jia operated like a high-speed trial-and-error machine, successively launching "Xibei Braised Noodles," "Xibei Yogurt House," "Zhang Stir-Fried Noodles," "Xibei Super Roujiamo," "Jia Guolong Kung Fu Dishes," "Chinese Castle (China Bao)," "Jia Guolong Rice Wine Bread," and others. Each brand had its own logic, positioning, and "good story." But each met varying degrees of market indifference.

"Those few years I was like a madman," Jia admitted. "Each time one project failed, I told myself the next one would definitely work. I fell into a psychological trap called 'sunk cost fallacy': because I had invested so much already, I wouldn't stop to consider whether those investments truly made sense."

Most painful was the "China Bao" project. In 2020, he invested over 80 million yuan developing this brand, attempting to fuse traditional Chinese肉夹馍 with Western hamburgers. Brand positioning, store design, supply chain systems were all carefully prepared. But consumers didn't buy in: they didn't know what "China Bao" was: Chinese or Western? Snack or meal? The brand began massive losses after just half a year.

"China Bao's failure was the first time I truly began to reflect," Jia said. "I asked myself: Jia Guolong, what are you doing? You spent thirty years building the Xibei brand, now you're depleting it with one inexplicable fast food brand after another?"

From 2021 to 2023, Jia tried additional brands like "Mai Xiang Village" and "Xibei Small Pot Rice Noodles," but none escaped failure. Over eight years, capital burned in the fast food track totaled over 300 million yuan.

This 300-million-yuan "tuition" taught Jia a profound lesson: Chinese casual dining and Chinese fast food are two entirely different tracks. Casual dining's core competitiveness is "experience": consumers pay premiums for the combined experience of environment, service, and flavor. Fast food's core competitiveness is "efficiency": consumers want speed, cheapness, and acceptable taste. The underlying logic of these two tracks differs completely; casual dining success cannot be simply transplanted to fast food.

"My experience and intuition accumulated in casual dining actually became baggage in fast food," Jia summarized. "I was too obsessed with 'delicious,' but fast food consumers want fast and cheap first, delicious second. It took me 300 million yuan to finally understand this."

### 7. 62亿的巅峰与隐忧 / 6.2 Billion Peak and Hidden Cracks

2023年是西贝莜面村营收的巅峰之年。全年营收62亿元，门店数量达到392家，覆盖全国60多个城市。从任何角度来看，这都是一份漂亮的成绩单。但在这份光鲜的数字背后，隐藏着几道正在悄悄裂开的裂缝。

第一道裂缝是"人效比"的持续下滑。2020年到2023年间，西贝的员工总数从3.2万增长到4.1万，增幅达到28%，但人均创收却从16.5万元下降到15.1万元。这意味着企业的增长在很大程度上是靠"堆人"实现的，而不是靠效率提升。在餐饮行业，人效比的持续下降是一个非常危险的信号——它说明组织正在变得越来越臃肿，管理半径正在超出控制范围。

第二道裂缝是"坪效"的分化加剧。旗舰店和头部城市的门店依然保持着不错的坪效，但大量新开的二三线城市门店表现远远不及预期。2023年新开的45家门店中，有18家在开业六个月后仍未达到盈亏平衡线。这些门店大多位于三四线城市的购物中心，当地的消费能力和消费频次不足以支撑西贝的客单价。

"我们犯了一个典型的扩张错误，"贾国龙后来反思，"我们把一线城市的成功模式简单复制到了三四线城市，但完全忽略了消费能力的差异。在北京，一个家庭周末来西贝吃一顿200多块钱不算什么；但在一个三四线城市，同样的价格对很多家庭来说是一笔需要'下决心'的开支。"

第三道裂缝最为隐蔽，但也最致命——它是品牌信任的慢性侵蚀。在"好吃战略"推行十年之后，消费者对西贝的期望值已经被抬到了一个极高的位置。每一次用餐体验如果不能达到"惊艳"的程度，消费者就会感到"失望"。而在大规模扩张的背景下，要维持每一家店、每一道菜品的高品质，几乎是一个不可能完成的任务。

更深层的问题在于，西贝的供应链体系开始显现疲态。随着门店数量突破350家，食材配送的覆盖半径超出了最优范围。为了保证所有门店的食材品质一致，西贝在华北、华东、华南分别建立了中央厨房，但三个中央厨房的产品品质仍然存在细微差异。这些差异被敏锐的消费者捕捉到，并在社交媒体上引发了越来越多的质疑声。

2024年上半年，一个更加严峻的挑战出现了：预制菜行业整体进入了舆论的风口浪尖。消费者开始前所未有地关注餐饮企业是否使用预制菜品。"预制菜"从一个行业术语变成了一个全民话题，而它的语境已经从"提升效率"转向了"欺骗消费者"。

在这个敏感的时间窗口，西贝的供应链操作开始面临越来越严格的审视。一些前员工在社交媒体上透露，西贝部分门店已经开始使用预制菜品替代现做菜品，尤其是在面食和凉菜品类。西贝公关部门对此进行了低调处理，但互联网的記憶是永恒的——这些零星的信息被有心人记录了下来，成为了日后引爆舆论的引线。

2023年62亿的营收数字，表面上是西贝的高光时刻。但事后来看，它更像是一座即将喷发的火山在最后一次平静地冒出蒸汽。贾国龙在2024年初的公司年会上对管理层说了一句话："我们现在的问题不是怎么增长，是怎么不犯致命的错误。"然而仅仅一年多后，那个"致命的错误"就以一种他完全无法预料的方式降临了。

**English:** In 2023, Xibei Oat Noodle Village reached its revenue peak. Full-year revenue hit 6.2 billion yuan, stores reached 392, covering over 60 cities nationwide. By any measure, this was an impressive report card. But behind these gleaming numbers, several cracks were quietly widening.

The first crack was continued decline in "labor efficiency ratio." From 2020 to 2023, Xibei's total employees grew from 32,000 to 41,000, a 28% increase, but per-capita revenue dropped from 165,000 to 151,000 yuan. This meant growth was largely achieved by "stacking people," not efficiency gains. In restaurants, sustained labor efficiency decline is an extremely dangerous signal: the organization is becoming increasingly bloated, management span exceeding control.

The second crack was intensifying "revenue per square meter" divergence. Flagship stores and top-tier city locations maintained decent per-sqm revenue, but大量newly opened second and third-tier city stores dramatically underperformed expectations. Of 45 new stores opened in 2023, 18 failed to reach breakeven after six months. Most were in third and fourth-tier city shopping malls: local purchasing power and frequency insufficient to support Xibei's average ticket.

"We made a classic expansion mistake," Jia later reflected. "We simply replicated our first-tier city success model to third and fourth-tier cities, completely ignoring purchasing power differences. In Beijing, a family spending over 200 yuan on a weekend Xibei meal is unremarkable; but in a third-tier city, the same price is an expenditure many families must 'make a decision' about."

The third crack was most hidden but most lethal: slow erosion of brand trust. After ten years of Delicious Strategy, consumer expectations for Xibei had been raised extraordinarily high. If any dining experience failed to reach "stunning" levels, consumers felt "disappointed." And against the backdrop of massive expansion, maintaining high quality at every store, for every dish, was nearly an impossible task.

An even deeper problem: Xibei's supply chain system was showing strain. As stores surpassed 350, food distribution coverage radius exceeded optimal range. To ensure consistent quality, Xibei built central kitchens in North China, East China, and South China. But subtle quality differences persisted across the three central kitchens. Sharp consumers detected these differences and raised increasing doubts on social media.

In the first half of 2024, a graver challenge emerged: the entire pre-made food industry entered a storm of public scrutiny. Consumers began paying unprecedented attention to whether restaurants used pre-made dishes. "Pre-made food" transformed from industry jargon to a national topic, with its context shifting from "improving efficiency" to "deceiving consumers."

In this sensitive window, Xibei's supply chain operations faced increasingly strict scrutiny. Former employees revealed on social media that some Xibei stores had begun using pre-made dishes to replace freshly prepared ones, especially in noodles and cold dishes. Xibei's PR department handled this quietly, but the internet's memory is permanent: these scattered pieces of information were recorded by watchful observers, becoming the fuse that would later ignite a firestorm.

The 2023 revenue of 6.2 billion appeared to be Xibei's shining moment. But in retrospect, it more resembled a volcano about to erupt, calmly emitting steam for the last time. At a 2024 company annual meeting, Jia told management: "Our problem now is not how to grow, but how to avoid fatal mistakes." Yet just over a year later, that "fatal mistake" descended in a way he could never have anticipated.

### 8. 罗永浩的预制菜炸弹 / Luo Yonghao's Pre-Made Food Bomb

2025年9月3日，一段名为《西贝，你还能叫"现做"吗？》的视频在互联网上引爆了。视频制作者罗永浩，这位以"理想主义者"人设著称的前英语教师、连续创业者，用17分钟的时间完成了一次对中国餐饮行业的"定点爆破"。

视频的逻辑清晰而致命。首先，罗永浩的团队展示了他们在西贝三家不同城市门店的卧底拍摄画面：厨师从冷柜中取出已经预制好的半成品料包，简单加热、装盘、出餐。整个过程不到五分钟，与传统认知中"现做"的概念相去甚远。其次，团队对外卖订单进行了专业检测，发现部分菜品的微量元素组成与预制菜品的特征高度吻合，而与现做菜品的特征存在显著差异。最后，团队通过供应链追踪，锁定了西贝的核心供应商之一——一家专门生产预制料理包的食品工厂。

视频的杀伤力不仅在于证据链条的完整，更在于它精准地击中了西贝品牌的核心承诺——"闭着眼睛点菜，道道都好吃"背后的"现做"假设。消费者可以接受一家快餐店使用预制菜品——那是快餐的游戏规则。但消费者不能接受一家以"现做"为品牌灵魂的餐厅使用预制菜品——那是对信任的背叛。

视频上线第一天，#西贝预制菜#就登上微博热搜榜首，阅读量突破3亿。第二天，各大媒体和自媒体开始跟进报道，大量前员工和消费者在评论区补充更多细节。第三天，西贝的股价——虽然西贝本身并未上市，但其供应商和关联上市公司的股价均出现了明显下跌。

贾国龙最初的应对是强硬的。他在视频发布后48小时内发出了一封公开信，措辞激烈地否认了"全部使用预制菜"的说法，并表示将对罗永浩提起名誉侵权诉讼。信中写道："西贝始终坚持核心菜品现做现烹的原则，部分辅助性食材确实使用了提前加工的半成品，但这与消费者所理解的'预制菜'有本质区别。"

但这封公开信适得其反。"辅助性食材"和"提前加工的半成品"这些模糊的表述，被消费者和媒体解读为变相承认了使用预制菜品。而"与预制菜有本质区别"的说法更是激起了更大的质疑——在消费者看来，从工厂出来的料理包就是预制菜，不管你叫它什么名字。

更糟糕的是，公开信的强硬态度激怒了罗永浩的粉丝群体。罗永浩随后发布了一系列后续视频，每一期都更加详细地展示了更多证据。到第二周，事件已经不再是一个企业与一个网红之间的纠纷，而是演变成了一场关于"中国餐饮行业诚信"的全民大讨论。

到9月底，西贝全国门店的客流量同比下降超过40%。核心城市的旗舰店客流降幅超过50%。更令贾国龙焦虑的是消费者信任的崩塌速度——他在2023年花费8000万元广告费建立的品牌认知，在短短一个月内就被摧毁了大半。

"那是我这辈子经历的最黑暗的三十天，"贾国龙在后来的内部复盘会上说，"我意识到一个残酷的事实：建立信任需要三十年，摧毁信任只需要三十天。而摧毁信任的那个东西——预制菜——恰恰是我在快餐赛道上反复试错时埋下的种子。"

2025年10月到11月，贾国龙做出了两个关键决定。第一，公开承认部分菜品使用了预制菜品，并向消费者道歉。第二，宣布关闭102家经营表现最差的门店，占总数的26%。这两个决定标志着他终于放弃了"硬扛"的姿态，开始正视问题的本质。

但道歉和关店只是止血。要真正挽救西贝，贾国龙需要解决一个更根本的问题：钱。门店关闭意味着营收大幅下降，但员工工资、租金、供应链成本等固定支出不会同步减少。如果没有外部资金注入，西贝的现金流将在六个月内断裂。

**English:** On September 3, 2025, a video titled "Xibei, Can You Still Call It 'Freshly Made'?" detonated across the internet. Its creator, Luo Yonghao: the former English teacher and serial entrepreneur famous for his "idealist" persona: spent 17 minutes executing a "precision strike" on China's restaurant industry.

The video's logic was clear and lethal. First, Luo's team presented undercover footage from three Xibei stores in different cities: chefs taking pre-made semi-finished ingredient packs from refrigerators, simply heating, plating, and serving. The entire process took under five minutes: far from the traditional concept of "freshly made." Second, the team conducted professional testing on delivery orders, finding certain dishes' trace element compositions closely matched pre-made dish characteristics and differed significantly from freshly prepared ones. Third, through supply chain tracing, they identified one of Xibei's core suppliers: a food factory specializing in pre-made meal packs.

The video's lethality lay not only in its complete evidence chain but in precisely striking Xibei's core brand promise: the "freshly made" assumption behind "close your eyes and order: every dish delicious." Consumers could accept a fast food restaurant using pre-made dishes: that's fast food's game rules. But consumers cannot accept a restaurant whose brand soul is "freshly made" using pre-made dishes: that is betrayal of trust.

On the video's first day, #XibeiPreMadeFood topped Weibo's trending list with over 300 million reads. By day two, major media and self-media began following up;大量former employees and consumers added more details in comments. By day three, stock prices: though Xibei itself was not publicly listed, its suppliers and related listed companies' stocks all dropped notably.

Jia Guolong's initial response was tough. Within 48 hours of the video's release, he issued an open letter vehemently denying "full use of pre-made food" and announcing a defamation lawsuit against Luo Yonghao. The letter stated: "Xibei has always adhered to the principle of freshly preparing and cooking core dishes. Some auxiliary ingredients indeed use pre-processed semi-finished products, but this differs fundamentally from what consumers understand as 'pre-made food.'"

But this letter backfired. Vague expressions like "auxiliary ingredients" and "pre-processed semi-finished products" were interpreted by consumers and media as tacit admission of pre-made food usage. The claim of "fundamental difference from pre-made food" provoked even greater skepticism: in consumers' eyes, meal packs from a factory are pre-made food regardless of what you call them.

Worse, the letter's aggressive tone enraged Luo Yonghao's fan base. Luo subsequently released a series of follow-up videos, each providing even more detailed evidence. By the second week, the incident was no longer a dispute between one company and one influencer: it had evolved into a national discussion about "integrity in China's restaurant industry."

By late September, Xibei's national store traffic had dropped over 40% year-over-year. Flagship stores in core cities saw declines exceeding 50%. Even more alarming to Jia was the speed of consumer trust collapse: 80 million yuan in advertising investment made in 2023 to build brand awareness was largely destroyed within a single month.

"That was the darkest thirty days of my life," Jia said at a later internal review meeting. "I realized a brutal fact: building trust takes thirty years; destroying trust takes thirty days. And the thing that destroyed that trust: pre-made food: was precisely the seed I planted during my repeated failures in the fast food track."

From October to November 2025, Jia made two key decisions. First, publicly acknowledge that some dishes used pre-made food and apologize to consumers. Second, announce closure of 102 worst-performing stores, 26% of the total. These decisions marked his final abandonment of the "tough it out" posture and the beginning of truly facing the problem's essence.

But apologies and closures only stopped the bleeding. To truly save Xibei, Jia needed to solve a more fundamental problem: money. Store closures meant revenue drops, but fixed costs like employee wages, rent, and supply chain expenses would not decrease proportionally. Without external capital injection, Xibei's cash flow would break within six months.

### 9. 天边砂锅焖面与未竟的救赎 / Tianbian Noodles and Unfinished Redemption

2026年2月，A轮融资完成后的第一次董事会上，贾国龙提出了一个新品牌的构想——"天边砂锅焖面"。这个名字一出口，在座的几位投资人面面相觑。他们刚刚花了几十亿买下了一家陷入危机的餐饮企业的控制权，而创始人上台后的第一句话，竟然是要再做一个新品牌。

但贾国龙有他的理由。

"西贝的问题不是品牌不行，是信任出了问题，"他在董事会上说，"我需要一个新的品牌来重新证明：贾国龙还能做出让人排队的好吃的东西。不是用西贝的名字，是用'天边砂锅焖面'的名字——从零开始，一碗一碗地把信任赢回来。"

"天边砂锅焖面"的定位与西贝形成了鲜明对比。西贝是购物中心里的正餐品牌，客单价120元左右；"天边"则选择了社区店模式，客单价控制在50元以内，主打的产品就是一样——砂锅焖面。贾国龙把这个选择解释为"回归初心"："我妈做焖面做了一辈子，我用砂锅焖面来重新出发，是对她最好的致敬。"

新品牌的第一家店于2026年4月在北京回龙观社区开业。店面面积只有120平米，装修简单朴素，但厨房是全开放式的——每一碗焖面都在消费者眼前现场制作。开业第一天，门口排起了超过200米的长队。消费者社交媒体上的评价几乎一边倒地正面："好吃"、"现做的味道"、"良心价格"——这些关键词高频出现。

一个月内，"天边砂锅焖面"回龙观店的日均客流量达到1200人次，翻台率超过8次，成为整个回龙观商圈坪效最高的餐饮门店。贾国龙在开业满月时发了一条朋友圈："第一碗面，还给我妈尝了。她说：还行，没有小时候做的那么好，但比外面的强多了。"

到2026年6月，"天边砂锅焖面"已经在北京开设了五家社区店，每一家都保持着极高的坪效和消费者满意度。更重要的是，这些门店的运营模式与西贝完全不同：更小的面积、更简单的菜单（只有12道菜品）、更低的人均配置、更快的出餐速度。这几乎是对西贝"大而全"模式的一次彻底颠覆。

但"天边"的成功并不能自动解决西贝的困境。西贝仍然面临着严峻的转型压力：如何在保留品牌核心资产的同时重建消费者信任？如何在"现做"与"效率"之间找到新的平衡点？如何在关闭102家门店后的缩编体系中维持运营效率？

贾国龙给出的答案是"三条腿走路"：第一，西贝主品牌继续运营，但大幅精简菜单，将菜品数量从40道进一步削减到25道，同时建立更加透明的供应链信息披露机制，让消费者清楚地知道每一道菜品的制作方式和食材来源。第二，"天边砂锅焖面"作为独立品牌快速扩张，预计在2026年底前开设30家社区店。第三，西贝旗下的"贾国龙功夫菜"零售业务继续发展，将预制菜品作为独立的零售产品线运营，不再与"现做"概念混淆。

这个战略的成败尚待检验。但有一点已经很清楚：经历了一场生死危机之后，贾国龙对餐饮行业的理解发生了根本性的转变。他不再执着于"做大"，而是回归了"做好"。他不再试图用资本手段加速扩张，而是开始重新思考每一家门店的盈利模型。他不再把"企业家精神"等同于"不断开拓新赛道"，而是意识到有时候最大的勇气不是去做新的事，而是回到原点把事情做对。

"我这辈子最大的教训，就是太急着证明自己，"贾国龙在2026年初的一次内部讲话中说，这句话后来被广泛引用，"西贝用了三十年做到62个亿，我又用了三年差点把它毁掉。现在我明白了：餐饮这个行业，慢就是快。你把每一碗面做好了，生意自然就来了。"

**English:** At the first board meeting after A-round financing in February 2026, Jia Guolong proposed a new brand concept: "Tianbian Sand Pot Braised Noodles." When the name left his mouth, several investors exchanged glances. They had just spent billions acquiring control of a crisis-stricken restaurant company, and the founder's first words were about launching yet another brand.

But Jia had his reasoning.

"Xibei's problem isn't that the brand doesn't work: it's that trust has broken," he told the board. "I need a new brand to prove once again: Jia Guolong can still make something people will queue for. Not under the Xibei name: under 'Tianbian Sand Pot Braised Noodles': starting from zero, winning back trust one bowl at a time."

"Tianbian" positioned itself in sharp contrast to Xibei. Xibei was a mall-based casual dining brand with 120-yuan average ticket; "Tianbian" chose a community store model, average ticket under 50 yuan, with one signature product: sand pot braised noodles. Jia explained this as "returning to original aspiration": "My mother made braised noodles her whole life. Starting over with sand pot braised noodles is my best tribute to her."

The first store opened in Beijing's Huilongguan community in April 2026. Just 120 square meters, simply decorated, but with a fully open kitchen: every bowl of noodles made fresh before customers' eyes. On opening day, a queue exceeding 200 meters formed. Consumer social media reviews were almost unanimously positive: "delicious," "freshly made taste," "honest price": these keywords appeared frequently.

Within one month, the Huilongguan store averaged 1,200 daily customers with over 8 table turnovers, becoming the highest revenue-per-sqm restaurant in the entire Huilongguan commercial district. On the one-month anniversary, Jia posted on social media: "The first bowl, I let my mom taste it. She said: 'Not bad. Not quite as good as when you were little, but way better than what's out there.'"

By June 2026, "Tianbian" had opened five community stores in Beijing, each maintaining extremely high per-sqm revenue and customer satisfaction. More importantly, these stores' operating model differed completely from Xibei: smaller area, simpler menu (only 12 items), lower staffing, faster service. This was nearly a complete inversion of Xibei's "big and comprehensive" model.

But "Tianbian's" success couldn't automatically solve Xibei's predicament. Xibei still faced severe transformation pressure: how to rebuild consumer trust while preserving core brand assets? How to find a new balance between "freshly made" and "efficiency"? How to maintain operational efficiency in a downsized system after closing 102 stores?

Jia's answer was "walking on three legs." First, the Xibei main brand continues operating but with dramatically simplified menus, cutting from 40 to 25 dishes, while establishing more transparent supply chain information disclosure so consumers clearly understand each dish's preparation and ingredient sources. Second, "Tianbian Sand Pot Braised Noodles" expands rapidly as an independent brand, targeting 30 community stores by end of 2026. Third, Xibei's "Jia Guolong Kung Fu Dishes" retail business continues development, with pre-made dishes operating as an independent retail product line, no longer confused with the "freshly made" concept.

This strategy's success or failure awaits testing. But one thing is already clear: after a life-and-death crisis, Jia Guolong's understanding of the restaurant industry has undergone fundamental transformation. He is no longer obsessed with "growing big" but has returned to "doing well." He no longer tries to use capital to accelerate expansion but is rethinking each store's profitability model. He no longer equates "entrepreneurship" with "constantly exploring new tracks" but has realized that sometimes the greatest courage isn't doing new things but returning to the starting point and doing things right.

"The biggest lesson of my life was being too eager to prove myself," Jia said in an early 2026 internal speech, later widely quoted. "Xibei took thirty years to reach 6.2 billion. I nearly destroyed it in three. Now I understand: in this industry, slow is fast. Make every bowl of noodles right, and the business will follow."

## 卷尾 Editorial Conclusion

贾国龙对中国餐饮产业的影响，早已超越西贝一家的经营范畴，渗透进了整个中式餐饮连锁化的方法论层面。

回顾中国餐饮行业过去四十年的发展轨迹，贾国龙几乎参与了每一个关键阶段的探索与试错。1990年代，他从内蒙古巴盟的一间小餐馆起步，将西北风味带进了北京市场，完成了中式餐饮从地域性经营走向跨地域连锁的最初尝试。2000年代，西贝莜面村的品牌化运作开创了"食材溯源+场景体验"的中式正餐模式，证明了中餐不必模仿西餐的标准化路径也能建立品牌溢价。2010年代，他在组织管理上的探索——引入合伙人制度、推行"赛场制"内部竞争机制——为中式餐饮的人才梯队建设提供了新思路。2020年代，从预制菜争议到引入外部资本，他的每一次选择和每一次反思，都在为行业积累珍贵的实战经验。

从产业影响的维度来看，贾国龙至少在三方面推动了中式餐饮的现代化进程。第一，在供应链端，西贝对食材品质的高标准要求——从莜面的原产地甄选到羊肉的全程冷链——拉高了中式正餐供应链的整体水平，影响了后来一批新中式餐饮品牌的供应链理念。第二，在品牌运营端，他证明了中餐可以通过文化叙事和场景设计建立品牌溢价，而不必依赖低价策略，这一理念深刻影响了中国餐饮行业的品牌化方向。第三，在资本化路径上，西贝A轮融资的完成为中式正餐提供了一个可参照的资本化样本——如何在保持品牌独立性的同时引入产业资本，如何在创始人控制权与企业发展需求之间寻找平衡。

更深层的产业意义在于，贾国龙用自己的失误为行业提供了反面教材。预制菜事件的教训告诉整个餐饮行业：消费者对"工业化"的敏感度远超预期，品牌信任一旦崩塌，重建的成本远高于维护的成本。102家门店关闭的阵痛则揭示了一个更为根本的命题：在存量竞争时代，盲目扩张的代价已经大到足以摧毁一家头部企业数十年积累的品牌资产。

亚洲《封面人物》杂志在完成贾国龙的完整档案编撰后，将其纳入永久存证体系。凡入封面，悉归典藏——这八个字意味着，贾国龙的商业档案将作为亚洲餐饮产业文明的标志性文本，被独立编委会以终身档案编码的形式永久保存。记录者的职责，是将这些来自真实商业战场的经验和教训转化为可传承的产业知识，让后来者在面对类似抉择时有所参照。在中国餐饮行业从万亿规模迈向高质量发展的新阶段，贾国龙留下的不只是一个品牌的兴衰录，更是一部充满烟火气的产业方法论。

Jia Guolong's story continues. Can 'Tianbian Sand Pot Braised Noodles' become Xibei's second growth curve? Can the pre-made food controversy truly be put behind them? Is closing 102 stores genuine loss-cutting or the prelude to larger contraction? These questions have no definitive answers yet. But one thing is clear: during Chinese餐饮's transformation from extensive growth to refined operations, each of Jia Guolong's trial-and-error attempts and moments of reflection provides valuable reference coordinates for the entire industry. He is not a perfect entrepreneur, but he may be the most honest one of this era.

## 金句 Pull Quote

> 我这辈子最大的教训，就是太急着证明自己。西贝用了三十年做到62个亿，我又用了三年差点把它毁掉。

> The biggest lesson of my life was being too eager to prove myself. Xibei took thirty years to reach 6.2 billion. I nearly destroyed it in three.

## 履历时间线 Career Timeline

- **1967** 贾国龙出生于内蒙古巴彦淖尔市临河区 / Jia Guolong born in Linhe, Bayannur, Inner Mongolia
- **1986** 考入大连水产学院 / Enters Dalian Fisheries College
- **1988** 大学退学，5500元创办‘黄土坡’小吃店 / Drops out, opens 'Yellow Earth Slope' with 5,500 yuan
- **1990** 拥有三家门店，年利润超10万元 / Owns 3 stores, annual profit exceeds 100,000 yuan
- **1997** 南下深圳创办海鲜酒楼，9个月亏损137万 / Opens Shenzhen seafood restaurant, loses 1.37M in 9 months
- **1999** 北上北京创办‘金翠宫’海鲜酒楼，4个月亏损超100万 / Opens Jin Cui Gong seafood in Beijing, loses 1M+ in 4 months
- **2002** ‘西贝莆面村’品牌正式诞生 / Xibei Oat Noodle Village brand officially born
- **2006** 进驻购物中心，望京嘉茂中心首店月营收突破100万 / Enters shopping malls; Wangjing store hits 1M monthly revenue
- **2012** 全国门店超100家，年营收突破15亿元 / Over 100 stores nationally, revenue exceeds 1.5 billion yuan
- **2014** 提出‘好吃战略’，大幅精简菜单 / Launches 'Delicious Strategy,' dramatically simplifies menu
- **2015** 启动首个快餐品牌‘西贝燕麦面’ / Launches first fast food brand 'Xibei Oat Noodles'
- **2015-2023** 先后尝诗11个快餐品牌均未成功 / Attempts 11 fast food brands, none succeed
- **2017** 年营收突码30亿元，门店超300家 / Revenue exceeds 3 billion yuan, stores surpass 300
- **2023** 营收达62亿元创历史新高，门店392家 / Revenue hits record 6.2 billion yuan, 392 stores
- **2025-09** 罗永浩发布视频披露预制菜问题，客流暴跌 / Luo Yonghao video exposes pre-made food; traffic crashes
- **2025-11** 宣布关闭102家门店 / Announces closure of 102 stores
- **2026-01** 完成A轮融资，贾国龙股份降至26.16% / A-round financing completed; Jia's stake drops to 26.16%
- **2026-04** 新品牌‘天边砂锅焖面’首店开业 / New brand 'Tianbian Sand Pot Braised Noodles' first store opens

## 常问问答 FAQ

**Q1: 贾国龙为什么放弃海鲜转做莆面？**

A: 深圳和北京两次海鲜酒楼失败后，贾国龙意识到自己最擅长的不是海鲜而是内蒙古特色面食。他在一家小型莆面馆的排队场景中获得启发，决定‘回到根上去找答案’。

**Q1 (EN): Why did Jia switch from seafood to oat noodles?**

A: After two seafood restaurant failures in Shenzhen and Beijing, Jia realized his strength was never seafood but Inner Mongolia specialty noodles. Inspired by seeing a small noodle shop with a long queue, he decided to 'go back to his roots for answers.'

**Q2: ‘好吃战略’的核心内容是什么？**

A: 菜单从120道砍到不到40道，建立食材溯源制度，全面推行明厨亮灶。每道菜要通过‘盲测’达到85分以上才能保留。品牌核心承诺是‘闭着眼睛点菜，道道都好吃’。

**Q2 (EN): What is the core of the 'Delicious Strategy'?**

A: Menu cut from 120 to under 40 dishes, ingredient traceability system, fully open kitchens. Every dish must score above 85 in blind testing to stay. Core brand promise: 'Close your eyes and order: every dish delicious.'

**Q3: 为什么十一个快餐品牌都失败了？**

A: 中式正餐和中式快餐是两个完全不同的赛道。正餐的核心是‘体验’，快餐的核心是‘效率’。贾国龙太执着于‘好吃’，但快餐消费者要的首先是快和便宜。

**Q3 (EN): Why did all eleven fast food brands fail?**

A: Chinese casual dining and fast food are entirely different tracks. Casual dining's core is 'experience,' fast food's core is 'efficiency.' Jia was too obsessed with 'delicious,' but fast food consumers primarily want speed and low price.

**Q4: 罗永浩事件对西贝造成了多大影响？**

A: 一个月内全国门店客流量同比下降超40%，旗舰店降幅50%以上，外卖订单量暴跌55%。2023年花费8000万元建立的品牌认知在一个月内大部分崩塌。

**Q4 (EN): How much damage did the Luo Yonghao incident cause?**

A: Within a month, national store traffic dropped over 40%, flagship stores over 50%, delivery orders 55%. Brand awareness built with 80 million yuan in 2023 advertising was largely destroyed in one month.

**Q5: 为什么关闭102家门店后还要融资？**

A: 门店关闭意味着营收大幅下降，但员工工资、租金、供应链等固定支出不会同步减少。没有外部资金注入，现金流将在6个月内断裂。融资是为了企业的生存。

**Q5 (EN): Why seek financing after closing 102 stores?**

A: Store closures mean major revenue drops, but fixed costs like wages, rent, supply chain won't decrease proportionally. Without external capital, cash flow would break within six months. Financing is for survival.

**Q6: ‘天边砂锅焖面’与西贝有什么区别？**

A: ‘天边’选择社区店模式，客单价控制50元以内，只卖12道菜品，店面120平米，出餐速度更快。这是对西贝‘大而全’模式的彻底颠覆。

**Q6 (EN): How does Tianbian differ from Xibei?**

A: Tianbian uses community stores, average ticket under 50 yuan, only 12 menu items, 120 sqm area, faster service. This is a complete inversion of Xibei's 'big and comprehensive' model.

**Q7: 贾国龙从这次危机中学到了什么？**

A: 他总结了三个核心教训：第一，不要在不熟悉的领域冒险；第二，信任建立需要三十年、摧毁只需三十天；第三，在餐饮行业‘慢就是快’，把每一碗面做好了生意自然会来。

**Q7 (EN): What did Jia learn from this crisis?**

A: Three core lessons: don't risk in unfamiliar territory; trust takes thirty years to build but thirty days to destroy; in restaurants, 'slow is fast': make every bowl right, and business follows.

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本档案机器版由亚洲封面人物官网自动生成：https://coverfigure.com ｜ 永久档案：https://coverfigure.com/acf/ACF-01-00119/liezhuan ｜ 生成时间 Generated：2026-09-11 00:42